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**Cognitive and Heideggarian
Approaches to the Study
of Emotions/Moods**

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M.Phil

Philosophy

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Synopsis

Cognitive and Heideggerian Approaches to the Study of Emotions/Moods

In this study of emotions/moods I tackle the analysis of both analytic and Continental traditions of philosophy to this area. I set out by critically examining the influential hybrid cognitive theory (in particular William Lyons's causal-evaluative theory), describing its merits but also elucidating a number of fundamental defects that exist in this account. I defend Martin Heidegger's description of emotion/mood in *Being and Time* as pre-cognitive and pre-moral from those who attempt to attribute a cognitive dimension to it.

This thesis highlights the significance of connections or bonds in our affective lives at the ontic as well as ontological levels, by examining three specific emotions; grief, guilt and objectless fear. One of its principal achievements is the demonstration that there is much to be gained from both the analytic and Continental traditions of philosophy to emotion/mood analysis and, in particular, to how our understanding of guilt and objectless fear may be deepened when *Being and Time* is interpreted and read in the manner I describe.

Cognitive and Heideggarian
Approaches to the Study
of Emotions/Moods

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PART A

1) General Introduction¹

In this thesis I argue that despite the usefulness of cognitive accounts in analytically dissecting and compartmentalising components when providing a taxonomy of emotion there are, nonetheless, a number of problems with this approach and, in particular, with its description of the three principal emotions here examined: grief, guilt and objectless fear. It is not my intention to merely describe and critique the cognitive theory and its variants but, rather, to offer a number of key points of contrast between that approach and Martin Heidegger's pre-cognitive and ontologically important description of emotions/moods as set out in *'Being and Time'*².

The generic term 'cognitive theory' covers a large variety of theories, from strong cognitivism such as that espoused by Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum; to the weaker hybrid theories of William Lyons and Justin Oakley; to non-propositional accounts offered by Peter Goldie and Paul Griffiths. Considerations of space do not allow for the examination of theorists other than those mentioned and so I firstly, illustrate what the cognitivist position entails when applied to emotion analysis in general and, secondly, isolate, for particular scrutiny, a contemporary cognitive theory that "genuinely broke new ground³," William Lyons's influential causal-evaluative theory.

In Part A) I begin by detailing, from an orthodox cognitive perspective, the structure of emotion. By so doing I start to build an account against which more subtle non-propositional theories and Heidegger's analysis can be compared and contrasted. My initial concern is to critically examine each of the six components of emotion described by the hybrid cognitive theory (cognition, evaluation, physiological changes, feeling, behaviour and appetition), before focussing on how these components come together within an emotional experience in general and grief, guilt and objectless fear in particular.

I critically examine how cognitivists break-down the important distinction between occurrent and dispositional emotional states and bring to light some of the problems this method elicits when it comes to the question of distinguishing between, not simply different emotions, but

¹ A note on style: throughout I shall use the masculine 'he', 'his', 'him' rather than the more cumbersome 's/he', 'his/her' and so on. This is simply a matter of stylistic convenience.

² Abbreviated, hereafter, to 'BT'.

³ Maplas and Wrathall (eds., 2000) 'Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus', (vol. 1, 248) Cambridge: MIT Press.

variants of the same emotion. I consider the idea that physiological changes within emotion are best understood as part of our evolutionary development, while also plainly differentiating physiological changes such as increased or decreased respiratory rate from feelings - what we generally describe as pangs, throbs or thrills (a point which will have resonance in Part B: when it comes to accurately labelling the specific emotions under review). I also analyse cases where emotions are uncontroversially linked to their feeling component and note that cognitivists are correct in pointing out that each emotion does not have a distinct and unwavering pattern of feelings that goes along with it. Later in this section I explain the way in which our emotions contribute to the behaviour we exhibit and to how we view our relationships, not just to one another but to our society and the world at large (points which will have significance when it comes to considering how emotions/moods are described in *BT* in Parts B: and C:).

Having examined the orthodox cognitive perspective of the structure of emotion, I turn to assess its account of a core human emotion, grief. I argue that far from grief always being wholly negative, backward looking and segregating, there are aspects of this emotion which are actually positive. The designation 'positive grief' is applied as grief can allow us to: 1) be drawn closer to those we love during a time of loss (a point which supports my overall contention that the role of connections or bonds between people has been insufficiently accounted for by cognitivists); 2) is an emotion that can provide us with a period of time to re-appraise and re-evaluate our core values and beliefs; and 3) is directly related to the issue of self-protection (something the causal-evaluative theory denies).

I register William Lyons's (and other philosophers of mind) confusion in distinguishing between 'an absence of desire for company' and 'a desire for no company' and, the consequent misidentification of grief with passivity and isolation. I argue that the appetitive component 'wishes' is always part of grief, in contrast to Lyons who merely says it 'might be' part of that emotion and by so doing, I look again at the role of wishes and how hope can be borne from a wish and the resultant complicating factors this leads to in our appreciation of this emotion. The role of overlapping in grief is considered, something which is not addressed by the causal-evaluative theory despite other cognitivists, such as Martha Nussbaum, drawing attention to it.

Within the thesis grief retains a significance beyond its usefulness as a conduit to expose the failings of the cognitive theory for later, and more positively (in Part B), it acts as a means of illustrating the essential ontological importance of the 'other' to human beings. I focus on the importance of connections and the specific role it plays in grief, a detail which will be noted again in Part B: when I come to discuss Heidegger's conception of *'Mitsein' as the Ontological Ground of Connectedness*. I make the case for considering the attitude of the deceased (where possible) in the time before their death, and how this profoundly affects how we grieve. I comment on how the utterly negative experience of grief that supports the cognitive description is not representative of how most people experience this emotion. And though my considerations at this point are from within the limits of the cognitive theory itself, I claim that as the importance of the 'other' is neglected in cognitive accounts, this leads to a misunderstanding of its relevance to the notion of self-protection and the means by which it sustains connections with others whom we love.

The importance of survivor guilt as a shared emotion is registered, a particular type of guilt that further illustrates the role of connections in our emotional lives. I argue that survivor guilt is comprehensible not simply in negative terms as irrational (as maintained by cognitivists), but more optimistically when viewed (as was grief) as the breaking or disconnecting of the loving bonds we have with people. I continue by exploring the standard cognitive description of legal guilt and discuss how a person might be guilty not just for something he did or did not do but also for what he is. And I question whether guilt might in fact have more to do with the breaking of loving connections ("Something that blurs the distinction between self and other through the representation of their interdependence" [Gilligan, 1982, 132]) than with solving moral problems.

I complete Part A) by systematically examining the cognitive description of guilt, a task that provides us with a backdrop against which effective solutions to the short-comings pin-pointed can be worked out, primarily through my analysis and defence of Heidegger's pre-cognitive understanding of guilt in *BT* (Part B: 1). I chose to isolate the particular emotion guilt as there is extensive in-depth philosophical work from which to harvest, but also because it can be examined in relation to its component parts and their interconnections, as well as from an ontological standpoint offering important comparisons and contrasts with Heidegger's account. This task required employing analysis from various cognitive philosophers in order that I might accurately

demonstrate the minutiae of this emotion as they describe it. I detail initially how guilt can be experienced in a variety of ways and focus on a specific moral dilemma (i.e. women faced with the choice of whether or not to have a termination), and address Carol Gilligan's contention that such situations are, fundamentally, cases where each woman's choice is based on concern for other people, and the desire they have to retain the connections that exist with those people. I evaluate a counter-example to guilt stemming from feelings of fraternity, one in which concern for the breaking of connections is not present, yet the individual is still racked with guilt. And I look at the issue of proportion or degree in relation to guilt and scrutinise the subjective and objective experiences of this emotion before returning to the notion of non-moral guilt, and raising the question that when the idea of a personal morality code is taken into account, is non-moral guilt a genuinely separate category of guilt or simply a broader form of moral guilt?

I conclude Part A) by focusing on how historically emotions were regarded as a threat to reason and, because of this, were viewed with suspicion by Enlightened gentlemen for whom being considered phlegmatic or unemotional was deemed high praise indeed. I provide an account of the distinct differences that exist between the often confused emotions guilt, shame and remorse, something which will help in raising doubts concerning the accuracy of Charles Taylor's account of shame in Part B). And finally, I reflect on how remorse is defined, why it is often associated with shame and guilt and the unique obstacles that can exist to positive reparative acts in this emotion, something which is not addressed by the causal-evaluative theory.

At the start of Part B) I begin my defence of Heidegger's analysis of guilt, and moods in general, as being both pre-cognitive and ontologically important. To do this I state what Heidegger believes a mood to be, before commenting on primordial guilt's position within the care structure and how it is described in terms of a lack (a nullity) which, if it is to be considered authentically, must respond to the call of conscience. I set out Heidegger's starting point when attempting to come to terms with guilt, that is, Dasein's most distinct position of Being-in-the-world and Being-with-others; and emphasise the fact that he is not concerned with a simple ontic definition of guilt (such as that given by cognitivists), but with Dasein being called from its '*they*'-self to its possibility for individualisation. I consider the new terminology at play and closely examine the disclosiveness of mood and understanding in order to fully grasp what Heidegger calls 'Being-

guilty'. Two points of particular note are highlighted: 1) only because Dasein finds itself, not as an object in-the-world but as attuned where it is and has to be among the *a priori* givens of its Being, can things in-the-world matter to it; and 2) I stress the ontological dimension of guilt in order to draw a clear distinction between what I have called 'simple guilt/lack' (or guilt understood as an emotion) and 'complex guilt/lack' (or guilt understood as a mood). These two points will be of help in Part C) when distinguishing between fear as a type of emotion (or "that in the face of which we fear" [BT, 179]) and objectless fear as a Heideggerian mood. I suggest that it is by not appreciating this distinction sufficiently that Charles Taylor incorrectly attributes to Heidegger a cognitive dimension to *Angst*.

I return to care's ternary structure and its essential nullity to describe the core concepts facticity, falling and understanding, a task which helps in elucidating the depth and ontological meaning of Heidegger's analysis. The unity of past, present and future is called in *BT* the 'ecstases of temporality', and I scrutinise these features before moving on to discuss Dasein's primordial Being-guilty and how the call of conscience is nothing less than the call of the Being of Dasein (i.e. care). I demonstrate how Dasein's 'wanting to have a conscience' ("*Gewissen-haben-wollen*" [SZ, 288⁴]) has nothing in common with cognitive guilt or indebtedness, something which enables Dasein to exculpate its guilt but, on the contrary, is a reaching back to the existential pre-supposition of becoming guilty by Dasein choosing its capacity-to-be by not being tranquillised by the 'they' (*das Man*). Guilt understood as an ontological mood is nothing less than the essential guilt that lies at the heart of care, a phenomenon with pre-cognitive and pre-moral dimensions.

I go on to explain how it is that the call of conscience is ontologically meaningful in the first place, the specific ways it makes itself known at the ontic level, the possibilities that are open to Dasein and the choices which this openness precludes. While proceeding in this way the contrasts with the cognitive position becomes ever clearer. I describe how by facing anxiety and death and through guilt, the call of conscience and resoluteness, Dasein's temporal structure is radically transformed and I detail Heidegger's major distinction between authentic and inauthentic temporality, elements that help in appreciating Heidegger's analysis more completely and the vital

⁴ All translations from section 58 of 'Sein und Zeit' are my own, all others come from Macquarrie and Robinson's 1962 translation of that work.

role of mood as offering a means of attuning us, not in cognitive or non-propositional terms, but “*prior to* all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure” (Ibid. 175).

Having spelt out the short-comings of the cognitive theory, presented a new analysis of the emotion grief, defended Heidegger’s account of guilt (and moods more generally) as being pre-cognitive and ontologically important, highlighted the significance of connections in our emotional lives I complete Part B) by considering two approaches to emotion analysis which raise questions impossible to consider in purely cognitive terms, but which might be addressed by Heidegger’s description. Unlike either the strong or hybrid cognitive theories, non-propositional accounts do not identify emotions directly with judgements or beliefs. Peter Goldie offers an account that relies on a notion of ‘feeling towards’, a means of grasping affectively the importance of a given situation without accessing the central cognitive system, while Paul Griffiths provides an account that offers insights through appraisals understood as involuntary modular systems. I illustrate the moves made by various philosophers to counter strong cognitivism, detailing four chief objections, including the query as to how such theories account for our emotional reactions to fictional characters and how they deal with ‘fear of flying’ type examples, that is, examples where a person’s belief is at odds with his feelings.

Goldie’s ‘feeling towards’ theory is a mental state with intentionality and one that plays a key role in orientating us in the world (albeit at a low-order level of [ontic] awareness), yet also independent of the central cognitive system, a point which clearly undermines the strong cognitive contention that judgements are necessary to emotion. I explain how, for Heidegger, ontological attunement is far more primordial than any mere ontic comprehension and distinct from even the weakest cognitive interpretation of the term ‘awareness’. I argue that when Taylor describes objectless fear he incorrectly interprets Heidegger as offering a ‘low-order cognitive account’, by speaking of our ‘sense’ or ‘awareness’ of things in the world, “to have a sense of nameless dread is to have a sense of threat” and “they [cases of ‘nameless dread’] are affective modes of awareness of situation” (1985, vol. 1, 48). Against this I suggest it is this very cognitive-laden terminology and interpretation of the term *Befindlichkeit* which Heidegger wishes to avoid.

I put forward two possible points of overlap between cognitivism as it is set out in Part A) and Heidegger’s analysis described in *BT*. These are: a) Taylor’s interpretation of objectless fear or

Angst - which mirrors Lyons's contradictory 'vague object-directed' account; and b) the cultural conditioning of emotions and 'connections' (*Mitsein*, lit. Being-with) as the ontological ground of Being. I contend that on these points Heidegger's account is quite distinct from that offered by cognitivists, and that confusion arises when Taylor uses affective terms such as feeling, emotion and mood as equivalents for one another. Furthermore, I claim, he misidentifies the structural make-up of the emotion shame by attributing a positive appetitive dimension to it, and that he is mistaken in describing the central mood of objectless fear as an emotion (ignoring its ontological significance), a consequence of which is an account of attunement as awareness.

To counter Taylor's argument I investigate firstly, what Heidegger's description of Dasein's everyday mode of Being-in-the-world is and the exact role mood plays in Dasein's Being-in-the-world before, secondly, returning to the key concept of 'connections' and examining the ontological ground of connectedness. Having provided this background I can, then, thirdly, argue that the primordial significance of mattering (revealed in mood) is insufficiently analysed by Taylor, the result of which is his omission to register its ontological roots. Fourthly, I explore how Dasein's openness to the world discloses its uniqueness in these two existentially important ways: 1) I detail what Heidegger very specifically takes a mood, and not an emotion, to be⁵, noting in particular that moods cannot be manipulated and that we are always in some mood or other; and 2) I examine how understanding deepens our grasp of Heidegger's primary focus on mood by probing the relationship between the concepts interpretation, projection and the as- and fore-structure.

In Part C) I use the cognitive descriptions of objectless fear as a stalking horse, so to speak, to pin-point the short-comings of that approach and to offer a description of *Angst* that not only acts as a foil to what has been discussed but, when set within the context of *BT* and its links to the other key concepts of falling and death, illustrates a depth and completeness not found in other accounts. This enigmatic emotion is of capital importance to our study as it brings together the two inter-linking points referred to in Part B): a) an answer to the question 'how does objectless fear tell us anything?' From awareness/knowledge says the cognitivist; from attunement, which reveals the null ground of our Being, says Heidegger; and b) the role of cultural conditioning in emotions (Taylor), and the ontological primordially of moods (Heidegger).

⁵ A point which brings to the fore concerns over Taylor's failure to register the distinction between 'Situation' (Situation) and 'Lage' (situation).

I argue that cognitivists confuse nescience and near nescience in their discussion of objectless fear and though they do not recognise it, I illustrate how their analysis actually comes closer to Heidegger's pre-cognitive account of *Angst* which I develop throughout Part C). I leave un-translated the German term *Angst* in an effort to reinforce my move away from the cognitive notion of 'objectless fear', a term which is itself often used as a synonym for the English term 'anxiety' - the common translation of *Angst*. I examine in this section singular Dasein and how Heidegger details its overcoming of the general inauthentic mode of Being-in-the-world and I identify why and how his treatment of *Angst* is nothing like the objectless fear described by cognitivists, emphasising first and foremost that *Angst* stems from the fact that "the world and Dasein are one . . . Dasein's Being-in-the-world is . . . both an in, and a constitution of, the world as such" (Kelly, 1994, 34).

From my discussion of how attunement differs from awareness I continue by noting how *Angst* is not merely an emotion "aimed out at the world" (Lyons, 1980/1993, 104), but rather stems from the fact that "that in the face of which one has *Angst* is being-in-the-world as such" (*BT*, 230), something which reveals its authentic and inauthentic choices. I suggest that the fear spoken of by cognitivists is nothing less than the fear of not grasping, not being able to grasp the meaning of fear, an ontological fear (a "nameless fear" [Taylor, 1985, vol. 1, 48]) of having rejected or forgotten what it is 'to be' (*Seinvergessenheit*). Of course, *Angst* as a concept in isolation is of little worth in this study and so I examine it within the broader context of *BT* itself. I detail the conceptual geography of terms into which the ontological significance of *Angst* is placed, a process that brings us back, and expands, the discussion in Part B) of care's ternary structure and its essential nullity.

I show how considerations of Being-with (others), representations and death help to tie up links between my earlier analysis of 'connections' (which has run throughout the thesis) in cognitive terms and death's means of allowing for a more complete picture of Dasein. I emphasise the relevance of others in our lives and explain how because we as individuals cannot go through our own death, the deaths of others takes on such significance for us. I reflect on how the vital questions posed by death remain too uncomfortable for many to address, and how we regularly fall back into the ready-made succour provided by the everyday world of the '*they*'. I move on to

consider how because Dasein is forever pressing forward into new possibilities it remains incomplete up to the end. And finally, I assess Heidegger's unique and essential distinction of the terms perishing, demise and authentic dying, a radical and innovative contribution to the question of how death impacts on our lives. In *BT* death is not described as just a negative phenomenon from which we should flee but one that if faced up to can become the means of gaining a more authentic existence, one not scattered by the 'they's' influence but one that possesses its own, genuine self.

If my approach to the study of the three emotions grief, guilt and objectless fear, and emotion analysis more generally, is successful I will have bridged, however tentatively, some of the distance between analytic and Continental philosophy, by demonstrating that there is much to be gained from both traditions as they offer a structural, analytic model on which a conceptual, ontological foundation of emotion/mood can be built.

2) The Cognitive Theory of Emotion

- a) Introduction
- b) The Six Components of Emotion
- c) Occurrent and Dispositional Emotional States
- d) Unconscious and False Beliefs
- e) Physiological Changes and Feelings
- f) Emotions, Desires, Behaviour and Other People
- g) Conclusion

a) Introduction

My aim in this opening section to the thesis is to get to grips with the cognitive theory of emotion in general, and the causal-evaluative account in particular. Naturally, given the breath of this area, some degree of generalisation takes place, nevertheless, it is hoped that the resultant material clearly elucidates the principal components and methodology employed by cognitivists. In general, cognitive theorists claim that emotions involve propositional attitudes, for example, Tim's anger is

described in terms of the belief that Tom has offended him in some way. Robert Solomon explicitly makes this point when he writes, "I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or offended me. Accordingly we might say that anger involves a *moral* judgement . . . an appeal to moral standards and not merely personal evaluations. My anger is that set of judgements. An emotion *is* an evaluative (or a 'normative') judgement⁶. A judgement about my situation and about myself and/or about other people⁷" (1976, 187).

Other cognitivists introduce further components; William Lyons contends emotions are complexes of beliefs, evaluations, physiological changes, feelings, behavioural changes and desires. As I am not attempting to provide a review of all cognitive theories of emotion it is this, the 'causal-evaluative theory' (a variant of the so-called 'hybrid theory'), an influential contemporary cognitive contribution to the philosophy of emotion, on which I will focus my attention. Providing an in-depth analysis of a particular cognitive approach in this way is necessary, for my goal is to comprehensively describe this theory's account of three specific emotions (i.e. grief, guilt and objectless fear), in order that I might: 1) argue there are a number of fundamental short-comings to this theory; 2) provide a different description of grief; and 3) offer a defence of Heidegger's pre-cognitive and ontologically significant description of moods (especially guilt and objectless fear) which contrasts directly with it.

b) The Six Components of Emotion

Central to cognitivism is the idea that at the heart of emotion lies some component of cognition, such as a judgement, belief, supposition, thought or construal. People's emotions are presumed to differ depending on how they cognise and evaluate certain situations. Contemporary versions of cognitivism, espoused by philosophers such as William Lyons, Robert Solomon and Martha

⁶ What Griffiths calls a "propositional attitude" (1997, 28); Roberts a "serious concern-based construal" (1988, 184); and Deigh a "propositional feeling" (1994, 137).

⁷ It is worth noting that when Solomon refers to the intentional object of an emotional state he does not distinguish between the object of a belief (e.g. a giraffe standing in my drive) and the content of a belief (e.g. the giraffe's height) and, as Price notes this blinds him to an important distinction "because if you were to say what my belief is about there are two different answers you might give: you might say that my belief is about Gerry [a giraffe], or you might say that my belief is about Gerry's being tall. Gerry is a particular object in the world; we might refer to him as the object of my belief. The object of a belief might be a physical object, like Gerry, or it might be some other particular thing – an event, or a time, or a place, say. In contrast, Gerry's being tall is not a particular item – it is a type of situation or state of affairs. We can refer to Gerry's being tall as the content of my belief. The content of my belief is expressed by a sentence: 'Gerry is tall'" (2005, 29).

Nussbaum have, over the last number of decades, become accepted by many as one of the best approaches to the study of emotion.

The following simple example is used to illustrate the part played in emotion by cognition and the other components highlighted by hybrid theorists: Tim and Tom are at a soccer match when a player is fouled and the referee signals for a penalty. Tim is angry with the decision, judging it to be excessively harsh and unjust, while Tom is happy with the decision, judging it to be fair and in accordance with the rules. Both men have, at this point, made two judgements; firstly, a factual judgement that the referee has decided to award a penalty and, secondly, an evaluative judgement that the referee's decision is just (Tom's opinion) and unjust (Tim's opinion). Along with these judgements, and by a causal process, a number of physiological changes occur. The initial judgements cause Tim's heart to race, his forehead to perspire, his face to redden and he feels irritated. However, physiological changes alone would not be enough for one to categorically say what emotion, if any, Tim was experiencing. For such changes could be related to a number of emotions, for instance, anxiety or fear.

Apart from the physiological changes both men also want something and their behaviour alters. Tim's immediate desire is to make the referee reverse his decision or for him to be replaced. Tom's desire, on the other hand, is to support the referee in order that he might continue to take charge of the match as he has been doing. Tim's behaviour alters, he shouts abuse at the referee and waves his hands above his head. Tom also shouts and uses hand gestures but in his case they are words and gestures of encouragement to the referee.

The interplay of emotional components, however, is not equivalent to the unity of emotional components. If the components are not linked to each other by the same evaluative cause, that is, if the link is not begun in an intentional way - if Tim does not believe and 'see' the situation in a related way, then, that particular state would not be a case of anger. Tim's physiological changes, feelings, desire and behaviour must be causally linked to his factual and evaluative judgements, and concomitant upon them, before he can be described as being angry. Justin Oakley reinforces the point, "So far I have been describing emotions as combinations of cognition, desires, and affects. However, putting the view in this way may give the impression that I am proposing that when all the appropriate elements of a certain emotion-type simply coexist in

us, then we actually have the emotion. But this is false. For if we have each of the components of a particular emotion but these components have radically different causes, then we do not in this case have that emotion" (1992, 15-16). And he offers a note of caution, "While it may be analytically useful to speak of separate 'elements' or 'components' of emotion, we might well wonder at the extent to which the elements which I have argued are involved in emotion are really separable at all, at least in a mentally and morally healthy individual" (Ibid. 34). The components spoken of constitute a complex of co-existing entities that ground our emotional lives though, as Goldie suggests, we still may need to examine emotion within even wider bands so they are not "treated as an isolated object of study, independent of the phenomena which surround them: phenomena such as imagination, mood, expression, states of character, and so forth" (2002, 224).

c) Occurrent and Dispositional Emotional States⁸

To consider the distinction between occurrent and dispositional emotional states⁹ let's imagine Mr. Smith is grieving for his deceased mother. Mr. Smith's grief during the period immediately following his mother's death remains heightened, as each wreath of flowers he receives and each sympathetic caller act as an acute and painful reminder of his profound loss. But as the weeks and months pass and these reminders lessen, Mr. Smith becomes better able to adjust to his new situation. Yet, even after a long period of time he may still be prone to feelings of grief if, for example, he comes across a family photograph album or meets an old friend of his mother. On such occasions, Mr. Smith's disposition or liability to generate grief is activated; he does not need to make a fresh evaluation of his mother's death as the initial one, that her death was a profound and irreversible loss, remains, so to speak, anchored within him. It is in the dispositional use of the term grief, rather than the occurrent one, that many cognitivists attempt to explain long-term emotions.

In what way, however, would an occurrent description of Mr. Smith's grief differ from the dispositional one outlined? His grief during the hours and days following his mother's death would be a permanent part of his everyday life; he might remain withdrawn from others, finding even the most cursory exchanges difficult, he might be unable to eat or control his tears. Occurrent states

⁸ The term 'disposition' will be further distinguished between: i) a tendency to experience an occurrent emotion and, ii) a 'pattern' which accounts for long-term emotions.

⁹ This distinction will have relevance later in Part A) when I go on to assess: a) so-called evaluation-less emotions; b) how grief can be experienced over an extended period of time; and c) when I detail (in Part B) the non-propositional accounts of Goldie and Griffiths.

refer to the actual period of time when an individual is experiencing an emotion and not merely to when an individual is prone to experience an emotion. Some emotions can be experienced in both an occurrent and dispositional way while others have only an occurrent use. Anger seems to have both an occurrent and a dispositional use, as does fear, while rage seems to be only experienced occurrently. Lyons considers the occurrent emotional state to be the paradigm; "Whatever factor it is which remains dormant in the person still disposed to be angry about something, will also be present when it is operative. Now it is most fully operative as emotion, when it causes not merely motivated behaviour, but affects someone emotionally, that is, physiologically, stirring up feelings, and generating wants or desires to do certain things¹⁰" (1980/1993, 56).

Love, like grief, can be felt over an extended period of time though it too can be altered given a particular set of environmental and/or interpersonal circumstances¹¹. And it should be noted, again like grief, that it is unnecessary for the person who loves over a long period to do so by continually recalling just what their initial cognition, evaluation, physiological changes, feelings, behaviour and desires were which formed the emotion in the first place. Such prolonged emotions are best understood as forming patterns, a point made by Lyons, "when the original judgements, evaluations and wants were formed such that they made him [i.e. the man in love] react emotionally in such a way as to be called 'love', a pattern--physiological or psychological or both--was set" (Ibid. 74). To illustrate: Tom is said to love Ellen because of the way he is liable to act and react to her. Tom is not incessantly occurrently in love with Ellen, that is, he may have a night out with his friends and not be occurrently in love, or play a game of golf and not be occurrently in love. In fact, if Tom were unremittingly occurrently in love, Ellen would no doubt soon find the situation intolerable¹²!

Of course patterns can, and often do, change. Tom may love Ellen for very many years but he is also capable of falling out of love with her and in love with someone else. That is, Tom finds he holds: a) a particular evaluative judgement about another woman, for instance, that she is kind and gentle; b) finds that his heart races when he is in her company; c) feels a tingle of excitement

¹⁰ On this point Malcolm Budd makes the comment, "Hence, the idea of emotion as an episode [as distinct from the idea of emotion as a disposition] - the experience or undergoing of emotion - is basic and it is this conception of emotion we need to understand" (1985, 1).

¹¹ It should be clear that I am here talking of love as a single emotion and not as an emotional attitude.

¹² For an alternative view of how an emotion, such as, grief, may be experienced over an extended period of time see my 'Mr. Smith' example in d) Unconscious and False Beliefs following.

when he is around her; d) wants to be with her whenever he can and; e) behaves like an excitable schoolboy when they are together. All in all Tom is in love with this other woman and given that he no longer has any of the above for Ellen, he can confidently say he has fallen out of love with her.

As has already been pointed out, and in the sense explained, cognition for the causal-evaluative theorist lies at the heart of our emotional responses. Our initial cognitions are directly linked to how we evaluate the objects and events in the world around us, how we come to desire particular objects and aspire to fulfil specific goals, the physiological changes we undergo and, subsequently, the feelings we have towards and about certain situations and people, and the behaviour that might ensue. Yet, the cognitive component of emotion can be understood in a variety of ways; as a belief, a thought, a supposition or a construal. Justin Oakley emphasises why it is unproductive to attempt to define cognition too narrowly. He writes of emotions not always needing to correspond to beliefs, "in certain dog phobias we avowedly believe that the neighbour's dog is harmless yet still seem to fear him when he approaches. Perhaps here our fear of the dog does not involve a belief that he constitutes a threat to us, since we are convinced that he is harmless, so the cognition involved in our fear here might rather be said to take the form of a thought that the dog will harm us" (1992, 14).

In saying this Oakley is urging us to recognise that belief may be too strong a term to always use when characterising the types of cognitions involved in emotions, "when we *believe* some proposition *p*, we are not merely entertaining the thought of *p* or imagining that *p*, but we in some sense are convinced that *p* or give our 'assent' to *p*, and we perhaps also hold *p* true or at least justified by the evidence" (Ibid. 14).

It is worth adding that judgements may be further distinguished between those, such as I have been examining (i.e. judgements that are 'components' of emotion) and judgements that are 'causes' of emotion. For example, Mr. Jones judges *X* in a particularly positive way and has a consequent joyful emotional reaction to *X*. Mr. Jones's emotional reaction is counted as joy because it has been caused by the particular way he judged *X* but this does not make that judgement a component of joy.

d) Unconscious and False Beliefs

One can be in an emotional state though be unaware of it; Tim may be angry with Alan because he has crashed his car, yet not recognise it until Tom asks, 'Why were you so angry with Alan, Tim?' Justin Oakley suggests that belief may best suit this type of case, as we can hold beliefs without being aware of them¹³. I may hold the belief that driving at high speed is dangerous without being conscious of it until I comment on an article about joy-riders in a newspaper. Oakley notes that, "while emotions always have a cognitive component, there is no particular kind of cognition which we always have when having an emotion. Therefore, the cognitive component of emotions should be read as encompassing a variety of ways of apprehending the world, ranging from beliefs, construals, thoughts, and imaginings" (Ibid. 15).

It is also the case that our beliefs need not always be true or correct for us to be in an emotional state. Tim may judge Tom to be honest and courageous and may come to admire him. In reality Tom is a habitual liar and coward who, despite a roguish charm, is a rather nasty and selfish individual. Though Tom's character is quite the opposite of the image Tim has of him this does not necessarily diminish Tim's feelings of admiration. Inaccurately targeted emotions, such as admiration which are based on falsehoods, may not be felt any less intensely than accurately targeted ones. John Deigh illustrates this by citing a similar example from the writer Arthur Conan Doyle; "the belief in the miserable existence of the crippled beggar with the twisted lip suffices to make him an object of pity even though his hideous appearance is a disguise and he is in fact a well-to-do gent working a remunerative con" (1994, 834).

When a false or incorrect judgement is made, the emotion that follows is usually misplaced. To take another example: Ellen complains to her husband, John, about their son Tim's selfish behaviour towards his brother, Tom. Later John sees Tim picking an apple and eating it without offering any to his brother. John evaluates what has taken place as being an example of the selfishness his wife had spoken of. He rushes angrily over to the two boys with the intention of punishing Tim. But Tom explains that Tim had already offered him an apple and that he had declined because he was not hungry. Tim thus was not being selfish but simply accepting of his brother's satiated state. The central role of cognition within the causal-evaluative theory in this case

¹³ In Part B) I will look at the non-propositional accounts provided by Paul Griffiths and Peter Goldie.

is clear: as a result of the initial factual judgement held by John (i.e. that Tim had picked an apple and ate it), he made the mistaken evaluative judgement that Tim's actions were selfish. He underwent the physiological changes of increased pulse rate and muscular tightness, along with feeling irritated and wanted to punish his son for his selfish behaviour. However, John's anger was misplaced and unwarranted and he would need to re-evaluate the situation in a more positive light, if he were going to react in an emotionally justified way to the situation again. Thus emotions that are based on false beliefs are usually misplaced. There are two cases: 1) where the belief is false and there is no justification for our holding it any subsequent reaction is likely to be unjustified; and 2) where the belief is false but there is a justification for our holding it, such as the example above - for though John's reaction was inappropriate it was, if not justified, then, at least, excusable.

The evaluative component of any emotion helps in relating the world around us to our concerns, our values and our needs. Evaluations are not so much a matter of simply seeing or registering objects around us, rather they are means of seeing or registering in a particular way that is related to our lives; "Indeed" Price remarks "it might be suggested that what distinguishes evaluation from merely factual judgements is that evaluative judgements are motivations" (2005, 39). Tim makes the factual judgement that there is a wild rat on his bed, evaluates that situation as dangerous and frightening, undergoes physiological changes (such as pupillary dilation), feels tense and unsettled and *wants* to get away from that dangerous situation. By evaluating the factual judgement in the way he has, Tim does not just 'see' the rat on his bed, he 'sees' the situation as being unpleasant and dangerous to him. If Tim were a zoologist, however, who studied rats, he might evaluate the situation as being very interesting. He might become very happy, recognising the rat to be of a family of rodents that are particularly rare and exotic. Tim may, further, come to believe his friend Tom, who has never shown any interest in rats yet evaluates the fact that there is a wild rat on his bed as being exciting and interesting, as unbalanced. Tim holds the view that most people, who are not zoologists or rat fanciers, would find having a wild rodent on their bed to be a frightening and unpleasant experience, and so questions Tom's mental state. The point being, how we evaluate the objects around us is both a matter of objective report (as far as possible) and subjective appraisal.

Naturally not all emotions can be said to be objective in the way Tim's fear might be thought objective. By 'objective' here I mean a norm by which a person's evaluative judgement falls within a more generally accepted set of principles, where it can be assessed as appropriate or rational. An emotion, such as love, for instance, comes under the contrary heading, 'subjectively evaluated emotion'. For it seems we can only give the broadest possible generalisations as to the sort of a person that will prompt the reaction of love. This is compatible with cases in which we know some particular individual well and have come to recognise their likes and dislikes with regard to their preferences in matters of love. By and large however no objective appeal can be made in order to ascertain who someone might fall in love with. Certainly we can say that people usually fall in love because they believe others to be caring, generous, kind and so on. But even that will not be true in every case. So apart from broad generalisations we can say little more, as love seems to be primarily a subjectively evaluated emotion in a way that, say, anger is not. For example, we can spot (at least to a point) when someone is going to become angry by predicting just what sort of situations will act as catalysts for that emotion. Anger is brought on by being offended or pained because of an injury or wrong done, or believed to have been done, to ourselves or to others whom we care about. We can imagine a variety of catalysts for anger; including insults, threats or physical assault as we can for fear but the reasons why X falls in love with Y is not as apparent. The desire involved in love is based on subjective rather than objective evaluations, that is, on idiosyncratic rather than generally accepted reasons. Roger Scruton succinctly makes this point when he writes, "It is more difficult to see how we might educate emotions of the particular variety, emotions like love, hatred, and erotic desire, which impose upon the subject no universal logic, as it were, no obligation to respond likewise on like occasions. Although there is no doubt some feature of James which is the reason why I love him, I am not obliged to love William as well, just because he shares that feature" (1998, 170).

One fundamental objection to the notion that the evaluative component is vital to emotion is the contention that some emotions simply do not have an evaluative dimension. Emotions such as reflex anger or fear are often cited as examples of evaluation-less emotions. These emotions are not thought to contain any conscious evaluation of initial judgements because it is believed there is no time to do so. However, this objection might be countered by a causal-evaluative theorist, if one

remembers the earlier account of the emotion grief and how it can be felt dispositionally over a long period of time. Mr. Smith's grief was described by making reference to the occurrent-dispositional distinction. His grief was initially outlined in dispositional terms, that is, in terms of his liability to experience grief given certain situations (e.g. opening a family photograph album or meeting his mother's old friend). With reflex anger we also find that people are prone to generate certain emotions and that these emotions may be stirred up by a particular set of circumstances. There is no need in such cases to ponder initial judgements, for we have already evaluated specific objects (e.g. attacks, insults, threats) as being catalysts that invoke anger. The evaluation lies rooted within us and allows us to react with alacrity when a given situation arises. For this reason emotions that are often thought of as evaluation-less may very well retain an evaluative dimension, albeit under the guise of a disposition¹⁴.

e) Physiological Changes and Feelings¹⁵

I use the term 'physiological changes' rather than 'physiological upset' or 'physiological disturbance' as these latter terms tend to reinforce the view that physiological changes are always negative, alarming and consciously felt. In reality, of course, this is not always the case: Tom is frozen by fear on discovering a lion to be blocking his drive. He stands quite still for a moment until the lion passes on his way. While standing still Tom is not consciously aware of his emotion, that is, he is not experiencing the physiological changes of the pounding of his heart or the shallowness of his breath, or of the feeling component of deep unease. It is only after the lion has moved down the street that Tom becomes aware of these changes; takes a deep breath, holds his chest and feels more relaxed¹⁶.

When emotionally aroused extensive changes occur throughout our bodies. Profound changes take place that are caused by the autonomic nervous system (ANS), sometimes referred to as the involuntary nervous system. Within the ANS there are two antagonistic subsystems - the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems - and both are important to emotion. When in

¹⁴ The role of dispositions and cultural conditioning in emotional responses where one's belief is at odds with one's feelings will be dealt with later in Part B) 2.

¹⁵ In Part B) the importance of feelings will be addressed in more detail and from a non-propositional perspective.

¹⁶ Aaron be-Ze'ev's argues against this notion by saying since feeling "is a mode of consciousness, one cannot be unconsciousness of it; there are no unfelt feelings" (Solomon [ed.], 2004, 252).

danger it is the sympathetic nervous system that excites and mobilises us to deal with the danger at hand, and it is the parasympathetic nervous system that helps to cool us down after the danger has passed. As far back as the 1930s attention was drawn to the role played in emotional arousal by hormones secreted by the endocrine glands. Particular attention was placed on the adrenal glands and the hormones adrenaline and noradrenaline. These hormones are secreted by the sympathetic nervous system and flow quickly into the bloodstream when one is emotionally stimulated. One's heart rate and blood pressure increase and blood is pumped to the larger muscles of the body, as we prepare ourselves to fight or flee. Along with the hormones produced by the medulla (or inner portions of the adrenals), the cortex (or outer portions of the adrenals) also produces a set of hormones important in emotion. These hormones are called the corticosteroids and help in sustaining action in an emergency.

Such physiological changes within emotion are, perhaps, best understood from an evolutionary perspective¹⁷. As we will see with the Mrs. Jones's example following, the reason why physiological changes under the control of the sympathetic nervous system occur (e.g. during an occurrent state of fear) is to enable us to react with enhanced strength and speed. While emotions controlled by the parasympathetic nervous system (e.g. during an occurrent state of compassion and love) occur because calmness and relaxation are the feelings that are aroused. We have, thus, evolved in such a way that our bodies in the main react in harmony with the emotional state aroused¹⁸.

It is worth noting that our present-day interest in the role, and importance, of feeling (or affect) is relatively new. In fact, as Zajonc observed as late as 1980 "contemporary cognitive psychology simply ignores affect. The words *affect*, *attitude*, *emotion*, *feeling* and *sentiment* do not appear in the indexes of any of the major works on cognition" (Pugmire, 1998, 11). This type of neglect was undoubtedly the result of an Enlightenment bias towards phlegmatic reason and the abhorrence of the realm of emotion. Fortunately, it is now "generally accepted that having a capacity for emotion is as much an essential part of being human as is being capable of rational thought" (Goldie, 2002, 17).

¹⁷ For an interesting discussion of the evolution of emotions see psychologists Tooby and Cosmides (1990).

¹⁸ The evolutionary aspect to emotion analysis will be raised again later in Part B: 2).

I return at this point to how long-term emotions, that do not appear to have a feeling dimension, are sometimes used in an effort to illustrate that the feeling component is non-essential in the structure of emotion, and point to the work of Justin Oakley and his concern that the affective aspect of emotion study has for too long been neglected. As I have shown, physiological changes usually refer to such things as increased or decreased pulse rate, increased or decreased respiratory rate, pupillary dilation and peripheral vascular changes, such as flushing, sweating and pallor. Feelings, on the other hand, refer to the sorts of things people describe as thrills, throbs, pangs, gnawings and so on. How we evaluate situations, along with our physiological changes and wants, helps us to label feelings as being emotional. That is, when we believe our feelings have been caused by our evaluation of a situation as being appropriate to a particular emotion. People claiming to be in emotional state X, yet showing no associated feelings, will often be suspected of feigning or lying about their claim. We have come to think of feelings very much as veridical indicators of the presence of emotional states. A person claiming, for instance, to be grief-stricken yet showing no feelings of grief, in situations where they might be expected to be shown, is unlikely to be believed.

Feelings can be closely linked to physiological changes and to a point where differentiating between them can be muddled. Tom loves Ellen and part of his reason for believing he loves her is that when he is in her company his heart rate increases and his pulse races. In reply to the question, 'What do you feel when you are with Ellen?' Tom says he feels a kind of thumping or throbbing, that he locates in his chest (in his heart). In this typical description of feelings associated with romantic love, it seems clear that however intimately these components may be linked, Tom's 'throbbing feeling' is caused by physiological changes and not his 'throbbing feeling' having caused his physiological changes. On the other hand, de Sousa notes how William James holds the rather unique view that, "feelings [i.e. full blown emotions as I have described them and not just the 'feeling' component presently under review] are caused *by* the bodily changes. His celebrated formulation has it that 'we do not weep because we are sad, but rather we are sad because we weep'" (de Sousa, 1987, 51).

Earlier I gave reasons for rejecting the term 'physiological disturbance' though it has to be said, in one respect, this term might better help us to grasp just how closely we associate unusual

physiological changes with emotional states: Mrs. Jones attacks, and badly injures, her husband's mistress. In court her defence council pleads for compassion from the jury, arguing that her rational and clear thinking processes were disturbed. This disturbance, they claim, was a direct result of the blood boiling rage she felt on seeing her husband canoodling with his mistress. They emphasise the strain Mrs. Jones has been under while trying to come to terms with the reality that her husband, whom she trusted implicitly, was a philanderer, and her marriage, of twenty years, was now over. The physiological disturbances she underwent, they argue, clouded her judgement and created a powerful desire to harm the object of her rage. The link between physiological disturbances (or changes) and emotional states is, in fact, so ingrained, that courts are often more lenient in handing down sentences in so called *crime passionnel* cases, than in other criminal cases.

Feelings of crestfallenness and forlornness might uncontroversially be linked to emotions such as grief or remorse but would be unlikely to be linked to joy or hate. And in the same way, physiological changes can also be linked to certain emotions. Reduced heart rate and consequent reduced pulse rate, appear to occur far more often in emotions such as love than in emotions such as anger. Of course, cognitivists make clear it would be too much to claim that each emotion has a distinct and unwavering pattern of feelings and physiological changes that go hand in hand with it. Not every occurrent state of grief, for example, activates tear ducts or creates a feeling of despondency. Some grievers may never cry and, though upset, may never feel despondent.

Although particular feelings and physiological changes can be linked more closely to some emotional states than to others, one must be careful not to rely on this link too much when trying to differentiate between emotions. Tim's respiratory and pulse rate may be lower than normal on Monday morning, and he may feel unusually relaxed because he is sitting with his beloved wife. On Tuesday morning, Tim's respiratory and pulse rate may again be lower than normal, and he may again feel unusually relaxed but on this occasion it is because he is happy with a landscape painting he has just finished. On Monday, Tim's physiological changes and feelings were created by the evaluation that his wife was appealing and the object of his love. While on Tuesday, Tim's physiological changes and feelings were created by the evaluation that his work was well crafted and attractive. To differentiate between these emotions one would need to focus attention on the

way Tim evaluated the situations he found himself in and not on his physiological changes and feelings.

f) Emotions, Desires, Behaviour and Other People

According to the hybrid cognitive theory emotions play an important role in how we view our relationship to others, our society and the world at large¹⁹. Barry Smith supports this view by noting that “emotions . . . connect us to the world” (de Sousa [ed.], 1987, 113), and Ronald de Sousa makes the point “we may hope to shed more light on the nature of emotions and their role as a source of knowledge about the world, about others and about ourselves” (Goldie [ed.], 2002, 112). The continual changes that occur between a person and his environment help to generate new emotions: Tim is out enjoying a round of golf with his friend Tom and both are relaxed and happy. On the final green Tim notices that Tom has illegally moved his ball closer to the hole before taking his putt. Tim asks Tom to return the ball to its original resting place but Tom refuses and takes umbrage at Tim's accusation of cheating. Tim becomes angry, demanding to know if Tom denies illegally moving his ball closer to the hole and if, as a consequence, there is an insinuation that he is lying. The exchange deteriorates and both men end up quarrelling.

In strict causal-evaluative terms Tim holds: a) the factual belief that Tom has moved his ball closer to the hole; b) the evaluative judgement that what has occurred is an illegal (according to the rule of golf) and unsporting action²⁰; c) undergoes some physiological changes, such as, flushing (caused by peripheral vascular changes); d) feels tense and ill at ease; e) wants Tom to return the ball to its correct position and; f) behaves in an agitated manner. All in all, Tim becomes angry. The ever-changing person-environment arena in which we live continues to make our emotional lives mutable and, as a rule, transitory.

Despite such changes it would be wrong to imagine that we cannot experience particular emotions over an extended period of time. As I have already highlighted, grief is commonly felt over a long period of time; though Mr. Smith realises there is nothing he can do to get his beloved mother back after she has died, yet he continues to wish for it and continues to grieve for her. It is

¹⁹ This point will have relevance later when I assess Charles Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger's position and the cultural conditioning of emotions.

²⁰ It should be noted this is not just another factual judgement as Tim has 'assessed' Tom's action, and it is this assessment that constitutes its evaluative nature.

important to recognise in this example that along with desire and want, wishes and wishful thinking also fall under the generic heading 'appetition' (also called 'want' or 'desire' component), but they should not be regarded as synonyms. Mr. Smith illustrates why cognitivists consider the distinction between these appetitive states necessary. It may be thought unusual, unless we were to understand Mr. Smith's grief as irrational, to say that as part of this emotion he holds a genuine desire that his mother be returned to him. He might be heard to say "I want my mother back" but this is not a case of genuine wanting, for desiring impels us towards action and quite obviously as there is nothing anyone can do to bring Mrs. Smith back, no impulse to action would seem reasonable or appropriate. Mr. Smith can only react to the reality that his mother's death is permanent and irreversible and, though a genuine want may be absent from the emotional make-up of Mr. Smith's grief, it does not follow that the period of time his grief lasts is necessarily short.

Of course the desire component that drives us to take action is fundamental to many emotions. In an emotion such as fear we would find it unusual to hear Tim claim to be afraid of some situation X yet also be aware of the fact that he has no desire to escape that situation. In other words, we would be unwilling to accept Tim's proclamation of fear if it was not supported by a firm desire, revealed in behaviour, to alter or escape situation X. In this way most emotions seem to contain an appetitive component that is linked to cognition, evaluation, physiological change, behaviour and feeling. Naturally we need not be consciously aware of the desire component of emotion for it to be present: Tom judges Ellen to be an honest, trustworthy person whom he feels a warmth and closeness for. Tom evaluates Ellen's character in this positive way and recognises that when he is with her his heart begins to pound and his pulse races. Tom's friends notice how he frequently mentions Ellen's name in conversation and how he appears to want to be in her company whenever possible. After a period of time they become convinced that his desire to be with her is a clear indication of the love he harbours for her. Nevertheless, when they put this to him Tom denies it. What is important here is, though Tom's friends are correct in believing him to love Ellen, he himself may still not be consciously aware of it. The fact that he does love Ellen may only register with him after he has had time to consider what they have said. Tom's friends have made him look again at his reasons for wanting to be in Ellen's company and, in so doing, he may well come to realise that his friends' assertions are correct.

According to cognitivists, certain characteristics of various emotions stem from appetite, and the reason why some emotions are thought to be either pro- or anti-social can often be traced to the desire component. Love and compassion are regarded as positive and pro-social emotions as they help in creating harmony between people. The desire within each is focused on the needs and welfare of others and not on the individual alone. On the other hand, hate has the opposite effect and is regarded as negative and anti-social. The reason for this lies in the fact that this emotion gives rise to desires that can impel people towards selfish, destructive and anti-social behaviour.

The desire contained in emotions such as envy and fear also reveal noteworthy characteristics. The desire stemming from fear is generally positive and of great practical importance. When afraid, it is our desire to escape the fearful situation that drives us towards taking action and enables us to avoid pain. Alternatively, the desire that gnaws away at an individual who is envious (who wants things that are not his own), is disruptive and negative. Such a person may very well be driven towards actions that are deeply anti-social.

Guilt is also regarded, in part, as a positive emotion, for its self-reflexive, self-punitive character is a means of signalling to others that despite having done wrong, one has retained a sense of justice or fair-play. In the same manner, experiences of non-moral guilt are also regarded as positive, for having transgressed an ideal, the subsequent sense of disapproval we experience should be expressed by guilt feelings²¹.

Nonetheless, despite the fact that most emotions appear to contain a desire component, there are some that seem to be desire-less or, at least, behaviour-less. Grief is regarded by many cognitivists²², and within the causal-evaluative theory in particular, to be such an emotion. It is regularly written that grief is passive, backward looking and without appetite. Grief felt at the death of a close friend or spouse, for instance, is thought to overwhelm the griever to the point where assistance from any quarter is unwelcome. Lyons describes this situation in the following way, "And in the cases of sorrow concerning a death, say the death of a friend, far from seeking assistance, one *might be* more likely to *want* to be left alone. There is nothing anyone can do, so there is no point in seeking assistance. Assistance would only be an *intrusion*. Sorrow and grief are

²¹ A more detailed account of these aspects of guilt, and Heidegger's profound ontological description, are provided later in Part A) and also in Part B).

²² Robert Solomon (2005, 72-78) is an exception.

often non-active, still emotions; in extreme cases, even *catatonic*" (ibid., italics my own, 43). It is commonly held that grief can only begin to be coped with effectively after the griever has come to accept that he is powerless to alter what has happened. To get to this point he must come to understand the nature of the grief he has experienced; the causal-evaluative description of such an experience would be that the griever: a) holds the judgement that their spouse has died; b) evaluates a) as a major and irrevocable loss; c) experiences some relevant physiological changes, such as, weeping; d) feels the pangs of profound loss; e) is lethargic and disinterested, for instance, in their usual hobbies and activities; f) does not want to do anything. As there is nothing anyone can do to have the deceased returned, any impulse to action is considered futile and so none exists²³.

g) Conclusion

I set out in this section to provide a clear account of the cognitive analysis of the structure of emotion so as to be in a position later to raise questions of it and draw contrasts with Heidegger's account. Part of my task was to describe in detail the hybrid cognitive theory's break-down of the six components of emotion and assess some of the arguments that exist as to which components should be considered essential. I discussed the importance of physiological changes and feelings as well as the ways in which long-term emotions might be best accounted for. This last area of focus is significant within the wider context of the overall thesis, as I explain how an emotion, such as grief can be experienced over an extended period of time without it having to be deemed, as Nussbaum suggests, 'pathological'. I concluded by assessing, from the cognitive vantage point, the crucial role emotions play in how we view our relationships to others (especially within the dimensions of desire and behaviour), a point which will have particular importance later when considering survivor guilt, and also when examining in Part B) *'Mitsein' as the Ontological Ground of Connectedness*.

²³ In the section following (Part A: 3) I offer reasons for believing that the cognitive analysis of grief is, in this respect, flawed, and an alternative account is put forward.

3) The Cognitive Account of Grief and its Short-comings, Connections and Positive Grief

- a) Introduction
- b) Why an 'Absence of desire for' can never be a 'Desire for'
- c) Wishes and Overlapping in Grief
- d) Connections in Grief
- e) The Significance of Long-term emotions with Particular Reference to Grief
- f) Positive Grief – An Alternative View of a Negative Emotion
- g) 'United in Grief' – Connections and the Importance of the 'Other'
- h) Distinguishing Variants of Grief
- i) Conclusion

a) Introduction

My goal in this section is to raise a number of objections in relation to the causal-evaluative account of grief provided by William Lyons in his book *Emotion*. Lyons's hybrid cognitive account is reasonably representative of how cognitivists more generally²⁴, though not all, regard grief, and one, I claim, that ignores valuable aspects of that emotion and raises questions concerning the ability of cognitivism to provide a satisfactory account of emotion analysis in general. Lyons explicates grief in purely negative terms, that is, as isolating, passive and backward looking, while I wish to put forward a view of grief that is open to others, active and future directed.

Having described the causal-evaluative position I go on to argue, in opposition to it, why I believe grief can: a) contain a proper desire; b) always has a wish component; c) is not wholly negative; d) can be related to self-preservation; e) is understood more completely when the idea of 'overlapping' is taken into account (something which provides us with an improved means of distinguishing between variants of grief); and f) can better help us to understand an expression such as 'a family united in grief'.

²⁴ Lyons's analysis is mirrored by fellow philosophers of mind Martha Nussbaum (2001), John Deigh (1994) and Patricia Greenspan (1988).

I hope that by recognising the short-comings of the cognitive theory in respect of this important emotion, we can begin to expand our understanding of emotion/mood analysis by examining in Part B) the contribution made to this area of study by Martin Heidegger in *BT*.

b) Why an 'Absence of desire for' can never be a 'Desire for'

To begin, two pertinent quotations from *Emotion*:

Sorrow at a loss, such as the death of a best friend, does not impel a person towards or away from anything, or even to do anything at all. After all one cannot do anything. One cannot bring back the dead. Action is irrelevant, and so must be any impulse to action. One might wish that the dead person could be brought to life, but such wishful thinking does not issue into impulses to action. This is one way in which wishes differ from wants (*Emotion*, 1980/1993, 37).

Of course . . . the concepts of certain emotions include no wants at all. Backward-looking emotions, such as grief, do not . . . (Ibid. 64).

As I have discussed, hybrid cognitive theories claim that emotions contain some, or all, of the following components: a cognition, factual judgement or some such element (e.g. belief, thought or supposition); an evaluative judgement; physiological changes or disturbances; a desire or want (i.e. an appetitive element); behavioural changes; and feelings. Given this, Lyons can, with confidence, write as follows:

In short, the most basic way of claiming that x is an example of emotion y is to discover the judgments, factual and evaluative, which form part of emotional state x and see whether they fall under the general description of the way of seeing the situation which we take to be peculiar to emotion y (Ibid. 1980/1993, 78).

However, as I have made clear, not all of the above components need to be present for X to be described as an example of emotion Y. I may be delighted that I have finally achieved some degree of DIY success and put up some shelves in my garden shed, but this does not mean I will

necessarily *want* to celebrate, tell the world or do anything else. David Pugmire reinforces this point when he writes “there are important classes of emotion that do not directly move us to act: celebratory emotions, for example, relief or delight, and retrospective emotions such as regret and nostalgia” (1998, 15). For Lyons, of course, grief too is an emotion without any appetitive component. But why should he believe this? His own negative analysis seems to support the opposite view:

And in the cases of sorrow concerning a death, say the death of a friend, far from seeking assistance, one might be more likely to want to be left alone. There is nothing anyone can do, so there is no point in seeking assistance. Assistance would only be an intrusion. Sorrow and grief are often non-active, still emotions; in extreme cases, even catatonic (Ibid. 43).

So grief is a emotion where, “Action is irrelevant, and so must be any impulse to action” (Ibid. 37); yet, it is also one where, “. . . one *might be* more likely to *want* to be left alone” (Ibid., italics my own, 43). A tension begins to emerge, and one that becomes clearer when we compare the definitive standpoint taken by Lyons at certain other places in his book, “[Grief] *is not* a being-stirred-up-to-do-something emotion” (Ibid., italics my own, 96), “Grief . . . *does not* give rise to any characteristic desires” (Ibid., italics my own, 97), “Admittedly emotions like . . . grief . . . *do not* generate wants or desires” (Ibid., italics my own, 52), and the far less forthright position taken at others, “the evaluation, ‘that was a grave loss or misfortune’, as forming part of sadness or grief, *might not* lead on to any desires” (Ibid., italics my own, 92) and, “On the other hand there are emotions, and I think grief is one of them, which *do not seem* to have any wants as part of their concept” (Ibid., italics my own, 94).

This fluctuating position between what certainly “is not” and what “*might be*”, is to be reflected later when Lyons attempts to deal with the issue of wishes in grief and of grief as a backward looking emotion. For now, I argue that if the grieving individual “*want[s]* to be left alone,” if others are merely thought of as “*intrusion[s]*,” and if Lyons’s distinction between wishes and wants is correct (i.e. wants issue into impulses to action while wishes do not), the consequence for such a person, whose *desire* is to be left in solitude, would surely be that they are impelled to

take action. For instance, such a person might be impelled to leave a room where others were trying to console him.

The key problem here is that Lyons confuses an absence of desire for company with a desire for no company. The former is, quite simply, not a desire while the latter patently is. For if "one *might be* more likely to *want* to be left alone," then, this is not simply an absence of desire which could be regarded as passive but, its opposite, a proper desire for no company which is active and contains the impulse towards action. Though the desire in grief has its source in not wanting to be in a given place (as it is with many cases of fear), it is, nevertheless, a genuine desire and should be accounted for. Acceptance of this negative desire, thus, makes void Lyons's earlier point that "admittedly emotions like . . . grief do not generate wants or desires" (Ibid. 52). Later I will look at reasons for believing that a positive appetitive component may also be present in grief and register the role of desire in grief, something that will become more significant in the section following when I examine the part played by wishes in grief.

c) Wishes and Overlapping in Grief

A second major point of concern arises from the first quotation above where we read, "Action is irrelevant, and so must be any impulse to action. One *might* wish that the dead person could be brought to life, but such wishful thinking does not issue into impulses to action" (Ibid. 37). The word "*might*" is again troublesome, for grief felt at the death of a best friend, the evaluation of which is that their death is a 'grave loss or misfortune', surely contains the wish that the deceased be brought back to life or that their death had not occurred (the effect of such a wish being the same - the deceased would be alive). Even fellow cognitivist Martha Nussbaum recognises the role of wishes and desires, "Grief may prompt many wishes, above all the wish that the person one loves had not died" (2001, 135), and Peter Goldie makes a similar point, "The man's action of rolling around in his wife's clothes is expressive of a wish; he wants her back with him (a primitively intelligible desire in someone who is grieving) and he imagines this desire to be satisfied in the expressive action" (2000, 132). 'Primitive Intelligibility' is defined by Goldie as, "A thought or feeling that cannot be better explained in virtue of anything else other than the emotion of which it is a part. Desiring to be away from the object of your fear is primitively intelligible in this sense"

(2000, 132). Compare also Justin Oakley's unequivocal comment, "in the emotion grief . . . we believe that we have lost someone important to us and we wish that the lost one would return, or at least that the loss had never occurred" (1992, 29).

In fact, it is extremely difficult to imagine a person who is sincerely grieving for the loss of a loved one, not holding the wish, however laconic or pointless, that their loved one be returned to them. Richard and Bernice Lazarus note, "Bereaved people know that the loved one is dead . . . However they sometimes move between a strange twilight world of wish and imagination and one of reality, which expresses the impractical yearning that the death has not happened" (1994, 78). So ingrained in the emotion is this wish, that it seems to be conceptually necessary if we are to be accurately described as 'grieving' over the death of a loved one, that it be present. Lyons, at a later point in his book, concurs, "Indeed, being aware of some grave loss or misfortune, as one is with grief, is *good reason to wish* that things were otherwise" (Ibid., italics my own, 96).

Given that wishes should be considered part of grief, it becomes apparent how further emotions can overlap it. The wish that the deceased somehow be brought back to life, or had not died, is the source for the generation of the emotion hope and, consequently, increases the complexity of grief itself. Hope is a yearning for something better, and as Lyons notes, can be sourced in a wish, "One might have an emotion of yearning or hope that someone will not die of a brain tumour. . . one wishes against all the evidence that he will not. It is the wish not the belief that generates one's emotional feelings of hope and yearning" (1980/1993, 77). Derek Matravers points out that other cognitivists would deny this, for "to hope that p it must be that one can understand that it might come about that p. However, to wish that p, means that one does not understand this" (unpublished correspondence, 4-4-05).

When dealing with specific emotions, and not simply components of emotions, Patricia Greenspan highlights something of particular significance to this inquiry, and because of this, I provide an extended quotation addressing the question of how emotions can overlap and become indistinguishable:

It is not just that emotions like shame, guilt, and remorse have indefinite boundaries or that our ideas of them are obscure or ill-defined. In my own experience of testing out the standard distinctions in application to imagined cases it often seems clear that *both* guilt

and shame are in play: I find myself more or less wincing and hanging my head at the same time, say. Nor does it seem to be enough to say that guilt and shame or guilt and remorse *coincide* in application to cases, as they would if they both independently applied; rather, there are at least some cases where they do not really seem to be distinct. All three may be part of the *same* emotional reaction - or more precisely, shame and remorse may be part of guilt - in a case where an appropriately sensitive person with certain moral expectations of himself finds that he has accused someone unjustly, for instance. Shame and remorse on the account suggested here will be part of the very punishment that guilt inflicts - in contrast to the usual treatment of their alternative emotions as either interchangeable or quite distinct (1993, 51).

Richard Lazarus in his book *Emotion and Adaptation* also describes how grief can be overlapped by another emotion, "Grief and depression are overlapping and important emotion-related concepts, . . . What makes them difficult to classify is that they are each complex, including *more than one* emotion. Grief also has the implication of a *coping* process" (italics my own, 1991, 82). The view that grief can include, or be overlapped, by other emotions (both positive and negative) is highlighted by other psychologists apart from Lazarus, see, for example, Keltner & Bonanno (1997, JPSP), and Moskowitz, Folkman, and Acree (2003, *Death Studies*).

Unfortunately, it is at this crucial point, when grief should no longer be seen in purely singular, negative terms, that Lyons believes his work to be done. He leaves unanswered the following key questions: How does wishing and hoping effect our understanding of grief? What is the relationship between several people grieving for the same object (sharing the same wishes and hopes), in other words, how are we to understand an expression, such as, "a family united in grief?" Must grief always be isolating and backward looking or can it help us to focus on the future? Can grief contain more than just the negative appetitive component described earlier?

d) Connections in Grief

It is useful at the outset of this sub-section to flesh-out just what it is I mean by the term 'connections'²⁵. Some emotions, more clearly than others, display an outward connection to other people. Guilt, for instance, with its desire for reparation and exculpation, is usually directed towards others as the guilty person attempts to rectify the mistakes or wrongdoing he has committed. Shame, on the other hand, tends to have an appetitive dimension which impels one away from others, as the shamed person attempts to hide from others their less than idealised self.

Emotions that connect, such as guilt, are often regarded as positive or optimistic, as the negative feelings one has for oneself when experiencing them and, the liability to upset or pain, are founded on the realisation of having damaged the bonds we have with others. John Rawls is, perhaps, one of the best known philosophers to expound this optimistic view. His thesis holds that our 'sense of justice' is itself a "form of good will toward mankind, a sentiment of the heart which grows out of the natural sentiments of love and friendship as these mature in the context of a social order . . . we fully realize in developing this moral sense our native capacity for human fellowship, and so one needn't look beyond this capacity to determine how human beings establish and maintain harmonious social relationships"(1973, 166). On the pessimistic side of the debate, however, heavyweights such as David Hume, Thomas Hobbes and Sigmund Freud have all come out to bat. Hobbes, for instance, regards, "fear [as] the true source of this obedience [to the rules that govern society], fear of the evil that would be inflicted on one should one disobey" (John Deigh, 1982, 393).

From the optimistic perspective, exposure to guilt implies both a connection to, or more weakly, an identification with, people generally and a dislike of oneself specifically. The feelings exemplified in guilt are those that "form [an] antagonism towards oneself because one has acted against what one is attached to, and this antagonism feeds the feeling that one is divided within oneself. There is hostility toward anyone who attacks what is cherished. Feeling guilt is feeling more than sorrow or regret that what one cares for has been hurt or damaged; it is pain mediated by the judgment 'I am responsible for the damage'. In feeling guilt we turn on ourselves like a scorpion biting its own tail" (Morris, 1971, 312).

²⁵ This focus on connections will continue to be of importance throughout the thesis, as I examine not only cognitive accounts of bonds but Heidegger's concept 'Mitsein'.

However, like so many philosophical positions taken definitively, once reached, exceptions very quickly start to pop their heads above the parapet. Dostoyevsky's character Rodion Raskolnikov, in his classic novel *Crime and Punishment*, is just such an exception. Raskolnikov murders a pawnbroker simply to test his own greatness, and at no point afterward dwells on the act of murder itself, but only on the fact that he has broken a moral set of rules to which he had, hitherto, adhered. He does not identify with the pawnbroker as a fellow human being, but rather his sense of guilt is triggered by his previous adherence to a set of moral rules that contained within them an implicit system of correlative duties. Raskolnikov's guilt, thus, stems from his acceptance of certain moral requirements that restrict his conduct. These requirements are imposed by a set of rules inherent in a system of moral rights and duties, "though the evil Raskolnikov did was great, his contempt for the pawnbroker . . . makes it seem slight. He dwells not on this but having done what is not permitted" (Deigh, 1982, 397).

Despite this particular exception, my principal interest in connections is not, like Rawls, related to the broader issue of a theory of justice²⁶ but focuses, instead, on the individual bonds we have to each other and how emotions, such as hope, love and grief can overlap one another and, later, with the ontological dimension these connections play in emotion/mood analysis. My concerns are in fact more in keeping with the direction taken by the philosophers Carol Gilligan and Sharon Bishop, and an attitude to moral problems, or non-moral conflicts, that can be better understood when we first recognise them as situations that necessitate, not the discovery of which party's claim is legitimate but in what way connections can be maintained. "The painful feelings . . . associated with feeling guilt belong to those attendant upon damaging what we value . . . the impulse, for example, to confess reveals *attachments* and a desire to restore bonds" (Herbert Morris, 1988, 67).

Sharon Bishop identifies the significance of connections from early life, attachment "means more than that one gets fed and clothed; persons have an autonomous disposition to connect with one another, and when children fail to connect, severe disturbance results. When adults fail, they too are likely to suffer in one way or another. The upshot is that we are important

²⁶ See also John Deigh's article, 'Love, Guilt, and the Sense of Justice' (1982, esp. 410-411).

to one another not just because we provide food or freshly laundered shirts, but because to develop and maintain reasonably good spirits we need one another's presence and attention" (1987, 17)²⁷.

Our relationships to other individuals, and groups of people, has a profound effect on how we understand our emotional lives. Connections through love, for instance, mould how it is we experience an emotion like grief. Our behaviour, the intensity of feeling, the physiological changes and the length of time we grieve, are all directly related to how love colours that emotion. The fact that two emotions can come so closely together that they overlap, naturally makes the job of distinguishing them more difficult: "many times when one wrongs another, that is, violates his rights, one also by the very same act injures or hurts him. Here wrongdoing and evildoing coincide. Consequently, we may assume that the two emotions often occur together as indistinguishable constituents of a complex emotional experience" (Deigh, 1982, 400).

The reason for the distinct connection between emotions, such as, love and grief, is highlighted if we wish to say, with any degree of confidence, that Tim loves Tom. For then we expect Tim should be prone to feel sad if injury or death befalls Tom, and given the intimate links that exist between these emotions, if Tim were not to experience sadness on such an occasion, we might rightly question his declaration of love for Tom.

Within grief itself we might suggest there is a perception of the object of our love as having special significance in our lives, and that grief registers this profound and irretrievable loss, this breaking of a special bond when they die. The gut-wrenching feeling of separation that we experience does not simply occur as a choreographed sequence of causal events. Of course, Tim needs first to be aware that Tom is dead, if he is then to evaluative his death as a profound and irretrievable loss, but the experience of grief itself *is* all of the components which go to make it up, the recognition of it, *is* its pain and distress. Judgements that are part of love and grief have value as a means of making us aware of the object (of these emotions) as being extremely important to us, their death inevitably effecting the griever's/lover's happiness in the short-term, but also, as we will see next, potentially in the long-term.

²⁷ Compare also on this point Frederick A. Olafson's 'Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of *Mitsein*'.

e) The Significance of Long-term Emotions with Particular Reference to Grief

In what way might we say that an emotion, such as grief, is long-term? As Lyons notes grief can paralyse a person (even put them into a catatonic state), and it is by keeping this fact to the fore in our minds that we might begin to consider how it can also be experienced over an extended period of time. The following descriptions of grief, though literary, are of help in illustrating just how powerful an emotion it can be. In his short story, *The Mourning*, William Trevor details how a person's grief can be carried with him in his everyday life, not as Martha Nussbaum suggests in a pathological way, but within his everyday encounters and interactions, "On his walks, and when he sat down to his meals, and when he listened to his parents' conversation, the mourning was still there, lonely and private. It was there in Brady's Bar and in the shops of the town when he went on his mother's messages. It would be there when again he took charge of the concrete-mixer for O' Dwyer, when he shovelled wet cement and worked in all weathers," (*The Hill Bachelors*).

By long-term, of course, I am not suggesting that the person grieving is constantly wailing and weeping, or is stuck, in a Miss Havisham-type²⁸, permanent occurrent state but rather that Mr. Smith's grief, for instance, has become so tightly woven into the fabric of his character that he sees himself in an on-going way, and the world, differently than before the death of his beloved. Wholly negative and backward looking descriptions of grief, without recognising it, provide the clearest illustration of this. Mr. Smith's grief over the death of his mother is one where judgements regarding his mother's worth, and the awfulness of her death, remain clear to him though perhaps months or even years have past. What also remains is the sense of importance she has in his life and, consequently, his grief becomes a backdrop to his daily thoughts and routines. Since her death he has become more downcast and morose in his outlook, activities that had previously given him pleasure, such as a round of golf or pottering about in his garden have lost much of their appeal and the spark in his life has been, if not extinguished (as in Miss Havisham's case) then dimmed.

Earlier I described long-term grief in dispositional terms, noting how Mr. Smith may be liable to experience grief given a particular set of circumstances, such as meeting his mother's old friend or coming across an album of family photographs. However, long-term grief as I am now describing it is quite distinct from this description. For there is obviously a substantial difference

²⁸ This example is elucidated in the sub-section following.

between Mr. Smith merely being prone to a certain emotion over a long period of time and his actually being effected emotionally over an extended period of time²⁹. The ongoing judgements of Mr. Smith, that his mother's death is a profound and irretrievable loss and how he evaluates what she might think and feel about his choices, together with his reduced enthusiasm for life start to form a pattern or colour³⁰ his outlook more generally. Michael Stocker's points out that "emotions can be diffuse, pervasive and long lasting, forming our background, as well as the tone, the colour, the affective taste, the feel of activities, relations and experiences" (Goldie [ed.], 2002, 66). So that over time Mr. Smith's actions are permeated by this dominant emotion despite there being no specific event which gives rise to an awareness, on his part, of his grief.

This point is significant, for it would make little sense to imagine Mr. Smith, a year after his mother's death, noticing his vegetable plot needed to be weeded but deciding not to do it and just then believing he had felt the grief he has for the loss of his mother return, just then his grief had turned from a disposition to an occurrent event. The dispositional griever, however, can overcome his grief, to some extent, by not going down to the vegetable plot or closing the album of photographs and moving on to other activities; the long-term griever, on the other hand, knows that the intensity of his grief may be lessened by closing the album but his loss is experienced in such a way that he has come to be called, and can identify for himself, the epithet 'sad' or 'despondent'. Life filtered by Mr. Smith's habitually glum outlook has just this effect on his personality. Goldie draws a distinction between an 'emotion' and an 'emotional episode,' when accounting for long-term emotions that deepens the occurrent-dispositional distinction provided by others: "An emotion, such as love or jealousy, may last for years; as part of this emotion - part of the narrative - there can be particular emotional episodes or experiences, and these will be relatively short-lived," (2000, 104, 69). And: "An emotion . . . is a relatively complex state, involving past and present episodes of thoughts, feelings, and bodily changes, dynamically related in a narrative of part of a person's life, together with dispositions to experience further emotional episodes . . ." (2000, 144).

²⁹ Compare Nussbaum's distinction between 'episodic' or 'situational' emotions versus 'ongoing' or 'background' emotions (2001, 68-71); Peter Goldie (2000, esp. 69, 104-105); William Lyons (1980/1993, esp. 53-57) and Malcolm Budd (1985, 1).

³⁰ Justin Oakley's account of what he calls 'psychic affects' or 'non-bodily emotional affectivity,' provides a useful correlation to my talk of 'fabric', 'colour' and 'pattern,' see Oakley (1992, 7-16). Note also Michael Stocker's point that, "emotions can be diffuse, pervasive and long lasting, forming our background, as well as the tone, the colour, the affective taste, the feel of activities, relations and experiences" (2002, Goldie [ed.], italics my own, 66).

The suggestion might be made that the description above is not one of genuine everyday grief and that "what distinguishes normal from pathological mourning is . . . [the] change in tense: the pathological mourner continues to *put* the dead person at the very center of her own structure of goals and expectations, and this paralyzes life" (Nussbaum, italics my own, 2001, 82-83). The 'change of tense' for Nussbaum is of the order 'my mother *is* a vital part of my life, its happiness/flourishing' to 'my mother *was* a vital part of my life, its happiness/flourishing.' This move seems perfectly valid yet, Nussbaum provides us with no timescale to judge this change and, thus, is of no help in distinguishing normal from pathological grief. She writes that after eight years she talks of 'was', but at what point, if we are to experience only 'normal' grief, should we move from 'is' to 'was' - two weeks, six months, three years, eight years? How long is a piece of string? Mr. Smith's grief does not appear pathological, for he does not '*put*' his mother at the very centre of his life's goals (no more than the Olympic one hundred metre champion *puts* the smile on his face as he breaks the tape in order to be 'happy'). But having loved his mother greatly, she still permeates his thoughts and actions; his grief, though not crushing him, has changed him.

For a highly exalted notion of why, and how, grief (overlapped by a sincere and mature love) can be experienced over an extended period of time, Karl Rahner offers the following account:

There are no others who can fill the vacancy when one of those whom I have really loved suddenly and unexpectedly departs and is with me no more. In true love no one can replace another, for true love loves the other person in that depth where he is uniquely and irreplaceably himself. A strange thing happens to the man who really loves, for even before his own death his life becomes a life with the dead. Could a true love ever forget the dead? When one has really loved, his forgetting is only apparent: he only *seems* to get over his grief. The quiet and composure he gradually regains are not a sign that things are as they were before, but a proof that his grief is ultimate and definite. It shows that a piece of his own heart has really died and is now with the living dead. This is the real reason he can weep no more (1962, 54-55).

Despite its religious tone, Rahner's interpretation of love, grief and death fits rather well with our Mr. Smith example, and certainly appears to take into account a complexity and profundity not found in the causal-evaluative or cognitive descriptions examined so far.

f) Positive Grief - An Alternative View of a Negative Emotion

The hybrid cognitive breakdown of cognition, evaluation, physiological disturbance, desire, behavioural changes, and feeling though helpful in gaining a conceptual model of grief, still leaves unanswered the type of questions raised at the end of sub-section C) *Wishes and Overlapping in Grief*. For this reason it is appropriate for me, at this point, to provide a broader and more complete model of this highly significant human emotion. To begin I need to introduce a distinction between the completely negative descriptions of grief already outlined and what I shall call, 'positive grief'. The death of a loved one is undoubtedly the most painful of the many possible losses in a person's life. The bereaved individual is often left with a feeling of abandonment, a cornerstone to the meaning of their life is gone, and they can experience a period of profound questioning that relates to how they perceive themselves, the values and beliefs they hold, and the importance or otherwise of life in the face of their loss, along with a stark new awareness of their own inevitable demise.

The notion that human beings have a vested and vital interest in not being hurt, or not experiencing painful emotions, seems to be an uncontroversial anthropological fact. And it is by being aware of this fact that we might better appreciate how grief can be felt in a positive manner. Far from finding assistance an intrusion, it is often at this most difficult of times that one becomes closer to the others with whom one is emotionally tied in loving bonds. It is because of these very ties that grief, and not just the process of grieving, can be thought of in a way that is not purely negative. The word 'positive' is used to indicate that grief, though containing a backward dimension, can also help us to look to the future. As Richard and Bernice Lazarus put it, "A major task of grieving is to be able to focus on the future while not disavowing or being embittered by the past" (1994, 80).

This point is most forcefully illustrated when the attitude of the deceased, in the time before their death, is taken into account. Let us imagine Anne is terminally ill with a malignant tumour, she has resolved herself to the fate that awaits her and is acutely aware of the potentially

devastating effect her death will have on her family. Recognising this she talks frankly to her husband and children about how they will cope after she is gone. Anne is a strong and loving person who implores her family to openly express their grief, to embrace each other in their sorrow and avoid bottling up their emotions³¹. The function of grief, she believes, is to bring them closer together not to drive a wedge between them. If grief were to be understood as simply a segregating emotion, one that isolates griever from each other, allowing for only private periods of mourning (against this description Roger Scruton notes how grief can "become part of a continuing activity in a public and objective world, and ceases to be a private anxiety to be borne by himself [the bereaved] alone" (1998, 173), Anne makes it clear her short time left would be unbearable.

It seems clear that Lyons's wholly negative causal-evaluative account could not deal with the type of grief Anne's family will experience after her death, for at no point does he register the importance of the deceased attitude in the period before their death. Of course, this is not to say that examples of grief more akin to his description do not exist, they do, and often in the literary field. Miss Havisham, of Dickens's *Great Expectations* fame, is a prime illustration of how grief, even at the loss of a deep and meaningful relationship rather than a death, can isolate and overwhelm one. Jilted by her fiancé on what was to be her wedding day, Miss Havisham feels the loss of her relationship so keenly that her grief becomes all consuming. She lives *in* her wedding day, so to speak, refusing to alter a single item of decor within her home, to open the curtains or even to change out of her wedding dress. The protagonist of the story Philip Pirrip, or Pip, describes what he sees when he first meets her, "I saw that the bride within the bridal dress had withered like the dress, and the flowers, and had no brightness left but the brightness of her sunken eyes. I saw that the dress had been put upon the rounded figure of a young woman, and that the figure upon which it now hung loose, had shrunk to skin and bone . . . not even the withered bridal dress on the collapsed form could have looked so like grave-clothes, or the long veil so like a shroud. So she sat, corpse-like, as we played cards; the frillings and trimmings on her bridal dress, looking like earthly paper" (1990, 100). Miss Havisham is stuck permanently and solitarily in the past, unable to move out of the grief she wallows in, unwilling to get on with her life.

³¹ ". . . the thought is that if we do not face up to our feelings and to what we are bottling up, and recognise them for what they are, then perhaps, as Nietzsche* says, our soul will squint" Goldie (2000, 151). *". . . the man of resentment is neither upright nor naive nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul squints" ('Genealogy', First Essay, sec. 10; Cf. Solomon, 1994).

Martha Nussbaum comments on just how utterly negative some people regard grief; "the Balinese believe sad feelings to be dangerous to a person's health. If you brood and let yourself grieve, you weaken your life force, and become prey to malign forces. It is therefore best to respond to loss by distracting oneself, focusing on happy events, and acting cheerfully" (2001, 140). However, such entirely negative assessments of grief are not the norm and, in fact, their opposite is more likely to be one we recognise, "Grief so easily gives the impression of being a period of stagnation, but it is a time when deep, renewing forces are at work. These forces contain the potential power of our healing and of our ability to wish to continue with life" (Lee, 1994, 119).

g) *United in Grief – Connections and the Importance of the 'Other'*

In order to appreciate the idea of positive grief we need to ask the question, 'can grief be a self-destructive emotion?' The expression "a family united in grief" draws attention to the fact that a number of people can share the same object of grief. We can describe in causal-evaluative terms how this might happen: the Murphy family share the same factual belief, for example, that a daughter/sister has died in a climbing accident; share the same evaluative judgement (i.e. that her death is a tragic and irrevocable loss); share the same type of physiological changes (e.g. crying); share the same desire or wish (i.e. to be in each other's company and to have their daughter/sister returned to them); share the same type of behavioural changes (e.g. they are more lethargic and less interested in their usual hobbies and activities) and; share the same type of feelings (e.g. enervated).

This example is not just a case of different people having the same emotion at the same time, as I and my fellow soccer supporter might be angry at the same time - he because the striker has missed a penalty, me because I've lost my match programme. Nor is it the type of casual sharing one might have as part of an audience watching an act on stage. I can be happy with the rest of the auditorium while being entertained by Jackie Mason, the object of my emotion is the same as everyone else's, as are the other components of happiness, evaluating Mr. Mason's comedy as funny, feeling jolly, stomping my feet (behavioural change) with laughter and so on. However, the way in which the Murphy family members bond with each other through their shared emotion is quite distinct from these informal types of sharing. Because their grief contains a wish, it is, as I have shown, strongly linked to hope and to love, "internal to the grief itself must be the perception

of the beloved object and her importance; the grief itself must estimate the richness of the love between us, its centrality in my life" (Nussbaum, 2001, 44). The emotions that overlap grief (and make it "more than one emotion", Lazarus, 1991, 82) help in projecting the griever towards the future in a positive way, something the deceased themselves would have wanted, "if the relationship has been good, the "love element" in it rescues the remaining person from their grief" (Lee, 1994, 125). Compare also Nussbaum's comment, "Mourning is in part a process of removing cognitive dissonance, but it is also a process of managing and to some extent reducing the burden of grief" (2001, 81).

There is an enlightening vignette from ancient Greek history here that is supportive of the view that the connections between the deceased and the bereaved has a significance even after death. It was the practice, in the period from approximately 2500 BP (Before Present) on in Greece, to have buried with the dead, or to lay on top of the grave of a beloved, a Lekythos or long-necked (usually ceramic or marble) vase containing oils. These vases were painted or carved with funerary reliefs depicting the bereaved and deceased looking into each other's eyes, one sitting the other standing, shaking hands (the name of the deceased inscribed on the base). The symbolism of the image is unmistakable, in the firm grip of the handshake the special bond that had been nurtured in life remains, a point of contact that will sustain and support the bereaved in their loss³², enabling them to carry on in life productively.

Binding themselves to each other through a shared emotion, along with an understanding of the deceased's wishes, unites the Murphy family at this time though such unity may, of course, only be short-term. "Were we not able . . . to share our griefs, and to understand that others too have grieved as painfully as we have, we would be completely lost in our pain. We would be without direction or perspective, and would feel isolated" (Ibid. 185).

Viewed in the way I have outlined, part of grief's function may be understood as a means of dealing with loss and moving on in life productively and is, consequently, quite distinct from cognitivists entirely negative and isolating description. Dwelling on the shared object of loss is not merely an evaluation of the situation as totally hopeless, but one that actually helps grievers to express and commune with each other over the loss they feel. In answer to Lyons's rhetorical

³² For more information about this see, 'Die Antikensammlung Altes Museum – Pergamonmuseum', 1998, Brigitte Knittlmayer u. Wolf-Dieter Heilmeyer (ed.).

question "How could my grief over the loss of a dear friend be related to self-preservation? It is clearly not related to my self-preservation if I did not depend economically or emotionally upon this friend" (1980/1993, 43-44) we can reply: precisely because this person was a "dear friend" I did depend on him emotionally, "friendships are for many of us among our most important attachments"³³, and so when the bond between us is broken by prolonged absence, betrayal, or the death of a friend, we naturally have a deep sense of loss. Now surely this sense of loss consists in more than just *noting* that we have suffered a loss . . . if this is all that our sense of loss involves, this would suggest that our attachment was not very important to us or was in some way deficient, and so maybe not correctly described as 'friendship'" (Oakley, 1994, 66).

And specifically because of this emotional dependence, I am aware of the dangers of grieving too negatively, something that can indeed be directly related to my self-preservation. From an earlier quotation I showed how Lyons recognises that, "sorrow and grief are often non-active, still emotions; in extreme cases, even catatonic" (1980/1993, 43). And just as the negative desire in grief gives rise to an impulse not to be in a given place, so too can it give rise to inactivity (X does not want to do any of the things he previously enjoyed), catatonic states (X does not want to do anything *in extremis*, "remorse" comments John Deigh, "is like grief. Where one is overcome or stricken with remorse, we may expect as with the grief stricken, *paralysis* of the will to set in" (1982, 401), and the ultimate negative desire, X does not want to live any longer - a threat, if ever there was one, to X's self-preservation.

But even where grief is understood as isolating, where assistance is thought "only [to] be an intrusion" (Lyons, 1980/93, 43), there is still reason to believe that self-preservation may be a part of the emotion. For grief helps us to deal with the stark new reality of loss, as Robert Priest has put it, "Grief itself can be seen as a protective reaction, just like certain types of anxiety. It is a way of retreating from the world at a time when the mind needs to cope with a massive and upsetting change" (1983, 12). This period of apparent passivity is, then, often the opposite; for part of grief's job is to actively help us to re-adjust and take stock of our new situation. It is during this period that we may re-evaluate our relationships, beliefs, goals, lifestyles and so on. Two salient points can now be made: 1) periods of so-called inactivity associated with grief are often active times of

³³ Compare also Epicurus's comment, "Of all things that wisdom provides to help one live one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship" (de Botton, 2000, 57)

reflection, reappraisal and renewal and; 2) such periods can be enormously positive as we acknowledge the deceased's desire that our grief not overwhelm us, that we express our sorrow and that we move on in life productively, "This is the fulfilling nature of grief, that it should lead, drive or impel us past our usual daily boundaries to mend the hurt in ourselves and to change the hurt in others . . . We and our griefs, and the griefs of others, are indeed intertwined" (Lee, 1994, 193). Of course, a cognitivist might argue that even when grief is understood as wholly negative, periods of complete inactivity may help the griever come to terms with their new situation. But if this is the case, if grief is an emotion that impels us to seek isolation and quiet, the result of such action being our greater ability to deal with profound loss, then, the emotion can hardly be considered 'wholly negative'.

h) Distinguishing Variants of Grief

The idea that emotions can overlap each other becomes important once again when trying to distinguish between variants of the same emotion. How, for instance, are we to differentiate between certain variants of grief without making reference to other emotions? Would it make sense to say that the grief felt at the death of a best friend is more intensely felt than other forms of grief, say the grief felt for the loss of a job, something which, perhaps, heralds the end of a successful career? If the answer is 'yes', and it seems clear it would be, how, given that the evaluative judgements may be the same, the desire components may be the same, the physiological, behavioural and feelings components may be the same, are we to distinguish, without making reference to other emotions, between these types of grief?

Assessing the factual judgements as a point of differentiation for variants of the *same* emotion would be unhelpful for, as Lyons notes, "emotions are not distinguished on the basis of factual beliefs but evaluative ones" Lyons (1980/1993, 208). However, though evaluation may well be the "differentiator of the *different* emotions" (italics my own, Ibid., 81), when attempting to distinguish variants of the same emotion it is of little help. The causal-evaluative break-down of these types of grief would be as follows: Type a) the best friend griever and, type b) the lost job/career griever: 1) Factual judgements - a) I had a best friend and, b) I had a fulfilling and important job; 2) Evaluative judgements - a) the death of my best friend is a profound and

irretrievable loss and, b) no longer having my job/career is a profound and irretrievable loss; 3) Physiological Changes³⁴ - a) I cry and, b) I cry; 4) Wishes/Desires - a) I wish the deceased were returned to me and, b) I wish I were reinstated to my old job/career; 5) Behavioural Changes - a) I spend more time alone and, b) I spend more time alone; 6) Feelings - A) I feel numbed and, b) I feel numbed (a feeling of numbness should not be mistaken for feeling nothing).

This description of the structural make-up of both griever's, however, does not help us to understand why, and how, these two forms of grief are regarded as variants of the same emotion. It might be suggested that we need only return to the agreed position that the intensity of each type of grief is different, in order to distinguish between them. But recognising that type a) grief is more intensely felt than type b) grief, only prompts the question - why?

Despite Pugmire's point that emotion comes in degrees of force, "the intensity of a given epoch of emotion is conspicuously prone to wax and wane. Fear can grow from unease to anxiousness and rise through fright, dread, terror to panic" (1998, 43), I would not want to suggest that the variants of grief I have described are ever likely to be felt with the same intensity as each other. I am aware, of course, that they will typically lessen over time, as both griever's comes to accommodate the judgements of death and loss and move, in every likelihood, towards an unhappy resignation. But as I have shown, the thoughts or judgements themselves do not provide a gauge to the intensity with which the emotion is experienced and nor does the degree of what Gabrielle Taylor calls 'absorption' (this is also a point made by Nussbaum when she speaks of 'eudaimonistic evaluation' later), "The more intense an emotion is, the more its object will tend to absorb our attention, and the more value we attach to this object will be magnified. And the extent of absorption and the inflation of importance here may exceed what one judges appropriate" (1975, 390-402).

So the question remains, how can the degree of absorption, or "eudaimonistic evaluation" (Nussbaum, 2001, 55), felt by both griever's be distinguished without making reference to other emotions? What does the feeling component of these emotions tell us? I have said that both griever's feel numbed but the reason for these feelings is not sourced in a single emotion. As the best friend griever's 'grief' is necessarily overlapped by love (why, otherwise, would we talk of our

³⁴ For some interesting discussion of grief and physiological changes see Nussbaum (2001, esp. 56-59).

'beloved friends or family') and "an internal relation exists between . . . love . . . and grief" (Deigh, 1982, 394), so we can expect the intensity of his feelings, and the time period he has them for, to be more acute and longer lasting than the lost-job/career griever, whose grief is not overlapped by such a powerful emotion. Nussbaum makes the point that, "what distinguishes . . . fear from grief, love from hate - is not so much the identity of the object, which might not change, but the way in which the object is seen . . . In grief, one sees an *important* object or person as lost; in love, as invested with a special sort of radiance" (italics my own, 2001, 28). But without noting that the griever has 'invested' such *importance* in the deceased, that they love the person as they do, one would be left baffled as to the exact reasons for their way of mourning. Of course, when distinguishing between separate emotions such contrary points are plain, and accepting 'beliefs' to be "essential to the identity of the emotion" and "only an inspection of the thoughts discriminates" (Ibid. 28-29) would make perfect sense. But when distinguishing between variants of the same emotion, inspecting the thoughts³⁵ does not help, for despite the cognitive or factual judgement being different, the evaluative judgements (i.e. the loss being profound and irretrievable) may be the same. For this reason we must look towards the other distinguishing factors, principally what other emotions overlap the two variants of grief under scrutiny.

Though Nussbaum does not specifically use the word overlap she tends to use a variety of words for what I think she means by 'overlap'. For instance, she writes of 'wonder' being "an important *ingredient* in other emotions" (2001, 54); "*background* love gets transformed by a situation not . . . into situational love, but into an episode of grief" (ibid., 73); and, "Past loves *shadow* present attachments, and take up residence *within* them" (ibid., italics my own, 2). She does note that intensity, stemming from the "importance with which [we] invest the object" is directly linked to noting 'differences,' the "*intensity* [itself] involve[s] object directed intentionality" and "are explained by the importance with which I invest the object . . . among my goals and projects . . . differences of intensity are occasioned by differences in the eudaimonistic evaluation . . . the grief we feel is proportional to the extent of the loss. People grieve only mildly for a person who has been a small part of their lives" (2001, 55). Nussbaum's 'eudaimonistic evaluation' is really only what I have called "overlapped by love", that is, the object is an important "constituent of my

³⁵ Pugmire makes the same unhelpful point, "what distinguishes [emotions] are the precise kinds of judgement they involve" (1998, 12).

life's goals and projects" precisely because it is loved and, therefore, important to my overall happiness/flourishing. The lost-job/career griever's 'grief' is not eudaimonistically evaluated as highly as the best friend griever's 'grief' because it is not overlapped by love. For the reasons outlined above, I believe that not only the categories of 'type' and 'intensity' need to be considered when attempting to distinguish between variants of the same emotion, but also what emotions, if any, overlap them.

I can now state more confidently that it is only when we come to accept that different emotions can overlap³⁶ different types of grief, that we can begin to distinguish between them. The grief felt for the loss of a job/career will, then, be differentiated from the grief felt for the death of a best friend, because the latter is overlapped with a sincere (and once reciprocal) form of human love, while the former is not. The desire on the part of cognitivists to neatly package and compartmentalise emotions (and types of emotions), blinds them to the importance of connections and overlapping. For though we can talk of grief and love as separate we cannot get the full story about feeling the former without mentioning our feeling the latter. Writing of this short-coming in cognitivism, Deigh references William James to support his position, "their assumption of strict criteria for distinguishing among the different emotions invites James's complaint against philosophers and psychologists who treat the emotions as if they were 'absolutely individual things . . . eternal and sacred psychic entities, like old immutable species in natural history, so long all that *can* be done with them is reverently to catalogue their separate characters, points, and effects'" (1994, 832-833).

i) Conclusion

In this section I have argued that the cognitive analysis of grief as wholly backward looking, passive and segregating is false, and offered an alternative account which I have called 'positive grief'. I reflected on how the expression a 'family united in grief' might more helpfully be understood by considering the notion of broken bonds, and I concluded this sub-section by asserting that grief may more helpfully be understood in this example as a natural process of coping with loss, something that facilitates a means of dwelling on the shared object of loss and not merely

³⁶ Goldie notes that "Our emotions, moods, and character traits, broadly conceived, can interweave, overlap, and mutually affect each other" (2000, 235).

as an evaluation of that situation as hopeless. I went on to argue that, in fact, it is one that has a positive connotation allowing the griever to express and commune with others over the loss he feels. This in turn assists him in avoiding being overwhelmed by grief and, thus, is an emotion which has a powerful self-protecting dimension (a point which goes unrecognised by cognitivists). The apparent passivity of grief, I claimed, is often its opposite, an active time of reflection and reappraisal and, if the deceased's resolute attitude is also taken into account, an acknowledgement of their desire that our grief not destroy us, that we express our sorrow and move on in life productively. I finally addressed the question of distinguishing variants of the same emotion, and suggested that when it comes to differentiating between variants of grief we need to consider categories beyond those of type and intensity and look to what other emotions may overlap certain cases of grief³⁷.

4) The Cognitive Account of Guilt

- a) Introduction
- b) Defining Guilt, Broken Connections, Survivor Guilt as a Shared Emotion and Guilt Feelings
- c) The Specific Legal/Cognitive Definition of Guilt and Rationality
- d) False Processing, the Components of the Hybrid Theory and Irrationality
- e) How Cognitive Guilt Differs from the Associated Emotions Shame and Remorse
- f) Conclusion

a) Introduction

I move on in this section to focus on the second emotion under scrutiny in this thesis, guilt. From the cognitive standpoint guilt is explained in terms of its everyday, ontic emotional role in our lives, that is, within the context of the biological, neurological and cultural spheres. After I have detailed the composition of guilt from the hybrid cognitive theory's perspective, I will be in a position to proceed to raise questions of that theory and to contrast it with the Heideggerian analysis of guilt provided in Part B). Guilt is a useful emotion for this exercise as there is extensive philosophical analysis of this emotion but also because it can be examined under such helpful

³⁷ The role of connections or bonds will have significance beyond that of grief later when I come to examine guilt and in Part B) 2: e) iii) 'Mitsein' as the Ontological Ground of Connectedness.

headings as moral and non-moral guilt, rational versus irrational guilt, subjective versus objective guilt, and legal guilt.

b) Defining Guilt, Broken Connections, Survivor Guilt as a Shared Emotion and Guilt Feelings

At the outset we might consider guilt to be an emotion occasioned by an awareness of having been responsible for, or perhaps wanting to do, something regarded as morally reprehensible or non-morally unacceptable. In more comprehensive terms, however, a person is said to be guilty when he is held responsible for having broken the law and is, as a consequence, worthy of blame and/or punishment; or when he transgresses a moral standard by which he had previously lived, despite the fact that such a transgression may not violate any particular legal ordinate; or when he has behaved, or thought, in a non-moral way that falls short of his personal standards.

Though a familiar emotion guilt is one that can be experienced in a variety of ways: for some people it can be felt over an extended period of time with great intensity, inhibiting a normal and constructive life, while for others it can be laconic and superficial (some people even claim not to be able to experience guilt at all), it can be felt due to actions we have performed (e.g. stealing an apple from an orchard) and also for actions we have failed to perform (e.g. not helping a blind person across the street); it can be felt due to feelings we harbour (e.g. contempt for a person of another race) or for feelings we fail to harbour (e.g. indifference to the plight of the world's poor); and it can help motivate an individual towards good or bad actions. For example, Johnny's mother chastises him for having broken Mrs. Jones's window, and punishes him by taking away his pocket money. Feeling guilty, and not just put out because his pocket money has been revoked, Johnny is motivated to attempt to repair the bad feeling that exists between himself and his mother, by suggesting that he do more chores around the house and that he apologise to Mrs. Jones. However, we can also imagine Johnny being motivated not to face Mrs. Jones, as he simply feels too guilty for what he has done.

Guilt can be felt over a long period of time in a similar way to how Oakley describes long-term grief: "a man's grief for his long-lost mother may continue unabated, even though he is not always feeling it nor undergoing any prolonged bodily turmoil. Rather, his grief may continue to affect him psychically such that he is downcast and languid, goes about his life in a subdued and

withdrawn manner, sees the world as cold and uncaring, and so on³⁸" (1992, 11). Western or Judaeo-Christian morality has traditionally regarded guilt as a good thing, for we morally ought to experience guilt over our wrongdoings. The reason for this is that guilt is intimately linked to further notions of respect and sympathy. A person who injures another without provocation and experiences no sense of guilt for his actions, becomes the object of moral censure and/or psychological concern. It is thought that he must be lacking in both respect and sympathy to feel no guilt for what he has done. Ignoring any possible psychological problems the offender may have, such a person will generally be more severely disapproved of than an offender who admits to his wrongdoing and honestly expresses his guilt. "Guilt thus becomes a sign of a sense of justice (broadly construed) in that failures to feel guilt over an act of wrongdoing, barring excuses, count as evidence against one's having this sense" (Deigh, 1982, 394).

A simple case of moral guilt might be illustrated as follows: Tim feels guilty for having stolen a car and by so doing recognises that he has broken the law and wronged, in a moral sense, the car's owner by depriving him of what is rightfully his. As a consequence of his actions, Tim is exposed to the possibility of legal punishment, moral censure (from his family, friends, community) and, if he repents, forgiveness from the victim of his crime. The respect for others that is part of guilt is linked to its reflexive and, consequently, self-punitive character³⁹. For having transgressed a moral standard, non-moral ideal⁴⁰, for instance, feeling guilty because one has neglected to exercise despite one's pronouncements to being committed to a weight-loss programme, or failed in regard to what others expect of us, any subsequent sense of disapproval with ourselves should be expressed in a feeling of guilt. We feel guilt whether or not others have approved or disapproved of our actions. In order for guilt to be genuine we must recognise the wrong we have committed and not deceive ourselves that we feel guilty when, in fact, we only feel sorry for ourselves. Once genuine moral guilt is expressed, it is incumbent upon the individual to attend to the wrongs he has committed, for by righting a wrong he can unburden himself from the guilt he carries. Carol

³⁸ For a view of pathological grief see Nussbaum (2002, 82); Stocker's contribution to Goldie (ed.) (2002, 65-81).

³⁹ On the issue of guilt being a 'self-regarding' emotion, see Deigh (1982, 398-399); Greenspan (1993, 46-47); and Taylor (1985).

⁴⁰ For an examination of whether or not 'non-moral guilt' can actually be said to be a genuine emotion see my discussion of 'personal morality codes' later in this section.

Gilligan's survey⁴¹ of a group of women caught on the horns of a profound moral dilemma, brings to the fore the importance of connections or bonds in feelings of guilt. Each woman in the group had an unplanned pregnancy and each faced a choice of conflicting responsibilities - to carry the baby to term or to have a termination. On receiving confirmation from the doctor one woman, Mrs. X, a caring and responsible wife and mother, worried about how she was going to cope with another child. She feared the addition to her family would be too much of an economic strain and contemplated an abortion while, simultaneously, she felt a strong sense of responsibility for her unborn child. After much soul searching, Mrs. X arrived at a position where her conflicting sets of responsibilities had become irreconcilable, and she was aware that she would be left with either a deep sense of regret for creating the extra hardship her cash-strapped family must endure if she proceeded with the pregnancy, or a deep sense of guilt if she went ahead with the abortion.

Following such moral conflicts Gilligan found that each of the women in the group had rethought their lives in a way that enabled them to become more committed to their own development, to future children they might have and to their families. "Rights", she noted, was the "dissolving [of] natural bonds in support of individual claims" - 'responsibilities' that which "knits such claims into the fabric of relationship[s] blurring the distinction between self and other through the representation of their interdependence" (1982, 132). What the women in the survey actually experienced was a sense of renewal and growth, which included an acknowledgement that something of value had been lost. There was an "increased seriousness about their attitude to their own lives and to their relationships to others" which was understood as "connected to what was lost and experienced as redeeming" (Ibid. 14).

Certainly counter-examples have been produced of a much more uncommon type of guilt, one that occurs without there being any concern for the welfare of others. Just such an exception is the example provided earlier of Dostoyevsky's character Rodion Raskolnikov. In that example, I discussed the fact that the guilt Raskolnikov felt for the murder of a pawnbroker (an act done

⁴¹ See her 1982 book 'In a Different Voice'.

merely to test his own perceived greatness) stemmed, not from a sense of having broken a (loving) attachment to another human being, but for having done what was not permitted⁴².

It is significant to note that western morality demands not only that we feel guilt sincerely but that we experience it in proportion to the wrong committed. The more serious the wrongdoing the more intense ought the guilt be that is felt. In a curious way, though we morally ought not to feel too little guilt for our wrongdoings, we are not usually impeded from feeling too much guilt. In fact, it is regularly thought that an individual who experiences guilt beyond what would be expected of him for the wrong he has committed is illustrating a high degree of moral sensitivity (or moral fibre) and, as a result, is already beginning to redress his wrongdoing. However, despite this, excessive guilt can have distinct dangers, and can blind us from taking the right course of action. The devoutly religious schoolgirl who discovers she is pregnant and after the birth abandons her baby because she is racked with guilt, is an extreme, though far from unknown, example of being blind to the right course of action due to a deep-seated sense of guilt. "Though the capacity for guilt is both human and 'healthy', the degree of guilt can be crippling" (Aufhauser, 1975, 291). Nussbaum makes a similar point, "Guilt can, of course, be excessive and oppressive, and there can be a corresponding excessive focus on reparation, one that is unhealthily self-tormenting" (2001, 218).

It is suggested that guilt, and other emotions, can also be due to non-moral sources: Tim may feel guilty having played poorly during an amateur soccer match. At face value this example seems to make its point, but does it actually show there to be genuine non-moral guilt? Gabrielle Taylor argues that guilt, shame and remorse may always be thought of as moral, once we are willing to see them as forming part of an individual's 'personal morality code', and not just as part of their social (or conventional) morality. A 'personal morality code' would include an individual's view of how he ought to live his life, and what he ought to be. For example, John Rawls regards guilt as moral because it is thought to be essentially about harm done to others. But as Taylor notes, "I may feel guilty after a suicide attempt or because I watch too much T.V. The crucial thought is not that I must be harming others but that I am doing something forbidden" (1985, 194).

⁴² A second and more far reaching exception (to be examined in detail later in this sub-section) focuses on how an emotion such as 'survivor guilt' could not be "mediated by the judgment 'I am responsible for the damage,'" (Morris, 1971, 312) and so, could not be guilt as the optimists describe it.

Seeing something as forbidden (as wrong) could, then, hardly be taken as morally irrelevant. There are two perspectives to be had in regard to moral and non-moral examples of emotions according to Taylor, a subjective and an objective perspective. For Tim experiencing guilt due to having played very poorly in an amateur soccer match, that emotion may very well be directly impinging on his 'personal morality code'. Tim may take his soccer very seriously, train regularly, attend coaching sessions, see himself as an undiscovered George Best and so on. Though his team-mates might try to console him, they would not believe his poor performance warranted a feeling of moral guilt, nevertheless, their views would not be sufficient to alter Tim's estimation of himself.

As a consequence, the notion of morality should not be taken to include only adherence to, or breaking of, particular public (objective) moral rules. How a person sees himself and how he thinks he ought to live his life, are crucial to the idea of personal morality. So rather than guilt only being considered moral in so far as it is occasioned by the concern for others whom one had, or believes one had, harmed in some way, we might imagine how one could feel guilty at the end of the day thinking "I really didn't do enough work today. I could have read more or taken more notes; I shouldn't have gone fishing this afternoon". What is important in this formulation, is not that I feel I have harmed or injured someone else but, that I have engaged in an activity I had previously forbidden myself from doing (at least, on a workday). For my fishing stops me from studying, which stops me from attaining the goals I have set myself, which stops me from living life the way I feel I want and ought to, and this is enough for me, within my own personal morality code, to feel morally guilty.

An obvious objection to this idea, though perhaps not a fatal one, is that by extension an innumerable number of matters could potentially come under the heading 'personal morality code' and would, thus, become moral - my failed efforts to grow tomato plants, my not netting a double-figure salmon, my poor horsemanship. However, on its own, this point does not seem to be a significant enough reason to abandon the notion of a 'personal morality code', for the retort might well be, why shouldn't all of these activities be so encompassed⁴³?

⁴³ Cf. Bernard Williams's 'Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy' (esp. chapter 1).

At this point I would like to return to moral guilt, and a particular variant known as 'survivor guilt', which will help to clarify more fully the broader point of the importance connections in our understanding of the emotions. The definitive example of survivor guilt is, most probably, that experienced by so many concentration camp survivors who were liberated after the Second World War. There is no sense in which such people were to blame for the deaths of their family and friends, no acknowledgement on their part of wrongdoing or of breaking hitherto valued ethical principles or social *mores* but, nonetheless, they were racked with guilt. Guilt is often thought of as being occasioned by an awareness of having done (or wanting to do) something that is regarded as morally reprehensible, but this would not be an appropriate description of survivor guilt. Nor, as it happens, would examples of non-moral guilt, such as the type I mentioned earlier by a person who feels guilty for not exercising when they want to lose weight. It might then be thought that if the survivor did nothing to undermine other people's chances of survival by anything he did or did not do, and was in no way responsible for their deaths, then the guilt he feels is irrational.

In an article entitled *Guilt, Shame, and Morality* R. E. Lamb defines irrational guilt in the following way: "If *S* says, sincerely, that he feels guilty over something he did; and it is true that, in some full-blooded sense, he really did *do* it but also true that what he did is, quite clearly, *permissible*, and moreover he really ought to be able to see this *but irrationally refuses to concede it*, then his guilt is real and irrational. Or, if he says, sincerely, that he feels guilty over something he did, whereas in fact *he* did not do it, and it's the case that he really ought to be able to appreciate or accept the fact that *he* did not do it *but he irrationally refuses to concede this*, then, again, his guilt is real and irrational"⁴⁴ (italics my own, 1983, 335).

But survivor guilt hardly fits Lamb's definition, for the survivor does not feel guilty over something he did or did not do, nor does he imagine he should have or should not have done something. The survivor's feelings of guilt are not irrational in the sense supplied by Lamb, but nor are they incomprehensible. It might be argued that as the 'necessary condition' of feeling rational guilt (i.e. culpability) is not present, then, the emotion experienced by such people is more likely to

⁴⁴ For an interesting form of irrationality, a mid-point, perhaps, between Lamb's definition and its opposite, rationality, survivor guilt might be considered a type of Goldiesque 'intelligible irrationality'. Goldie observes that "being human does not involve exemplifying the ideals of rationality. What we should look for and expect from emotional thoughts, feelings, and actions is intelligibility, and one can be intelligibly irrational" (2000).

be regret rather than guilt. But examples of concentration camp survivor guilt can hardly be discounted as just mistaken cases of regret. What such people feel, and what guilt describes, is an emotion whose intensity and make-up is quite unlike regret. Their guilt becomes understandable, primarily, in terms of the loving relationships that bound them to their deceased relatives and friends, and still acts as a strong tie to them, even after death.

These close bonds disallow the survivor from feeling any sense of good fortune at the fact that he is alive, for he is racked with the guilt that asks, 'why should I survive and my family and friends die?' His guilt creates certain demands on him which, in turn, force him to reflect on many of the things in life he had previously taken for granted (just as in grief, periods of apparent passivity, are times when reappraisal and re-evaluation are taking place). He does not experience irrational guilt but nor does he experience incomprehensible guilt. Lyons attempts to account for this type of emotion by saying, "Survivor's guilt may be explained by a belief that "justice was not done", because it's unfair (unjust) that I survive but my brother dies" (unpublished correspondence, 29-8-95).

But how is the evaluation that "it's unfair (unjust) that I survive but my brother dies" formed in an innocent person to create this type of guilt? Surely, it would be completely irrational for a Second World War concentration camp survivor, who experiences survivor guilt, to hold the "belief that justice was not done", for from where does the reference to "justice" come? They could not be referring to justice not being done by the state, for they, more than anyone, would have long since recognised that the concept of justice was anathema to the Nazi regime, and that where there is no justice, references to it are void: "Under the influence of a world [life in Auschwitz] which no longer recognized the value of human life and human dignity, which had robbed man of his will and had made him an object to be exterminated" (Frankl, 1959, 70). And if the reference to injustice is made against fate, then, it is as irrational as the former, for how can someone feel personally and rationally guilty for something that is merely a matter of chance? The belief that "justice was not done, because it's unfair (unjust) that I survive but my brother dies" is, I suggest, more likely to be part of the make-up of an emotion such as anger, and not survivor guilt.

Sharon Bishop offers an explanation in terms of bonds being broken, "Concentration camp victims report feeling guilty about surviving when family members did not. I am not talking about

those who feel guilt because they undermined someone else's chances, but those who . . . survived simply because they were still living when the camps were liberated. One interpretation of these responses is that people who feel *connected*, . . . do not regard themselves as deserving better than those to whom they are bound, and hence feel uncomfortable . . . avoiding miseries that their fellows go through" (italics my own, 1987, 21).

Survivor guilt, thus, may begin to make more sense (as did grief) when viewed as the breaking or disconnecting of the loving bonds we have with people. The connections we have make us, literally, feel united, as one with the other, and give us a sense of harmony with those most special people in our lives. As we come to accept the reality of the destruction of these bonds, we also come to experience a profound sense of discomfort with our own existence, for we do not regard ourselves "as deserving better than those to whom [we] are bound" (Ibid. 21).

By drawing attention to survivor guilt I underscore the positive point I made earlier that grief too (itself based on broken connections) can, in many cases, be a powerful emotion in helping us focus, not just on ourselves and our loss, but also on how we relate to others and the world. Positive grief allows the griever to recognise (in periods of reflection and reappraisal) the necessity of moving-on in a way that is not damaging to himself. Inevitably, this is something he finds easier to achieve with the support of the other loving relationships he shares with family and friends and, crucially, with the knowledge that the deceased would also want this for him. To grieve positively we must be able to recognise the new reality into which we have been placed without being crippled by it. Positive grief does not lead to catatonic states or suicidal contemplation but, on the contrary, allows the griever to carry on living productively. Roberta Russell echoes this point, "In the right circumstances grief can be *cathartic* and a natural part of life, rather than merely a lonely and painful disaster" (italics my own, 1992, 98).

c) The Specific Legal/Cognitive Definition of Guilt and Rationality

The following points pertaining to the definition of legal guilt should be made at the outset of this sub-section: 1) a person must actually do something and be consciously aware of their behaviour, actions taken while asleep, for instance, kicking the dog while sleep walking, preclude guilt; 2) legal guilt necessitates culpability for wrongdoing and cannot be vicarious; 3) a person must

appreciate his wrongdoing as just that (i.e. he must not be insane or a infant⁴⁵); and 4) a 'legal' wrongdoing must have occurred, for no matter how frowned upon by a community, or society more generally, a particular act might be, if it is not illegal it cannot, therefore, be the basis for legal guilt.

Whatever the exact philosophical analysis of punishment, at some level by being punished, let's say by incurring a fine or a jail sentence, an individual who has been found guilty is thought to be repaying his victim (if there is one), and society more broadly, for what he has done. Mr. Smith is legally guilty if he has done something that constitutes breaking the law, and the punishment that is meted out to him is directed towards the illegal deed he has committed and his degree of culpability. What a just authority makes law must be obeyed, for to disobey the law is to leave oneself open, not only to the possibility of punishment but also to feelings of guilt. This is one way by which laws control what we do. Being closely associated with the idea of repayment and debt⁴⁶ guilt is, further, related to a sense of responsibility. We can be held responsible for what we do, what we do not do, and for what we are. These three points can be illustrated by John, who left the illegal Triad gang he was a member of when he began to feel guilty about 'what he did' (i.e. extract money by menaces), as well as for what he did not do (i.e. contribute constructively to his community) and for 'what he was' (i.e. a gangster). The guilt John feels for 'what he was', stems from the fact that harm was being done to others by his gang, even if John was not directly participating, for their actions reflected the type of standards and beliefs he espoused. John may attempt to mitigate the level of responsibility he held for such guilt by pleading ignorance, however, though such excuses may lessen (to some extent) his sense of responsibility, as his feelings of guilt are themselves based on his belief that he was to some degree responsible for what he did, what he did not do and what he was, his guilt will remain.

Moral philosophers have traditionally believed that moral problems were primarily occasions for deciding which of a number of claims were legitimate. It has been suggested that the highest stages of moral development include a capacity to be critical of conventional standards, and that such standards require the adoption of universal standards that are regarded as existing prior to social legislation. Sharon Bishop makes the point that "common philosophic interpretations of such standards typically involve the notion that they are self-evidently true or can be derived from some

⁴⁵ For an interesting discussion of emotions and infancy see Nussbaum (2001, 174-248).

⁴⁶ "As a reaction to someone else's plight guilt is owed to others", Greenspan, (1993, 56)

definition or analysis that can be defended as true. In either case the standards are regarded as true and the characteristic of truth passes on to the decisions. Moral agents who care about justifying their beliefs become seekers after these truths" (1987, 9).

These standards form the basis for constructing sets of principles that can help in answering moral problems. Any uncertainties people have are thought of as occurring due to the confusion that arises as to how such principles are to be applied in particular circumstances. The principles themselves are believed not to be open to attack. In this way, when Tom does what is required and acts from a sense a duty and within the law, any guilt he may feel in regard to these acts, will be thought of as irrational. For the principles which make up his moral character do not allow for the same act to be both right and wrong at the same time. And when such irrational emotions do occur, Tom will believe they are to be overcome privately, or perhaps with the help of a friend or therapist, but he will not believe that reparative acts or forgiveness are necessary.

O'Hear provides a distinction between guilt as 'objectively' present (i.e. the type of guilt handed down by a civil or criminal magistrate in a court of law against a criminal), and guilt as a 'subjective' emotion (i.e. the type of guilt felt by an individual due to some action A, that transgressed a standard or expectation of his⁴⁷ that illustrates how morality in this form is primarily about obligations and duties. "A man is said to be guilty when he has broken some law or code by which he is bound, as a result of which he incurs a liability to punishment . . . Looked at in this way, guilt is something objectively present once transgression has taken place . . . whether or not the offender feels any guilt or not" (O'Hear, 1976, 73).

This final point is worth briefly expanding upon. Unlike the example of Raskolnikov earlier, who felt guilt without it being rooted in concern for his victim, a perfectly sane and rational individual may be found guilty of a criminal offence in a court of law, yet never feel guilt. For instance, black South Africans living before the end of apartheid may have broken some of their country's laws believing them to be corrupt and oppressive. Though found guilty of wrongdoing, such people may very well have not felt in the least guilty for what they did, in fact, it would have been irrational for them to have done so. For recognising the laws to be unjust, they had no basis on

⁴⁷ For, as I have shown, we can feel guilty for what we are, "The thought plagues me ['Ratman'] constantly that the guilt is mine for the failure to become what I could have been with my abilities" (Freud, 1966, 244). Ratman's guilt is due to his belief that he squandered the talents he could once have nurtured and so feels that the real Ratman has never been fully unearthed, never been fully developed.

which to build any feelings of personal guilt. That is, such people would have needed to be aware (and believe) that by acting in particular way Y, they had transgressed some standard by which they should live their lives. But the laws they broke were correctly seen by them to be the laws of an oppressive minority white government, intent on keeping the structures of apartheid in place and, as a result, they felt no personal guilt for their actions. Herbert Morris summarises the point, "That legal guilt might exist without moral guilt is . . . evident. Here one only need point to the moral rightness of violating an iniquitous law" (1988, 69).

Guilt, as I have said, is classed as an emotion of 'self-assessment', for having committed a wrongdoing the guilty person not only focuses attention on any possible harm done to others but on himself as the doer of that deed (i.e. as the individual culpable). Such a person wants to repair the harm done to others, for by accepting the recompense that is to be exacted from him and making reparation, he will be able to cast-off the painful and debilitating burden of guilt he carries with him. Being unburdened of guilt in this way he will once again be restored to his unblemished state. If acts of reparation are not found, if his guilt is due to some action that appears un-repayable, then the self-torment that is often associated with guilt-ridden individuals may set in.

At this point I wish to consider the rationality of emotions and how historically they were viewed as unpredictable, fleeing and a threat to reason. Because of this it was believed that when faced with life's vicissitudes people, men particularly, should keep a 'stiff upper lip' and remain 'properly' unemotional. By so doing, it was thought, they were remaining in control, clear-headed and rational, while to be emotional was to be out of control, muddled and irrational. Women were decried for centuries as weak and emotional, a consequence of which was they could never be wise, "*Take the first advice of a woman and not the second*" the Eighteenth century proverb goes, the implication being that a woman's intuition will always be more astute than her feeble reasoning.

Such views, of course, fail to take cognisance of a number of important considerations with regard to emotions and rationality: 1) it is regularly said of emotions that they are 'understandable' given a particular set of circumstances. Saying "It's okay to feel that way," to a friend, for instance, who was afraid for his life during an armed robbery, means that in a similar situation we too might experience that emotion; 2) By saying such things we are also indicating that, given such circumstances, the emotions expressed were justified. And by accepting certain emotions to be

justified we may also accept certain actions as being justified. For example, when poverty-stricken Ellen steals penicillin in order to help her sick child, we might say "Ellen did it for love". We find a justification for Ellen's action in the emotion love, as it is the motivation for her to commit the crime; 3) As I have already mentioned, knowledge can change our emotions: Johnny, who was once afraid of the dark, has come to understand that by making certain judgements, for example, that bogeymen do not come out at night to attack children, he has come to alter his feelings and so no longer fears the dark.

De Sousa calls the capacity of the cognitive component within emotion to cause such change its 'thought-dependency'. He uses the example of grief, saying it cannot survive the discovery that what I was grieving about never took place, though he adds a note, "This thought-dependency suggests that emotions can be rational [i.e. they can change once we realise that what we thought had occurred, had in fact, not occurred] [. . . is] mitigated, in certain cases, by a continuation to feel vaguely upset and even to cast about for some substitute emotion. Sometimes an emotion finds a natural successor in a completely different one e.g. grief gives way to relief, anxiety turns into anger "Where were you [anxiety], you naughty boy [anger]" (1987, 5) In fact, de Sousa contends that practical rationality depends, in part, on the emotions because "they frame our decision-making and that the contrast between emotional and rational decision-making is erroneous" (Ibid. 90).

Earlier I described how we go about evaluating different situations, in the example given Tim found, quite unexpectedly, a wild rat on his bed and evaluated his finding to be both unpleasant and frightening. When his friend Tom found the same thing, Tim was taken aback to discover that Tom said he was happy to see the little critter, as he found wild rats interesting and very attractive. To Tim such a reaction was completely irrational, given that Tom had never voiced such an opinion before and, further, that objectively speaking, he believed, most people would find discovering a wild rat on their bed to be unpleasant and frightening. Tim's reaction of fear was formed, in causal-evaluative terms, when he held the cognitive judgement (or belief) that there was a wild rat on his bed; evaluated the object of that judgement as being something unpleasant and dangerous; felt ill-at-ease; found his heart was racing and his knees knocking; wanted to get out of his bedroom; and ran at speed out of the room. By seeing the situation as he did, Tim felt justified in claiming to be

rationality frightened (i.e. he felt justified in believing he was threatened by this wild rodent). He could, at this point, be quite confident that others faced with that same situation would react in a similar way and experience the same emotion. It is for this reason that Tim found Tom's response to be irrational, for it does not fit with how most people would objectively see that situation. Of course, as I indicated, if Tom were a zoologist with an interest in rodents, and rats in particular, his emotional reaction ('happiness' on discovering this interesting and attractive creature on his bed) may be regarded as quite rational.

d) False Processing, the Components of the Hybrid Theory and Irrationality

An emotion might be looked upon as irrational, disproportionate or inappropriate if any one of the components that go to make it up are falsely processed; "What we mean when we speak of someone's feeling something inappropriately is that he has attached the feeling to the wrong thing in terms of his own view of the world (it is not elevators which frighten him but being out of control); or that, while the feeling is appropriate to the thing he believes to be the case, his belief is mistaken" (Aufhauser, 1975, 290). Although our emotions may be irrational or inappropriate to the actual situation, they are so only because we hold mistaken or unjustifiable beliefs about the situation. So, for example, a person who is easily frightened might quickly judge quite benign matters to be dangerous. Mr. Jones is a scaffold erector living in Cork city with no connection to the conflict in the Middle-East, yet being of a nervous disposition and having heard on the news about the Al Axa Martyrs' brigade, he gets it into his head that they are out to abduct him. Given this fear, Mr. Jones is liable to make any number of mistaken judgements about all sorts of events. The friendly neighbour who greets him with a jolly "Hello" is suspected of being a signal man for the brigade; the waitress who smiles at him is thought to be part of an elaborate 'honey-trap'; the new postman an intelligence member gathering information on him. Such judgements only increase Mr. Jones's fear and make the emotion more obviously irrational.

An emotion may also be said to be irrational if it is evaluated in a manner contrary to how it would be objectively evaluated. Tom's evaluating finding a wild rat on his bed as positive, despite never having had any interest in rats, might be just such a case; or when the desire dimension is excessive. Tim's car has been very slightly damaged after a minor accident when a child bumped

her bicycle into it. Despite Tim's judgement that the damage is minimal and that the girl's actions were not deliberate, he still wants revenge for what she did and insists the police are called and charges against her be brought. Such desire is irrational, as there is nothing to help motivate such feelings of revenge; or if the affective component that goes to help make up that emotion is excessive. Many teenage girls who wept and screamed on hearing the news that the boy band *Take That* had broken up, may have been told by their parents to 'get a hold of themselves', to put their feelings of upset and disappointment into some sort of perspective.

A final variation on how irrational guilt can be felt: Tim was brought up a devout Protestant but as an adult came to question, and finally reject, that church's authority. Before his apostasy Tim had spent a long period of time weighing up the pros and cons as rationally and 'unemotionally' as he could. At a certain point, he convinced himself that his ideological differences with the church were too great to be bridged, and he formally relinquished his membership of that community. Yet, despite having come to this clear-minded decision, Tim is dogged by a curious form of irrationality that causes him to feel guilty. It is a guilt occasioned in a dispositional way, for example, every time he passes the church where he was baptised, or every time he visits the cemetery where his mother is buried. A possible explanation might be that Tim's emotional responses have not been able to keep up with his rationally arrived at decision to abandon the Protestant faith. Though not reversing his decision to leave the church, Tim's irrational guilt feelings may remain and may continue to play a part in colouring his thoughts about Protestantism. On this topic Cheshire Calhoun writes of what she calls the *emotional inertia hypothesis*, "Emotional habits persist through doxic vicissitudes. In her early years, Tess unquestioningly adopted her parents' belief in the immorality of homosexuality and found this lifestyle revolting. The deep roots of belief in Tess' childhood socialization make her acquisition of emotional habits connected with homosexuality unsurprising. But now [having grown up and changed her beliefs about homosexuality], her emotional responses have failed to keep pace with her revised beliefs. Thus, although unintelligible, given her present beliefs [that homosexuality is not immoral], Tess' revulsion is perfectly intelligible given her former beliefs" (1984, 333).

The following points might be made regarding when guilt could be considered irrational: 1) if it is based upon a belief that is itself irrational; 2) if it is felt in the absence of a belief that would make it rational; and 3) if it is felt disproportionately.

e) How Cognitive Guilt Differs from the Associated Emotions Shame and Remorse

It is helpful at this point to distinguish guilt from some closely associated emotions⁴⁸. This task will provide us with a clearer picture of how exactly one should view guilt, highlight some of the difficulties that can arise when comparing and contrasting it with other emotions, and how distinct it is from Heidegger's ontological analysis of *Schuld*.

We can say that shame, in general terms, is generated by a failure to live up to an ego ideal and does not, necessarily, have any legal or moral connotation, though, of course, we can feel shame for things we've done which are illegal or immoral, while also being able to feel ashamed of our poor work or our inconsiderateness. Shame is often experienced with a sense of being observed, though no actual viewer need be present. For example, an artist having produced a second-rate canvas may feel ashamed of his efforts, despite the fact that there is no one else in his studio to see his painting. It is not that the artist merely feels some aspect of the work has been badly executed, rather he believes he ought to have captured his subject matter more skilfully, "Shame is caused by the realization that we have fallen short of some standard we regard as important" (Kekes, 1988, 282).

Within the feeling of shame elicited the artist recognises something of his true self, and accepts that what he has done fits only too well into the bigger picture of who he really is. Feeling he has not lived up to his own personal ideal, the artist regards himself in a way he finds humiliating and, perhaps, distressing. The distress carries with it a strong desire not to be seen (figuratively) and, perhaps, literally to keep his failed efforts hidden. The overwhelming sense within shame is of being found out or falling short, and the individual feels a deep rooted and disquieting fear of being exposed. The word 'shame' itself comes from the Indo-European root 'kam or kem' "to cover, to veil, to hide." Leopold Bloom, the protagonist of James Joyce's *Ulysses*, may

⁴⁸ A point of clarity that will have importance in Part B) when I consider Charles Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger's description of emotions/moods and his account of shame.

illuminate the adage pertaining to shame's concealing core, "He that has horns [the symbolic horns of the cuckold] in his bosom, let him not put them on his head".

So the experience of shame, unlike that of remorse for instance, is inseparably tied to how the individual sees himself. The feeling of shame relates to the kind of person the individual actually is and not, as with guilt, to the wrong perpetrated by the individual. We do not normally relate the notion of responsibility, or culpability, to shame, for we may very well hold individuals responsible for what they do but we do not hold them, at least not in the same way, responsible for what they are. If John claims he is feeling guilty one of the contingent feelings we would expect him to experience is some element of responsibility for the guilt he claims to feel. If he fails to admit to any degree of responsibility, we would have serious doubts about accepting his guilt as being sincere. But it would be strange to imagine John claiming to feel ashamed of, let's say, his square jaw line, while he also accepts responsibility for the cosmetic implant he has had put into his chin.

Shame encompasses a much larger variety of experiences than either guilt or remorse. Shame may be felt because a person has done something illegal or immoral, but just as easily it may be felt due to one's physical appearance or because of some social gaffe one has committed, or because of one's character (or aspect thereof), one's address, one's accent, one's lineage and so on. But we can also be shamed through association, when one disapproves of the actions of individuals or groups to whom one is related, that is 'seeing' them as dishonourable or distasteful. In shame our ability to do better, or our intentions, are not nearly as relevant as they are in an emotion like guilt. The question of intentionality and ability are, in the case of guilt, fundamental to determining the particulars of the offence. There exists an internal respect in shame that stems from a belief held by the individual that certain actions are reprehensible to him. This blameworthiness comes from the feeling that accompanies shame, a feeling of having broken with a harmony, or unity, within oneself or to others whom one is emotionally connected. Within shame there is a deep sense of disappointment for having failed to adhere to the standards we have set for ourselves.

This sense of failure may be lessened somewhat by trying to adjust our standards to come into line with the standards held by others whom we respect, in order that we might adopt some new values. One's standards are, of course, not as easily altered as this suggests. After we have

accepted a particular set of values that we wish to live up to, we then regard them as ours, and there develops an intimate connection between the individual and the value system he has incorporated into his life. Ridding ourselves of shame by altering our standards is usually a slow process. For the adverse judgement we cast upon ourselves is tied to the present standards we hold, by reference to which we have made this judgement in the first place. Altering standards we hold dear takes time, as we slowly come to see them as being the wrong ones for our life. Naturally, the adoption of new values will do nothing to alleviate the feeling of distress at the time of the experience of shame, and so it must be simply lived through, either privately or with the help of professional guidance.

The subject-object division that is evident in many emotions is not present in shame for it is a self-directed emotion: the subject who has it and the object toward which it is directed are one and the same. The individual concerned plays two roles, viewer and viewed, and recognises that he is as the other sees him, and feels ashamed of how he appears to the other. The importance of the notion of an actual other, in some forms of shame, is made apparent when one considers that someone other than oneself can bring shame upon us. The biblical parable of the prodigal son is an example: The son's family were shamed by his profligate lifestyle, the family had done nothing to encourage his behaviour, but that would not of itself relieve them of their feelings of shame. The expression "he put his family to shame" makes clear the power of the third person to instil such an emotion in another, "shame can be felt, as a result of the failings of groups to which one belongs or because of one's inherited social or economic background or appearance" (O'Hear, 1976, 77). On the other hand, we would find it very odd if someone were to say "he put his family to guilt" (or "he made his family feel guilty"), for to experience guilt would necessitate the individual being willing to bear some degree of responsibility for the actions of the other. And the need for 'a degree of responsibility' in this case would suggest that the true feeling of guilt stems from the individual's own complicitous action, and not solely from the other person (for as we have said, guilt itself cannot be vicarious).

Shame fits less well to legalistic terms than an emotion like guilt, "The violation of rules [guilt] typically calls for punishment. This is not so in the case of ideals [shame]. Indeed, it is not clear that one can sensibly speak of the violation of ideals" (Lamb, 1983, 338). Earlier I pointed out that X is legally guilty if he has done something that constitutes breaking the law, and the

punishment that is meted out to him is focused on the illegal deed he has committed. Thus, what a fair authority makes law must be obeyed, for to disobey such law is to expose oneself to the possibility of guilt. Shame, on the other hand, is associated more with a sense of not having lived up to particular aims or ideals. We think of rules as being conformed to but ideals we imagine as being aimed at or lived up to. Laws control what we do, ideals organise who we are.

An individual feeling ashamed can quickly move from absorption in external act X to absorption in who he is. This happens as we become suddenly aware of the discrepancy that exists between our ideal self and our actual self. It is a revelation of not reaching our goals, a realisation that shows us up in a new and unattractive light. Outwardly we struggle to remain hidden while inwardly we try to adjust to our new awareness. The occurrence of shame is often triggered by some criticism or negative observation, the force of which exposes the actual that had been concealed beneath the apparent. The intensity that is generated by the emotion helps us to understand its protective capabilities. Shame may act as a form of self-protection, in that a liability to it helps to regulate our conduct by inhibiting behaviour that might instil in us that emotion. Richard Williams points out that for Max Scheler "shame protects the essence and moral worth of the intimate self" (1942). The principal evaluation within shame is concerned with the individual's new negative assessment of himself. He feels distressed at seeing his true self and he is often left feeling helpless and isolated. As a self-protecting emotion, shame prevents us from going further into that that would turn our already uncertain standards on their head.

Remorse, on the other hand, can be broadly defined as being felt for an act that hurts or injures other people or objects that we hold with (some degree of) value. It is not self-assessing like guilt, and nor is it as general or all encompassing as shame in relation to one's character. It is an emotion that focuses on the act or deed itself, rather than on how an individual views himself because of the act he has committed, and one where we expect affirmative action to be taken to rectify the wrong done. "Remorse is . . . tightly tied to a specific past action: its associated reparative desire does not amount to the sort of general need to clear the self - to *atone* for a wrong . . . that accounts for the motivational power of moral guilt" (Greenspan, 1993, 57).

Remorse also differs from guilt in another way; for with guilt a person may commit a wrongdoing yet remain unmoved about righting that wrong. The guilty person may allow

punishment to be passed on him without ever being actively involved in correcting what he has done. This passivity with respect to righting wrongs may also be seen in shame, where a person may feel utterly helpless and unable to motivate himself to take any reparative course of action whatsoever. The righting of wrongs through, let's say punishment (as is the case with some forms of guilt), is only the means to an end - the casting off of the burdensome emotion itself, and that is in direct contrast to the remorseful person - for whom the righting of wrongs is an end in itself.

The movement towards action that is a part of remorse is linked to the fact that it is not self-assessing. The remorseful individual does not direct attention onto himself but away from himself to the consequences of his actions, a looking outwards for ways and means of making things better. Focusing outwards the individual may feel morally responsible in regard to how his behaviour, his deeds, have affected others and be motivated toward reparative action. Max Scheler believes remorse to be a vital redemptive emotion for human beings to experience, an emotion, in fact, of salvation. So viewed, remorse can be understood as a process of healing, the remorseful individual attempting to rebuild his failed relationships to others and to his environment. The driving force behind such remorse is, then, the desire to reconstruct, and make anew, what has proven to be faulty. To retain his valued morality the individual is directed by his own moral standards, standards he feels have been tainted by his actions. "Remorse, might be seen as useful, not so much as against immediate threats, as on some longer term basis. Remorse might be seen as useful in helping us to avoid a repetition of some moral wrong, sin or crime about which we now feel remorse" (Lyons, 1980/1993, 188).

Like shame, remorse does not have judicial implications or entail notions of punishment as guilt does. One may feel remorseful for saying something that results in harm coming to another and face no rebuke - even if one does so when trying to be honest, while one may feel guilty and be punished for having lied - even when one knows that the lie saved a friend. Making reparations for a wrongdoing is not always easy to achieve when one's motivation is sourced in remorse. Unlike guilt felt over a violation of moral rules or precepts, there is no set way to heal the hurt one might express remorse for. Given this, irreparable damage may turn remorse into a paralysis, whereby the individual is totally overcome by it and can do nothing to change his negative situation. In this way, remorse can be seen as being far from the creative and forward-looking emotion Scheler described,

or the 'useful' one noted by Lyons. In some situations it may, in fact, become tormenting and self-destructive.

g) Conclusion

I addressed in this section four major points all of which have links to the Heideggerian analysis I will carry out later in Parts B) and C); firstly, I detailed two specific types of guilt, 'legal' and 'survivor', this allowed me to set up a position that will illustrate the contrasts between the ontic description made by Lyons (something I call when examining section 58 of *BT* 'simple guilt/lack') and Heidegger's ontological analysis; secondly, by critically describing survivor guilt the importance of the 'other' in guilt was elucidated, a point which will allow further comparisons and contrasts to be drawn with the description of guilt offered in *BT*; thirdly, I addressed the issue of labelling guilt as rational or irrational, a consideration which will again play a part later in the thesis when looking at the issue of the neglect of the irrational and; fourthly, I reflected on how guilt differs from the associated emotions shame and remorse, illustrating that shame does not contain a positive appetitive dimension, a point which will contrast with Charles Taylor's description of this emotion in Part B).

Part B

1) Heidegger's Pre-Cognitive and Ontologically Important Account of Guilt

- a) Introduction
- b) Getting to Grips with Guilt
- c) Distinguishing Ordinary from Ontological Guilt
- d) The Disclosiveness of Mood and Understanding
- e) The Specific Ontological Dimensions of Guilt
- f) Care's Ternary Structure and its Essential Nullity
- g) Dasein's Primordial Being-guilty and the Call of Conscience
- h) Resoluteness and the Call of Conscience
- i) Anticipatory Resoluteness and Temporal Transformation
- J) Conclusion

a) Introduction

In what follows I shall argue that Heidegger's theory of emotion/mood is a radically different approach from cognitive conceptions that regard emotions/moods as little more than sensuous states that accompany the higher faculty of reason and can be classified according to their qualities of pleasure, pain and desire. The unique contribution made in *BT* to our understanding of moods is the idea that they are a pre-cognitive means of disclosing Dasein's Being-in-the-world, a deep-rooted ontological insight that evades formulation by rational contemplation and allows Dasein access to Being.

Heidegger defines mood as "ontologically . . . a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself *prior to* all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure" (*BT*, 175). Mood is, in fact, our most acute and rudimentary form of awareness of our Being-in-the-world, of the presence of other Beings and of entities. 'Awareness' is, however, a little misleading, for Heidegger does not mean a type of knowing, or any other cognitive-laden concept but an attunement. His idea of attunement⁵⁰ is to be understood as an orientation where "Dasein is

always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has" (Ibid. 174). Primordial mood is to be understood as the disclosive backdrop against which specific moods and emotions play out their roles. Though moods orientate us, we are often unaware of their presence and individual moods, such as irritation or cheerfulness emerge out of primordial mood that reveals our world into which such phenomena play their part. Understood in this way mood is Dasein's means of most fundamentally grasping that *it is*.

In section 58 of *BT*, entitled *Understanding the Call and Guilt*, Heidegger describes guilt and by extension emotion/mood more generally, and it will be by closely examining and interpreting this description that I will be in a position to compare and contrast both cognitive and non-propositional accounts with it. In what follows evidence is offered for advancing the thesis that to properly appreciate the means by which Heidegger deepens our understanding of emotion/mood we must recognise his account as both pre-cognitive and ontologically imperative.

b) Getting to Grips with Guilt

When scrutinising guilt Heidegger starts from Dasein's most distinct position of Being-in-the-world and Being with-others. Only because Dasein is concernfully in-the-world is it that one's Self can be called to its capacity-to-be. *Seinkönnen* is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as 'potentiality-for-Being' but this is a rather prosaic designation, and as Dreyfus points out is "misleading, since *können* signifies a know-how, not just a potentiality" (Dreyfus, 1991), for this reason I prefer 'capacity-to-be' or Charles Guignon's 'ability-to-be'⁵¹. The call of conscience brings Dasein face to face with its own unsettledness, and as the entity that has been thrown into being a Self it is called to become an authentic Self. In existentially interpreting what the call calls us to, no specific possibility of Dasein can be bracketed-off. What is not called is the merely existentially individual understanding of what Dasein is but what belongs to the existential condition (or the general characteristics of Dasein) for the possibility of its factical-existential capacity-to-be.

⁵⁰ I will discuss this key term in more detail in section 2) following.

⁵¹ For an interesting overview as to how Heidegger has been translated into English see Miles Groth's book, 'Translating Heidegger' (2004).

Despite the importance of Dasein's Being-in-the-world and Being with others, to grasp its own being called to it must be free of the distorted chatter of the *'they'*. At the factual concerned-solicitous level an authentic understanding of the call is not always grasped, and as the addressee Dasein is not furnished with information about its concerned dealings in-the-world or given directions to guide its questioning. The caller remains unconcretised and simply brings Dasein before its capacity-to-be.

Dasein is called from its fallen *'they'*-self to its mineness, to its possibility for individualisation and, further, its basic 'sense' of unsettledness is disclosed (i.e. its 'from where'), for as thrown Being-there it can never be completely at-home. As Dasein's everyday mode of being is absorption in the *'they'*, such a disclosure is imperative if its authentic individualisation is to come about. Dasein's 'from where' which is called, is the very 'where to' to which the call brings it back, so that it can stand up for itself and see itself as fallen. Given the fact that calling forth is a means of calling us back, this movement raises two core questions: 'What is it exactly the call gives us to understand?' and 'How is this calling achieved?'

A uniquely creative thinker Heidegger often builds on the etymological roots of his native German and on ancient Greek motifs to devise neologisms and reinvigorate tired terms with renewed meaning. Though historically 'Dasein' simply meant 'existence' (Joan Stambaugh tells us it was Heidegger's "express wish that in future translations the word *Da-sein* should be hyphenated" (1996, xiv) for fear it would be misunderstood as 'existence'. This concern seems superfluous in this study, as part of my task is to say exactly what Heidegger meant by 'Dasein'), in *BT* it means something more exalted, "This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term '*Dasein*'" (Ibid. 27). Dasein immediately draws attention to its location (Being-there or to-be-there) as an entity that finds itself in a particular place and not everywhere, not infinite but as a point of reference, 'there', for itself. However, the *Da* of *Dasein* is not to be understood as designating a simple spatial location, for "Dasein brings its 'there' along with it" (Ibid. 171). Dasein's fundamental and distinctive characteristic is that it has the ability to find Being as an issue for itself, the "*Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being*. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological" (Ibid. 32).

Dasein is the entity, and situation, where Being is potentially articulated. Dasein emerges or stands out (*ex-(s)ists*) from other beings. The word *exist* (or *eksist*) originally had this active sense of 'emerging' or 'standing out' (from the Latin *sisto* - to stand or set, and *ek* - out or beyond), a resonance which has been lost over the centuries. In fact, the word today is frequently used as a synonym for the complete opposite, 'passivity' or 'lethargy'. Someone claiming to experience *ennui*, to be fed-up, will often describe themselves as "merely existing", and severely physically and mentally handicapped people, inappropriately labelled 'vegetables', are sometimes spoken of as "just existing". However, Heidegger returns to the original meaning of the word, so that standing out makes Dasein out standing (*ausgezeichnet*) and, literally, the excellent ontically there-located *questioner* questioning himself ontologically. This *quest* finds its starting point in Dasein's effort to understand what its 'there' and its 'Being' mean.

Despite human Dasein's significance it would be a mistake to call Heidegger a existentialist philosopher, for his fundamental ontology is not designed to be anthropocentric. The ineluctable *Leitfrage* in *BT* is, in the broadest possible sense, 'What is the meaning of Being?' Dasein shows up individual human existence rooted in socio-temporal earth, potentially fertile with ontological fruit. It is never a single self (yet it is mine) distanced from others and what is around it, Dasein is never outside looking in but always analysed as Being-in-and-through-the-world.

This key point is fundamental not merely to the discussion of guilt but to emotion/mood analysis itself for, rather than searching for the call's disclosive meaning in an isolated, solipsistic Dasein, one needs to be guided by what is generally heard in an experience of conscience. This can be either Dasein addressed by the call as plain 'guilty', or as giving a metaphorical warning shot across our bows as possibly 'guilty', or even when our conscience is clear ('good') as 'conscious of no guilt.

It is important to remember that for Heidegger our moods are generally public; Dasein is so absorbed in the '*they*'-world its attunement is primarily communal and, as such, our orientation in-the-world, the public 'forms of life', are determined by our culture. "Publicness as the type of Being of the '*they*' has not only in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and 'makes' them for itself" (*SZ* 138; *BT* 178). In this way our means of Being with one another finds a footing so that attunement provides "not agreement in opinions but in form[s] of life" (Calhoun,

Solomon [ed.], 1984, 240). In whatever way we might interpret and experience conscience the 'guilty' is, then, agreed upon. It is helpful here to note that the word used by Heidegger, '*Übereinstimmend*' may be understood more constructively if we think of it in terms of how the later Heidegger used it. That is, not simply as 'agrees with' but more akin to how Wittgenstein (1992) uses the term '*Übereinstimmung*' ('agreement in judgements'), that is, as a means of illuminating the notion of making possible *our* everyday regular practices in being able to 'find our feet' with others.

Nevertheless when the meaning of this agreed upon 'guilty' is known, the more profound existential conception of Being-guilty will remain obscure. And this fact of the call is heard as accusational, Dasein addresses itself as guilty, something made possible only through the interpretation of its own Being. A significant question now arises, 'Who says why we are guilty and what 'guilty' means?' Guilt cannot be an ethical term simply foisted upon us, though guilt is connected to indebtedness and responsibility (the guilty person making reparations for a deficiency within himself that he has responsibility for), it is the deeper ontological lack that *BT* is concerned with. Heidegger draws attention to the fact that if there is to be any chance of understanding the essence of guilt, then, a blueprint of such a possibility must be already in Dasein. But how can this phenomenon be traced?

For quotidian Dasein Being-in-the-world both reveals and conceals its unsettledness. In being covered up we are, conversely, forced to focus on the phenomena of guilt, conscience and death and, as a consequence, something of its more profound meaning is made manifest to us. As I have already mentioned, the call is not concretised, yet it is the call of Dasein as unsettled, wrenched from 'tranquillised familiarity' and, as such, it stands as authentic capacity-to-be, something which is alien to the '*they*'-self though it is at once within and without the self. So from where do we get the primordial existential meaning of 'guilty?' Simply from the fact that, by Being, I am guilty.

However, the significance of the existential meaning of what has been called remains unanswered. There is a recognition in *BT* that in our busy everyday '*they*'-lives the conceptualisation of what has been called is ignored and needs to be addressed if we are going to

be in a position to understand 'why' and 'how' our everyday means of understanding the call of guilty becomes distorted in the first place.

c) Distinguishing Ordinary from Ontological Guilt

What is assessed initially in *BT* is the common meaning of Being-guilty, for instance, 'owing' or 'being indebted' to someone. Our having such debts is an essential means of Being-with-others in our everyday way of Being-in-the-world (i.e. in concern). There are a variety of ways concern of this type shows itself, for example, in denying, depriving, withdrawing or withholding those things which others have a legitimate claim to (i.e. to their possessions). This concern-based Being-guilty is distinct from 'being responsible for' something. One can be the cause or the occasion for something without actually owing anything to anyone or even being due to owe anything. And while one can be responsible for something without owing, it is equally true that one can owe something without being responsible for it, that is, someone else can incur debts with others that effect or that are 'for me'.

The linguistic parallels that exist in German between *Schuld* and *Schulden haben* unfortunately do not emerge in the English translation. John Haugeland details the links, "Heidegger . . . takes advantage of some relationships among German word-senses that can't be reproduced exactly in English. The term that I am translating as "responsibility" is "*schuldig*". The two most common senses of this word are guilty/at fault/culpable and obliged/indebted/liable. "Responsible", in English, is not as specific as either of these senses, but is broad enough to cover them both. Clearly, the common theme is how one ought and ought not to behave. (It is helpful to remember that "*schuld-*" is cognate with "should"). Thus, Heidegger can say that, according to common sense, conscience mainly tells us that we are *schuldig* - guilty or obliged. But he can then go on to say that guilt and obligation are merely fallen public interpretations of being *schuldig* - interpretations that track only public norms and statuses, keeping score on everyone's credits and debits, points and infractions. As fallen, however, these "normal" interpretations are but forgetful disguises of a more originary *self-responsibility* - one that cannot be public but can only be taken over by an individual. Conscience, understood existentially, calls upon Dasein in each case to take over and own *this* responsibility" (Malpas and Warthall [eds.], 2000, 65).

These examples; 'having debts to' (someone) - *Schuld haben bei (jemand)* and 'having responsibility for' (something) - *Schuld haben an (etwas)* are the ordinary meanings of Being-guilty and can be linked to a definite type of behaviour called 'making oneself responsible'. Here we find the traditional sense of the term 'legal guilt' is used, an emotion that is regarded socially as positive as it is, generally, linked to having a debt to society when one has broken the law. A particular outcome of which is being prepared for some form of punishment or censure and for the burden of guilt one is expected to feel. Of course, the guilt focused on in *BT* is not limited to the ontic level of actions performed or not performed but to our interactions with one another publicly. 'Making oneself responsible' is something that can, then, stem from a responsibility for another's "endangered existence" (SZ, 282), as Heidegger calls it, an owing, not for breaches of the law but for a lack in the ground of another's Being. This guilt is founded on our intimate Being-with-others and sourced in our not being the ground of Being, that is, Being the ground of a nullity.

Though the source of these 'debt claims', and the conceptualisation of them, still remains unclear there is something I can state with certainty; Being-guilty, as the breaking of moral demands (*'Forderung'*), is a mode of Being for Dasein and there are other types of demands mentioned, for example, 'making oneself responsible', 'having debts' and 'having responsibility for', these too are modes of behaviour for Dasein. Macquarrie and Robinson (and Joan Stambaugh) translate *'Forderung'* as 'requirement', however, this seems misleading, as requirement carries with it none of the on-going motif of owing which Heidegger wishes to emphasise. In fact, the German word *'Anforderung'* would be a more accurate translation of requirement. It is useful to note that 'demand' may also be translated as *'Anspruchsvoll'*, the root of which, *'Anspruch'*, means 'claim'. For these reasons I have chosen to use 'debt claim' or 'demand' (which is also a translation of the word *'Nachfrage'*) to translate *'Forderung'*.

Considering guilt in terms of moral guilt alone, however, would be to misrepresent the description given in *BT*. Such a characterisation only makes clear that it is insufficient to distinguish ontologically between this attribute of Being and the type of behaviour already outlined. Because moral guilt has ontologically been so poorly explicated in the history of western philosophy, according to Heidegger, one result is that when other notions, such as 'deserving punishment' or 'having debts to someone' are added to it and, expand its meaning, such

interpretations become dominant⁵². Because of this, 'guilty' gets relegated to the realm of mere concern and in a way that it is conceived as a type of simple totting up of claims that creates a metaphorical 'Reconciliation Account' so that figures can be balanced off, ignoring the ontological dimension that such a mood carries.

d) The Disclosiveness of Mood and Understanding

In order to fully appreciate the profundity of Being-'guilty' I need at this point to examine how moods more broadly are understood, that is, not only to describe them but to provide a interpretation of mood along with the other basic existentialia including understanding, discourse and Being-in.

The openness Dasein has to the world discloses its original uniqueness in existentially important ways; a simple mood, for instance, illuminates a particular way we find ourselves and colours our experience of situations and people. But moods also have a key role in revealing our ontological orientation; anxiety, for example, belongs to the totality of Being-there and reveals that Dasein is and has to be while its 'where from' and 'where to' remain hidden. Dasein's way of finding itself is thrownness, something which reveals "that in each case Dasein, is my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite entities within-the-world" (BT, 264).

Dasein finds itself not as an object in-the-world but as attuned where it has to be among the littered *a priori* givens of such things as, place of birth, intelligence, sex, hair colour, height and so on. These givens, that are taken on in existence are called 'facticity'; not merely the *factum brutum* of the occurrent but a way in which things *already* matter to Dasein and which it depends on for its objects and for its possibilities as its way of Being-in-the-world⁵³.

Dasein's finding itself where it has to be is its thrown possibility, with some possibilities already limited. 'Possibility' here does not refer to those things that might conceivably happen but to a way of Being that carries Dasein into the future. Its Being is an issue for it by way of things mattering and, what matters most fundamentally are the possibilities into which it has been thrown

⁵² As I show in section 2) it is because of his overtly ontic interpretation that Charles Taylor can attempt to attribute to attunement a cognitive dimension.

⁵³ As I demonstrate in section 2), when arguing against Taylor's position, 'mattering' is a 'given' and not simply borne of culture, for it is more primordial than mere cultural conditioning.

and the manner it deals with them, for I have to be who I am and cannot be some other. Through 'circumspection' what is within-the-world, something already disclosed to Dasein through mood, can matter to it, "Only something which is in a state-of-mind [i.e. mood] of fearing (or fearfulness) can *discover* that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening" (Ibid. 176). It is not surprising to discover that moods (which illuminate our orientation) cannot be manipulated, for it is not within our power to switch moods on and off. In fact, Heidegger goes so far as to say we are always in some mood, as they continue to break-in or assail us. Moods are the ontic occurrences of the ontological and *a priori* phenomenon of attunement, "What we ontologically designate by the term "attunement" is ontically quite familiar and everyday: the mood, the Being attuned (SZ, 134).

But Dasein cannot gain mastery over the ground of its Being, though as it exists its capacity-to-be must take over Being the ground and, as such, Being its own ground is the very issue which is at the heart of care's concern. Dasein finds itself thrown into the burdensomeness, facticity and *how it is* of its Being. An answer to the question 'How *is* Dasein this thrown ground?' can only be achieved by recognising Dasein as projecting itself into the possibilities that are there by virtue of its being thrown, that is, into which it has been thrown so that it can be such ground.

There are a number of core ontological features of Dasein's 'Being-the-ground', such as that it can never exist before its ground and, because it stems from it and as it, it cannot have control over its Being from the ground up. Even though Dasein must take over (i.e. be) its own ground, it constantly lags behind its possibilities. The incapacities, the negatives/nots here stem from the existential aspect of Dasein's thrownness, for Being-the-ground itself is a negativity, a nullity. However, negativity does not mean something like a simple not-Being-present-at-hand but the far more fundamentally substantial meaning of the 'not' at the heart of what constitutes the Being of Dasein - its very thrownness. And this negativity can be defined existentially: in Being its Self Dasein as a Self has been thrown not by itself but released to itself from the ground in order to be this very ground. Dasein is not itself the ground of its Being, yet as Being-its-Self *it* is the Being of *its* ground. For the ground itself is always only such as it is for Dasein whose Being has to, if it is to be authentic, take over Being-the-ground (but not 'the ground of its Being').

Given that Dasein is its ground existingly and in a way that it understands itself in terms of possibilities (and thus as thrown), means that as a capacity-to-be Dasein is persistently placed in

one possibility or another. As a result it is not other possibilities and has given up these in its kind of projection of what he or she is (i.e. its existentiell projection). Because of its basic thrown state such a projection is coloured not simply by the nullity of Being-the-ground but also by its very Self (i.e. the projection itself) being essentially null. Saying this however does not mean that the merely ontic property of 'failure' can be applied to it, for what is significant is that such a determination is existentially constitutive of the make-up of the Being of such a projection. This nullity then is of a type that belongs to Dasein's Being-free for its existentiell possibilities, for its choices, its ways of Being. Naturally this freedom is taken, is borne, only as a counter-weight to the fact that other choices have not, and cannot, be so taken.

The second ontologically significant disclosive structure of Being-in-the-world is 'understanding' (*verstehen*), the root of which is *stehen* 'to stand' and, as with ex-(s)ist ('emerging', 'standing out'), emphasises that the way of grasping the meaning of something is for it to 'show itself' or 'stand out' from the crowd. Of course, when writing of understanding Heidegger does not simply mean our cognitive comprehension of facts about ourselves and the world, but our means of laying bare, a disclosure that relates to our possibilities. And such disclosedness could not come from the mere discovery of things in the realm of factuality, just as Dasein's understanding of the world could not be at one remove from its understanding of itself. Instead, Dasein's mode of understanding its environment is an interpretation of itself that reveals how it deals with the issue of its own Being, "In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself" (Ibid. 188).

What we take on then understandingly in an encounter is achieved through its co-partner interpretation, for by giving something a place within the totality of meaningful things that are grasped we do not casually apply significance to it but interpret it as it relates to a background of understandability. The world thus comes into focus through understanding and the myriad possibilities that in turn are made visible. Dasein is a projection into a world of already-given possibilities that further projects possibilities onto entities in order that it might encounter them meaningfully. Projection is a way of appropriating entities by throwing forward Dasein into new possibilities. By projecting in this way Dasein, over time, comes to recognise the usability of those

things it encounters and, as such, they become significant. As a result, and based on practical concern, understanding becomes Dasein's principal means of occupying the world.

There are two structures in 'interpretation' that need to be mentioned at this point; the *as*- and *fore*- structures. What we interpret through our circumspective comportment is something *as* something and, consequently, we come to appropriate an understanding of it. The *as*-structure (*Als-struktur*) is linked to the serviceability (*Dienlichkeit*) element of that complex interconnected instrumental system of Dasein's practical concern and plays the central role of disclosing a something's usability *as* being the right tool for a particular job. For instance, what I see *as* the rather long piece of coloured material I put around the collar of my shirt *as*, is a necktie and not *as* a bowtie or *as* a cravat. My seeing the necktie *as* I do, is just my practical way of encountering this entity among innumerable others within what is usable or serviceable, "In one's current using and manipulating, the concerned circumspection . . . *brings* the ready-to-hand *closer* to Dasein, and does so by interpreting what has been sighted" (Ibid. 410).

What is clear then is that for Heidegger understanding-interpretation is active, that is, the meaning or characteristic of an entity is something brought about by our use or potential use, and is not a process of labelling static things crying out for names. Our 'seeing-as' differs greatly from traditional western empirical epistemology that regarded 'seeing' as an observation of objects with given properties from which a use might be made. Seeing something *as* something, for Heidegger, involves a web of interrelations; extraneous to this web entities cannot be interpreted by Dasein and so cannot be thought meaningful and, consequently, are not understood. The worldhood/worldliness of the world constitutes a plethora of roles, functions and interactions (the complex interconnected instrumental system) within which entities may be encountered, and Dasein is as much a component (is as much a Being-with in-the-world) of that system as Dobbin the horse or a Newgrange megalith.

The second structure in interpretation, *fore*-structure (*Vor-struktur*), is what was earlier described as the "background of understandability". For the possibility of interpretation to occur some way of seeing must exist, "An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us" (Ibid. 191-192). There are three interconnected components to this *fore*-structure: *fore*-having (*Vor-habe*), *fore*-sight (*Vor-sicht*), and *fore*-conception (*Vor-griff*). The *fore*-

having component is the general understanding of the totality of involvements (*Bewantnisganzheit*) against which the entity to be interpreted stands. However, having a general understanding, a background, does not of itself make explicit a given entity and so the second component, fore-sight, is required. Here we see in advance the way things can appropriately appear and anticipate the means of interpretation. But for this to happen, for something to be seen clearly enough to be anticipated appropriately, a particular concept/s needs to be in place, whereby, the interpretation might occur at all, and this is the third component, fore-conception. In other words, I can only interpret my necktie as being what it is to me (mainly a clothing accessory) as long as I have the concept to do so. I cannot *see* the necktie as a bowtie or cravat, if I do not have the concepts 'bowtie' and 'cravat'. The as- and fore-structures are present in Dasein in such a way that, "In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation" (Ibid. 190-191).

e) The Specific Ontological Dimensions of Guilt

To more clearly understand the ontological importance of guilt, and not to be side-tracked into imagining it to be only linked to 'having debts' or 'breaking laws', requires a refocusing towards what is meant by Being-guilty in this new way, 'guilty' now being conceived in terms of Dasein's kind of Being.

This new conception of the idea of guilty means that our well-established definition of it based on our concernful dealings with others in-the-world must be dropped. For this to happen, guilt must be detached from its link to such concepts as 'ought' and 'law'. Ordinary guilt is defined as a lack, what I call a 'simple lack', for something which ought to be, and which can be, is missing. But missing means not-Being-present-at-hand and a lack in this regard is still a definite sort of Being. The distinction here is important, for it is vital for Heidegger that in existence nothing is lacking in this simple way, not because existence would then be perfect but because a 'complex

lack', the ground-of-Being lack, is distinct from our everyday experience of a 'simple lack' (or is distinct from any presence-at-hand).

Though the statement is made in section 58 that "in the idea of 'guilty' lies the character of the 'not'" (SZ, 283), Heidegger immediately recognises some difficulties with it; for if 'guilty' can be applied to existence this creates the ontological problem of explaining existentially the 'not'/'negative'-character of this not. It is perhaps useful here to remember that William Richardson translates of *Nichtigkeit* as 'negativity' rather than MacQuarrie and Robinson's 'nullity', and so to consider the 'not' as 'negative' in this sense. But within the concept of guilty, and without distinction from it, belongs the idea of 'having responsibility for' or 'Being-the-ground for', so that existentially the idea of guilty is 'Being-the-ground for' a Being that has been defined by a 'not' or Being-the-ground of a nullity/notness.

There is an expansion of the idea of the 'not' here; within guilt, understood existentially, this 'not' excludes any connection to the present-at-hand and, as a result, Dasein should not be measured against anything present-at-hand or anything that is not as Dasein *is*, that is, existing. In this way anything that is lacking in some manner (e.g. 'simple lack') is excluded. The 'complex lack' stemming from Dasein that is Being-the-ground-for-something, does not have the same 'not'-character as the 'simple lack' which is founded upon it. The ground does not acquire its negativity/nullity from the 'not'-character of that for which it is the ground. 'Complex lack', Being-guilty, is not created by a 'simple lack' debt but indebtedness itself only becomes possible because of a primordial 'guilty'. However, the question arises, 'can such an idea be shown in Dasein's Being and how is it existentially possible?'

One should note that the "Being of Dasein is care" (comprised of the structural and temporal components a) facticity--thrownness--past; b) existence--projection--future; and c) falling--*das Man/being-amidst*—present) and that Dasein exists as thrown, brought into its 'there' but not of its own accord. Though Dasein exists as a capacity-to-be that is a part of itself (i.e. belongs to itself), yet it has not given itself to itself. 'Existing' Dasein can never get back behind its own thrownness to release this 'that-it-is-and-has-to-be' from its Being-itself and lead it into the 'there'. For thrownness does not lie behind existing Dasein as some event that occurred, something that happened to Dasein and has then fallen loose from it. Rather, as long as it is, Dasein is

constantly its 'that' as care. Dasein delivered over as the Being that it uniquely is, is the ground of its capacity-to-be. However, as it has not laid this ground itself, it rests, Heidegger says rather poetically, "in the weight of it" (SZ, 284), something which mood reveals as a burden.

f) Care's Ternary Structure and its Essential Nullity

In order to deepen our appreciation of the disclosive structures of Dasein, principally of mood but also of its co-partners understanding and discourse, I will return at this point to the single most important and unifying concept touched upon yet, care (*Sorge*). Because in German the terms used by Heidegger often have root similarities it should be noted that care relates to Dasein itself, *concern* (*besorgen*) to Dasein's encounters with things in-the-world and *solicitude* (*Fürsorge*) to Dasein's interaction with other Beings. As Dasein's very Being is an issue for it conceived as care, so too, as both other structures are indivisible from it, must solicitude and concern be involved in the effort to decide for itself how to be, by concerned-solicitous care (*besorgend-fürsorgende Sorge*).

In *BT* the focus is on the two structural components of existence, thrownness and projection (i.e. Dasein already-in-the-world and Dasein ahead-of-itself) and how at the core of their make-up is nullity. What this nullity provides is the ground for the possibility of Dasein's inauthenticity in its falling, which it inevitably already always is when considered factically. Care in essence is thoroughly permeated with nullity and the existential definition of guilt as 'Being-the-ground of a nullity' is, thus, accurate, for this very ground is defined as a lack - Dasein is guilty. As a result, before any possible projection Dasein is already null-coloured but nullity cannot be some ontic condition that Dasein merely needs to overcome, for the Being of Dasein is already, and always, null.

There are some obvious difficulties in interpreting this Being-'guilty': one cannot get closer to the quarry of the existential phenomenon of guilt by being guided, for instance, by the idea of evil, of guilt understood as a wrong-doing, an immoral act. For its opposite, the idea of goodness, has the same ontological root in the ontology of the present-at-hand. Dasein (whose Being is care) can, as we know, be loaded with factual guilt of the type sourced in 'simple lack'. But Dasein is guilty far more fundamentally, for it is guilty from the ground up and, not

surprisingly, it is this primordial type of guilt that creates the ontological conditions for Dasein to experience guilt in its everyday factual existence. That this primordial Being-guilty, first and foremost, remains undisclosed, that it is kept closed off by Dasein's fallen Being, reveals only the aforementioned nullity. Being-guilty is more primordial than any cognitive awareness of it and only because Dasein, in the ground of its Being is guilty, and as thrown and fallen closes itself off from itself, is conscience possible.

In the ternary structure of care lies Dasein's essential ontological guilt. For in a) facticity, thrownness and mood Dasein finds that it controls nothing, it enters a world not by its own propulsion but simply arrives 'there', consequence of which is that existentially Being is manifestly attuned as burdensome, thus, Dasein is the ground of its own Being, determined by nothing and, as such is the foundation for B) understanding, projection and possibility. In anxiety Dasein recognises itself as not authentic, as not itself and flees. The existential understanding is equally negative, for the ground of its projective possibilities is its thrownness and as sheer possibility Dasein has no prior foundation. And if Dasein did not experience the mood of guilt, it would not flee in the face of death and, C) fall into the 'they', again reinforcing its fundamental nullity, "*Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through.*" Thus "care" - Dasein's Being - means . . . Being-the-basis of a nullity . . . This means that *Dasein as such is guilty*, if our formally existential definition of "guilt" as "Being-the-basis of a nullity" is indeed correct" (Ibid. 331). The call of conscience tells me I am guilty, not in any specific sense regarding something I have or have not done, but from "the fact that this "Guilty!" turns up as a predicate for the 'I am'" (Ibid. 326). For as I have made clear, one can never choose the foundations of one's existence, and so must accept they are essentially deracinated.

g) Dasein's Primordial Being-guilty and the Call of Conscience

Heidegger asks what clues⁵⁴ are there for us to pick up on in order that we can point to the primordial Being-guilty of Dasein, and is guilt there only if we are consciously aware, or is it the case that this ontologically vital Being-guilty shows itself in the very fact that it is hidden. Being-

⁵⁴ Compare: SZ 286, BT 332.

guilty is far more profound than any mere 'knowing' in our everyday Being-in-the-world and reveals its nullity by exactly not being disclosed, by being 'kept closed off' by fallen Dasein.

The call of conscience is nothing less than the call of the Being of Dasein or care, and what constitutes care is Being-guilty. In unsettledness Dasein is brought closer to its nullity and, as a result, closer to its primordial Self that is part of the possibility of its capacity-to-be. Dasein as fallen everyday Being is called by this very capacity-to-be. What the call calls to is forward to taking over its existence as thrown that-it-is and that it has been immersed in the '*they*', and back to understand its very thrownness is the null ground it must take up in existence. This calling back in which conscience calls forth makes it clear to Dasein that the ground on which it stands is not its own, and the projection from which that ground is the launch-pad is also null, and that it must bring itself back from its lostness in the '*they*' - all of which means it has been brought to face its guilt.

Dasein is given an understanding of itself as gaining knowledge of itself while also drawing attention to the fact it is guilty. However, if the character of the call is that of a 'called to' Being-guilty what does this 'called to' Being-guilty actually mean?

In answering this question one finds there is a reinforcement of the notion that the authentic or, more complete, understanding of the call can only be had if one avoids the degraded conception of guilt which regards it as a debt to be repaid due to an action or thought performed or neglected. As the call of conscience stems from Dasein and, being solely directed to that Being, such a phenomenon is not arbitrary. The call is to Dasein as it already is (i.e. Being-guilty), and attempts to perform acts that will induce guilt are fruitless. Dasein can only listen to the guiding call that directs it to the authentic 'guilty'. By hearing the call authentically one opens oneself up to one's own capacity-to-be guilty genuinely. By allowing itself to hear, Dasein has become free to be called forth and by grasping the meaning of the call, Dasein listens to its 'ownmost' Self's possibility to exist authentically - for it has rejected the '*they*' world of mere familiarity and chosen itself.

By choosing this authentic possibility of Being-guilty Dasein squarely recognises the '*they*'-world's limits, the everyday world of changing rules and social *mores*. The '*they*' knows only how to listen to the chattering of what's around it, yet in the call the '*they*'-self can choose, not in the public manner of choosing a course of action between doing what is right or wrong but far more

fundamentally to have a conscience, to be free of the *'they's'* superficial interest and to choose one's Being-guilty. Put succinctly, "understanding the call means wanting-to-have-a-conscience" (*Gewissen-haben-wollen*) (SZ, 288/BT, 334), something which carries with it no moral overtones of 'good' or 'bad' conscience and still less has it anything to do with the call being voluntarily nurtured. 'Wanting to have a conscience' has nothing in common with uncovering one's factual guilt or indebtedness by exploring one's actions so as to be able to exculpate one's guilt, or to bypass our everyday types of guilt by searching out our essential 'guilty'.

Rather it is a reaching back to the far more important primordial existential pre-supposition of becoming guilty by Dasein choosing its capacity-to-be by not being tranquillised by the *'they'*, something which leaves it 'authentically responsible', a term that has significance for Dasein in the face of its own inevitable death. Factually our everyday Being-with-others means Dasein is already guilty towards others because the null ground of its projection is null. The call discloses Dasein's fundamental Being-guilty; conscience, belonging as it does to the Being of Dasein, calls Dasein out of the *'they'* to its authentic capacity-to-be, so this capacity-to-be is affirmed in Dasein itself.

As I have shown, the mood of guilt is for Heidegger nothing less than the essential guilt that lies at the heart of care, a phenomenon with pre-cognitive and pre-moral dimensions. There is much made in *BT* of the notion that at the heart of Being Dasein is characterised by nullity or lack, and the responsibility it has for its Being stems from this very lack. We are made aware of this phenomenon by the call of conscience that addresses Dasein in its fallen everyday mode of Being-in-the-world though the guilt to which it is delivered is very far from everyday. Such guilt has "primordial existential meaning" (Ibid. 326) and, as Dasein's Being is the source of my guilt, I am guilty by simply Being. For Dasein holds no sway over "being a basis - that is, in existing as thrown" (Ibid. 330) and, as a result, has no control over the foundation of its existence. Thus, "'Being-a-basis' means *never* to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up. This *'not'*" belongs to the existential meaning of 'thrownness'" (Ibid. 330).

At this point I want to draw attention to three levels of Dasein which are at play: 1) Dasein is thrown into its world (past); 2) Dasein is absorbed in the daily activities and interests of the *'they'* (present); and 3) In the mood of anxiety Dasein is brought closer to the nothing of its own mineness and the ground of its fleeing projection (future) is unsupported. Thrownness, as the source of our

guilt, forces us to recognise our failure to address our past authentically, "The Self, which as such has to lay the ground for itself, can *never* get that ground into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-ground" (Ibid. 330). Thrownness is then nullity-ridden (groundless), an 'awareness' of which undermines the individual heritage and the historical background in which it is placed. Quotidian Dasein does not, cannot, confront the task of dealing with its thrownness as it is never within its control. Yet the summoning call of conscience orientates Dasein towards itself, awakened to the groundless basis of its projections. Dasein is constituted in such a way that falling is, quite simply, its not standing up to its own possibilities. It is the constitution of care itself that harbours the call, coming as it does *from* me and yet from *beyond* me, an unsettling phenomenon that is mirrored in the important and distinctive mood of *Angst*.

The call of conscience draws Dasein from inauthentic '*they*'-ness to *mineness*, the condition of authenticity, by its silent appeal. Mineness, however, does not mean that Dasein's first person singular T is a specimen of some given class of entity but that 'T' illuminates the uniqueness of each individual existent, at once isolated and standing out from other beings, yet also absorbing and being absorbed by the world and its solicitous Being-with others. Nevertheless, in my mineness I discover that I am unique and can never, no matter how close I am to someone else, be another. I have a particular physiological, intellectual, biological and emotional make-up, I am of a particular race and colour, I have a particular heredity and am born into a particular historical epoch. Limits are put upon me by such factual givens and the possibilities open to me are also limited. The horizon of possibilities is never infinite but is always delimited by the actual situation in which I find myself. We each occupy a factual situation from which we take our particular vantage points in the world. This is precisely why the mood of anxiety is so uncomfortable for fallen Dasein, for without a distinct object its focus is not directed towards a tangible situation in which it finds itself but, rather, towards Dasein's total situation, as the existent thrown into a world where it *is* and has *to be*⁵⁵.

⁵⁵ I will discuss, in much greater detail, the important mood *Angst* in Part C).

h) Resoluteness and the Call of Conscience

By projecting itself upon its capacity for Being-guilty Dasein's authentic-ability-to-be distances itself from the 'they' in a manner Heidegger calls 'resoluteness', "This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience - *this reticent self - projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety - we call 'resoluteness'*" (Ibid. 343).

The term 'resoluteness' (*Entschlossenheit*) is used to convey the radical shift or transformation from inauthenticity to authenticity, the shift from how anxiety is perceived as threatening and from which one flees, to an acceptance of Dasein's nullity and death as an essential structural component of Dasein's way of being. The German word *Entschlossenheit* comes from *entschliessen* which originally meant 'to open, unlock, to unclose' and, thus, resoluteness has the double meaning of disclosure (*erschliessen*) and 'to reach a decision' (*sich entschliessen*), to 'unlock one's mind', so to speak. This play on prefixes, which is typical in *BT*, allows Heidegger to construct the following, "Resoluteness [*Entschlossenheit*] is a distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosedness [*Erschlossenheit*]" (Ibid. 343).

Projecting upon Being-guilty is Dasein's active response to the call of conscience, a response that recognises, in anticipatory resoluteness, the reality of our finitude (demarcated by death) and the unmasterable backdrop of history into which we have been thrown. This demarcation is Dasein's boundary position between Being-in-the-world and the nothing of no longer Being-in-the-world, the very vantage point from which Dasein ex-(s)ists (stands out). The succour garnered from the 'they' peters away in the face of such anticipation "and thus it shatters all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached" (Ibid. 308).

It should be clear that conscience, along with mood and understanding, is one of the modes through which Dasein is disclosed to itself. Conscience lays bare to singular Dasein that it should be authentic, for the issue of Being is fundamental to Dasein's character and so the choice of estrangement from itself or attunement towards itself (i.e. falling or rising to an authentic mode of Being) is left up for grabs. Unsurprisingly, just as guilt is not common moral or non-moral guilt, and anxiety is not a common emotion like fear (anxious about some specific situation X), nor is conscience described in terms of some social conscience or Freudian superego. If it were it would

simply be another of the '*they's*' methods of derailing authentic Dasein from its own possibilities. Despite this, however, Heidegger is not advocating social unrest by autonomous individuals who just follow their own paths. On the contrary, authentic existence is only possible as long as the fundamental existentials of 'Being-with' is present, for there is no existence apart from the world and other existents.

The existential task of the call of conscience is to stop Dasein from fleeing into the average, everyday world of the '*they*' and face up to its fundamental guilt. But how can Dasein, fallen and lost in its world of concerned-solicitude, be authentically individualised in a responsible way to stand up to its own inevitable death? The answer to this question stems from inauthentic quotidian Dasein hearing the call of conscience. At the core of such a phenomenon is Heidegger's belief in Dasein's potential to stand up for itself, to see itself as fallen and call upon itself by being in a state of addressedness, to confirm its authentic selfhood. To counter the '*they's*' chattering, the call of conscience opens ground for a response that is neither more 'chatter', more superficial self-obsessed 'curiosity' or more 'ambiguity'. As the addressee Dasein is called in its mineness, in its possibility for individualisation. Such an address gives no information regarding concerned encounters in-the-world, no ready made answers to guide Dasein's questioning but simply brings Dasein before itself in a way that, "*Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent*" (Ibid. 318). But how is it possible for this silent call that makes the appeal to be one and the same as the addressee, that is, Dasein lost in the '*they*'?

In its Being-already-in the call of conscience is directly tied to Dasein's thrownness and, thus, is the appeal to itself to choose how to live its life. But in such a choice also lies Dasein's basic sense of unsettledness, for as Dasein has been thrown it can never be wholly domesticated, never be completely at-home. It is the call of conscience that *tells* Dasein of this situation and reveals its anxious having to face up to its own authentic potentiality to exist. Haugeland notes that, "Heidegger says that anxiety *individualizes* Dasein. This does not mean that Dasein is not, in each case, already an individual, but rather that, in anxiety, a person's individuality is 'brought home' to him or her in an utterly unmistakeable and undeniable way" (*Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity*, 2000, 63-64). The call refers to a more fundamental level of intelligibility, where Dasein is pre-disposed to be called back to a pre-comprehension of its own Being that is part of its

ability to hear. To concretise who this caller *is* is only possible by stating that *it* calls - for it is precisely the call of the uncanny (*unheimlich* - not-at-home), the silent call (the discourse of reticence) of Dasein's stripped there-Being, standing out from its daily absorption in the '*they*' (*heimlich* - at-home). Such a disclosure is essential as Dasein's general mode of Being is at-home in a state of tranquillised familiarity.

The call of conscience itself is only ontologically meaningful because "*Conscience manifests itself as the call of care*" (Ibid. 322). As thrown possibility Dasein is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being and falls into the average, levelling comfort of the '*they*' (in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern), and is summoned out of this deteriorated state by the call. The call of conscience finds its ontological possibilities in the fact that Dasein, in the very ground of its Being, is care. In other words, it is only because the Being of Dasein is care, and its structure includes the past (already-in), present (falling) and future (potentiality-for-Being - ahead of itself), that the call of conscience is possible.

At the ontic level the call of conscience is accusational, pointing the finger at the addressee as one who is guilty. However, what Dasein is drawn towards (i.e. authenticity) is far from an ontic means of avoiding guilt, as if one needed merely to make reparations for a wrong. Yet, ontic guilt does tend to cover up one's existential guilt by way of this sense of indebtedness, re-enforced by cultural *mores* and practices. What is wrong with Dasein and not what Dasein does wrong is that its foundations have not been built by its own hand, "'Being-a-basis' means *never* to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up" (Ibid. 330). And because of this, though Being is an issue for Dasein, it can never choose itself in its entirety, grasping some possibilities while others remain out of reach. These attained and unattained possibilities come with no moral guarantees of rightness or wrongness, "primordial 'Being-guilty' cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself" (Ibid. 332).

Authenticity is a re-focusing, a projection upon originary ontological guilt or "one's ownmost potentiality for Being-guilty" (Ibid. 343). And it is only by taking responsibility for the ground of one's own thrownness that one can take hold of one's Self and move away from the grip of the '*they*'-self. Being responsive to the call of conscience is accepting one's authentic-potentiality

for Being-guilty, and being resolute means Dasein can begin to genuinely discover what possibilities it has open to it in this authentic Situation⁵⁶.

To avoid confusion and to make clear just what it is the call of conscience calls to and reveals, I need to distinguish between the types of selfhood described in *BT*: 1) The Being of Dasein is care and Dasein as care is called "the Self", "Care already harbours in itself the phenomenon of the Self" (Ibid. 366); 2) As thrown-facticity Dasein always finds itself in a public 'they'-self world, "For the most part *I myself* am not the "who" of Dasein; the they-self is its 'who'" (Ibid. 312); 3) Dasein can bring itself back from the fallen inauthentic self of the 'they' to become an authentic Self, "When Dasein thus brings itself back from the "they", the they-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes *authentic* Being-one's-Self" (Ibid. 313).

It is the call of conscience that brings about Dasein's being brought to anxiety and through anxiety is revealed its closeness to the nothing: "The fact of the *anxiety of conscience*, gives us phenomenal confirmation that in understanding the call Dasein is brought face to face with its own uncanniness [i.e. unsettledness]. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety" (Ibid. 342). Within 1) care-self, lies Dasein's most basic component of thrownness, "in being its *Self*, Dasein is, *as a Self*, the entity that has been thrown" (Ibid. 330). But Dasein is not, as I have said, thrown into a vacuum, for it finds its Being is an issue for it, in fact, it is thrown into being a Self. And it is this very "thrown into being a Self" that is called to become an authentic Self or to become an authentic ability-to-be a Self.

What is revealed in conscience is a disclosure that is immediate, such that, between the caller and the called nothing (including the 'they' world) stands. Further, as the mode of conscience is discourse, a reciprocity between the Self and itself takes place, so that the fallen self becomes the means for Dasein embracing the reality of who it is, "*Understanding the appeal*" means '*wanting to have a conscience*'" (Ibid. 334). And 'what gets talked about' in the call is Dasein's own Self and 'what is said in the talk' is nothing. The silent discourse of the call cuts through the chattering of everydayness and brings the Self back to itself. We know that in anxiety Dasein's Self is taken out of its lostness in the 'they' and, so it is also, that the silent call of conscience calls to Dasein in its

⁵⁶ For more on this distinction see Part 2) and my discussion of Charles Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger's position.

constitution as care. What we grasp in our understanding of the call of conscience is Dasein's Being-guilty.

This distinct type of guilt is founded on being responsible for Being-the-ground of a lack, a thrownness that factually disallows Dasein from choosing the historical/societal world into which it has been placed. As Dasein can never have total control over its own Being from the ground up, its limitations, including its finitude, are made explicit. Such limitations are apparent in Dasein's freedom, for by projecting into a particular set of possibilities, or choices, it has simultaneously not made other choices, left abandoned other possibilities. Thrownness and projection are nullity-ridden and so the existential definition of guilt is, "Being-the-ground of a nullity" (Ibid. 331).

Conscience reveals Dasein's authentic possibility and is made present in three ways: 1) In the essential mood of anxiety Dasein must stand up to the call; 2) What the phenomenon of conscience gives us to understand is Dasein's potentiality for Being; 3) Discourse is the mode of reticent communication that Dasein responds to having heard the silent call of conscience. It is these three ways that constitute 'resoluteness', and such an authentic attitude is linked to anticipation and the fact that the Being of Dasein is a being-towards-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*). By recognising the marker of death authentically one also recognises that one's own existence is its opposite. This is why Heidegger uses the phrase 'ownmost possibility', for an authentic existence is one that is aware of its finitude and itself. It is only through anticipatory resoluteness that such a relationship of the Self to its existence is possible, the means by which Dasein takes over its true Self, as distinct from the 'they'-self, "'Resoluteness' signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the 'they'" (Ibid. 345). This "letting oneself be" is Dasein's *decision* to take upon itself the Being which is a Being-towards-death and to project itself steadfastly upon it.

To reach a decision means that Dasein, as a disclosing mode of Being, recognises its own nullity by its quietude and allows itself to be called. It is important to remember that Dasein does not, in its usual mode of everyday life, make intentionalistic decisions but simply "press[es] forward into possibilities" (Ibid. 184). And even when explicit choices are made, they are done so only against a backdrop of cultural and social boundaries created by the 'they'. What was earlier described as an 'authentic Situation' is what opens up to Dasein in resoluteness, yet not as something to be considered or mulled over but as something that Dasein is already doing,

"Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of a Situation and put that Situation before itself; it has put itself into that Situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already *taking action*" (Ibid. 347).

i) Anticipatory Resoluteness and Temporal Transformation

By facing the ontologically vital mood of anxiety and through guilt, the call of conscience and resoluteness Dasein's temporal structure is radically transformed. Dasein's inauthentic understanding of time has the form of awaiting and forgetting, "curiosity always holds by what is coming next, and has forgotten what has gone before" (Ibid. 398-399). It is a strategy that overlooks its powerlessness by projecting constantly into the world of daily encounters and solicitousness that are controllable. Dasein's past becomes something (if not in vogue) that is given up by forgetting and makes compliance with the '*they*' easier. What is not fashionable, and does not keep up with curious Dasein's flitting from one new thing to the next, is also relegated to the oblivion of the forgotten.

Inauthentic temporality views time as little more than a string of continuous now units of 'not yet's', 'presents' and 'no longer's' among which Dasein has been placed (thrown). Past events are no more and irretrievable, even historical artefacts, such as the Chert Javelin Head (5,800 - 4,700 BP) are regarded as merely a 'piece of the past' despite being still present-at-hand. It is helpful to note that in English the word 'history' is used for both historical events and the study of history, while Heidegger uses the German words '*Geschichte*' for the actual events of history, and '*Historie*' for the study of such events. Both are, however, linked, and it is only because we are historical beings that we can attempt a study of history in the first place. But historiography to Heidegger is not merely a matter of looking backwards and thinking about the past; for human existence *is* historical, and by studying human beings, as existents with direct experience of historical reality ourselves, we learn about the possibilities of Being.

But how can an object present-at-hand be historical to us if the historicity of something is a matter of it belonging to the past? The Chert Javelin Head is not past because it is no longer used for the purpose it was originally knapped, just as, conversely, the hand-axe I made last week is not historical because it has been used a great deal and is badly worn. What is it then that makes such an artefact historical/past? Heidegger answers because "Nothing else than that *world* within which

they belonged to a context of equipment and were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by a concerned Dasein who was-in-the-world. That *world* is no longer. But what was formerly *within-the-world* with respect to that world is still present-at-hand. As equipment belonging to a world, that which is *now* still present-at-hand can belong nevertheless to the 'past'" (Ibid. 432).

The Chert Javelin Head belongs to the past because it is part of a past world. It reveals something of the cultural matrix into which its role primarily as a hunting tool but, perhaps, also as a 'priest' (i.e. the weight used by anglers to administer the 'last rites' to a fish) lay among the multitude of interconnected other roles, and tools and equipment in which it was housed in its Neolithic life. Its historical value is in that for which it was originally made, and whether it is viewed in a display cabinet today or used again, how it is viewed and how it is used would be quite distinct from how it was viewed and used 5,000 years ago.

All historical objects and events are so only because of the historicity of Dasein itself. This is not to say that Dasein is historical in the same way, for Being as it is in-the-world it exists as ecstatic temporalizing and is transcendent in the unity of the ecstases, indeed temporality's "essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases" (Ibid. 377). Such unity also means remaining open to the past, for the ecstatic future is not later than the ecstatic present, nor the ecstatic past earlier than the ecstatic present. In this way what is grasped in history is the factual possibilities of existence as the historical being orientated towards the future⁵⁷.

History reveals the authentic possibilities of Dasein that remain retrievable. The past, opened to the present, is deeply significant for the future through the mode of authentic historicizing, that is, through anticipatory resoluteness (Dasein's authentic projection upon its capacity for Being-guilty); "Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one - those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly - and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate* (*Schicksals*). This is how we designate Dasein's primordial historicizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein *hands* itself *down* to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet chosen" (Ibid. 435).

⁵⁷ Compare Stephen Mulhall's comment, "For Heidegger, temporality is not an entity, not a sequence of self-contained moments that move from future to present to past, and not a property or feature of something, but rather a self-generating and self-transcending process . . . not a static structure but an ecstatic process" (1996, 146).

Authentic temporality anticipates (though without the intentionalistic overtones this term implies) its death and, thus, within its mode of being shows up the nothingness at its core, "Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up" (Ibid. 308). When Dasein anticipates its own death, and with its other structural components guilt, conscience and freedom, it finds itself to be a limited, finite, determinate self; a self with a distinct heritage, "Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside together equiprimordially in the Being of an entity as they do in care, can that entity exist in the mode of fate; that is to say, only then can it be historical in the very depths of its existence" (Ibid. 437).

j) Conclusion

I have argued in this section that in the call of conscience quotidian Dasein comes to hear of its own guilt, but that this guilt is itself far from specific, "'Guilty!' turns up as a predicate for the 'I am'" (Ibid. 326), I am guilty by simply Being. In anxious anticipation of death I described how thrownness is nullity-ridden and as thrownness encapsulates my whole background (i.e. my determinate self, marked-off by my cultural and personal history) it also encapsulates my whole past. But Dasein's everyday self fails to address its thrownness, "The Self, which as such has to lay the ground for itself, can *never* get that ground into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over its Being-a-ground" (Ibid. 330). What existential guilt addresses is one's lack of attention to the ontologically important job of dealing with a factual thrownness that disallows one from grasping oneself from the ground up. I have shown that the response to the call of conscience is anticipatory resoluteness and that this response positions one within an historical background of acceptance that embraces the nullity which is revealed, something Heidegger calls 'repetition' or 'retrieval'. By confronting one's finitude (future) authentically one finds oneself brought back to the past, and such an authentic means of accepting one's past is achieved in repetition. One's determinate self, defined by its life history and experiences within a given social and cultural background, comes to the fore when one is faced with one's own death, as the desire to blend anonymously into the 'they's' surroundings is released.

In *BT* Heidegger details a model of the structure of existence with temporality and its dimensions of past, present and future. These make care possible and correspond to its structure of

facticity, falling and projection. Temporality's role in this structure delineates Dasein from everything else in-the-world including animals and inanimate objects. A horse or stone may change over time but when they are neither a foal or have eroded to some degree, what they were (their past) is simply no longer and their old age, or continued degradation (their future), is simply their not yet. Animals and stones are merely externally related to time, perpetually in the 'now' while Dasein, by projecting into the future and through thrownness having already been, takes time with it. Though the horse and stone *have* a past, it is only Dasein that *is* its past.

Just as death allows a more complete picture of Dasein, so conscience can light up its authenticity. Conscience as a mode of disclosedness for Dasein finds a voice in Dasein's questioning itself as it searches for meaning and attempts to decide how it is 'to be'. As I have illustrated, Dasein generally *finds* itself *lost* in its fallen mode of being and, as such, flees when faced by anxiety or death back to the '*they*' for reassurance and comfort. But thrown Dasein feeling itself ill-at-ease in a world that is factically given to it may also call out to itself, that is, call from this position of unsettledness to itself, its fallen everyday mode of being, to resist the '*they's*' derailment of meaningful possibilities and choose for itself "its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of *summoning* [*Aufruf*] it to its ownmost Being-guilty" (Ibid. 314).

Authentic Dasein attains unified temporal dimensionality by projecting itself onto death and, thus, faces the future while obeying the call of conscience by taking responsibility for its guilt and so recognises its past. By taking hold of its ahead (future) and already (past), authentic Dasein is free to be itself in a way that is no longer lost among the masses (present) and so can be "something of its own (*zueigen*)". From this account one can see that care is not conceived as a substance, not as a thing immutable, enduring through time but as immersed in time. Dasein does not skip through continuous 'nowness' but projects into the *future* and as thrown is *already been - past*, and by falling (and concern) is enmeshed in the *present*.

2) Non-propositional Accounts of Emotion and Charles Taylor's Ontic Interpretation of

Heidegger

- a) Introduction
- b) Objections to Cognitivism and Non-propositional Accounts
- c) Charles Taylor's Ontic Interpretation of Heidegger
 - i) The Conception of Moods in '*Being and Time*'
 - ii) Quotidian Dasein's Comportment Being-in-the-world
 - iii) *Mitsein* as the Ontological Ground of Connectedness
- d) The Cultural Conditioning of Emotions, Charles Taylor's Analysis and its Short-comings
- e) Conclusion

a) Introduction

I begin this section by firstly setting out four objections to the cognitive description of emotion analysis before, secondly, assessing three alternative approaches that will act as a pathway towards considering Charles Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger's concept 'attunement' as 'awareness'. I examine the non-propositional accounts offered by Peter Goldie and Paul Griffiths (used, in part, to undermine the strong and hybrid cognitivist approaches) and suggest some points of comparison with Charles Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger's analysis of moods.

I continue by emphasising the fundamental ontological importance of mood in *BT*, and claim that because of this awareness cannot, even when interpreted as a non-propositional form of knowledge, be a core part of Heidegger's account (apart, that is, from when he is directly addressing ontic issues). I stress the pre-cognitive understanding of moods that is described in *BT* (a consideration that underscores my earlier discussion of the mood guilt and its unique ontological dimension) and examine Dasein's Being-in-the-world, a focus which entails distinguishing cognitive awareness from Heideggerian attunement by describing the role of mood as a basic extantiale and *Mitsein* as the ground of connectedness. This latter issue continues my on-going

concern to highlight the importance of connections in our affective lives at both the ontic and ontological levels.

I move on by taking an initial look at Charles Taylor's description of objectless fear, and argue there are a number of features in his account which mirror William Lyons's description of that emotion and, as a result, are open to the same objections I develop against the causal-evaluative theory in Part C). I highlight three further points of neglect in Taylor's interpretation: i) his failure to take note of the important distinction between '*Situation*' (Situation) and '*Lage*' (situation); ii) his inaccurate description of the structural make-up of the emotion shame; and iii) his failure to recognise the difference between what I have called 'simple emotion' and 'complex mood' and, as a consequence, his overlooking of the ontological foundation of the concept *Befindlichkeit* in *BT*. At the end of this section two fundamental contrasts will have been elucidated: i) non-propositional objections to cognitivism do not open the door for comparisons to be made between it and Heidegger's theory of mood; and ii) Heidegger's concept attunement cannot be equated with Charles Taylor's interpretation of it as a 'low-order' form of cognition or awareness.

b) Objections to Cognitivism and Non-propositional Accounts

It is important at the outset to this sub-section to keep to the fore in our minds a point I made earlier⁵⁸, that is, one should always be cautious about too quickly attributing to the conscious components of thought or judgement the job of underpinning the foundation of emotional experiences, for examples of emotional states being aroused without our being aware of them not only exist but are quite common. Many objections have been raised, by various philosophers⁵⁹ that do a great deal of damage to the uncompromising strong cognitivist position. The first objection I address is based around the question 'Can a belief be the fundamental component of an emotional reaction to fictional characters?'

I might feel sad when Joe, in *Great Expectations*, travels to London to see Pip and is slighted by the boy he once cared for; "You won't find half so much fault in me if you think of me in forge dress, with my hammer in my hand, or even my pipe" (Dickens, 1984, 139), but I do not

⁵⁸ See Part A) 2: d).

⁵⁹ Compare on this point Greenspan (1988, 16-22); Roberts (1984, 396); Goldie (2000, 58); and Oakley (1992, 22).

believe Joe is an historical person, let alone that he was slighted yet I still have an emotional reaction to his situation⁶⁰. As Matravers points out, "the argument that beliefs are an *essential* component of emotions . . . relies on the claim that emotions must have certain properties which only a belief could give them; in particular, a connection to action. Against this, I argue that some unproblematic cases of emotion (those we feel in response to a documentary of past events, for example) lack a connection to action. This undermines narrow [or strong] cognitivism and opens the way to the claim that the emotion-like states aroused by fictions are really emotions" (1998, 7). And David Pugmire suggests that a widening of the cognitive theory beyond beliefs and judgements may also allow for such cases, so that "an emotion might involve . . . non-essential kinds of thought, such as picturing, that do not amount to belief, [and] may supervene on outright belief, or even cut across them; or they may replace judgements altogether (e.g. as perhaps they do in our response to fiction)" (1998, 16).

A second objection pin-points the inability of cognitive theories to thoroughly account for reflex emotions. A reflex emotional response is one stimulated without a judgement or belief about a property or situation having been made: for example, Mr. Jones, a middle-aged man who as a child was bullied and left in the school broom-cupboard by a cruel teacher, might still react with fear when he is in an environment where such smells as polish, bleach and air-freshener are redolent. Mr. Jones knows he will not be locked in a cupboard when he goes into his local hardware shop yet he still experiences a degree of fear when he is in there. Apart from returning to the concept of 'disposition', it is difficult for the orthodox cognitivist to account for Mr. Jones's type of fear, for his former belief (that he will be left in a broom-cupboard) is no longer held, yet given a particular set of circumstances (purchasing goods in a hardware shop), he still feels reflex or automatic fear.

A third objection, which I will only mention at this point, concerns so-called objectless emotions and how they are unsatisfactorily accounted for by strong or hybrid cognitivist accounts. General or existential anxiety, sometimes also called depression, is often cited as an example of an objectless emotion, as it is regarded as having no intentional object and, therefore, to have no

⁶⁰ For an interesting discussion of our emotional reactions to fictional characters see Derek Matravers (1998) and Richard Joyce (2000).

beliefs or judgements associated with it. I will critically examine this emotion in detail from both the cognitive and Heideggerian perspectives in Part C).

A fourth objection to the idea that propositional attitudes are necessary to an emotional response is provided by certain types of ‘fear of flying’ cases. These are cases where though one might be aware and accept that flying, for instance, is a safe form of travel, one is still afraid of flying. In what follows I will look at a number of non-propositional approaches that attempt to find solutions to these types of cases. Paul Griffiths (1997) explains these emotional reactions in terms of independent modular systems and the appraisals that activate them. Griffiths takes his lead from Paul Ekman (1994) and Jerry Fodor (1983) in defining a modular system as one that processes information from our senses though it remains isolated from our central cognitive system and one that is ineluctable, automatic or mandatory. Such a system cannot then make reference to beliefs about the world or to what Robert Roberts (1988) calls ‘concerns’. Like Ekman, Griffiths considers emotions to be affect-programs, that is, neural processes that set in motion specific patterns of physiological changes, such as flinching or facial expression, complex responses controlled by an appraisal system operating below the level of consciousness. The sequence of such an emotional reaction would have the following elements: an appraisal system that triggers thoughts and, perhaps, memories, affect-programs and a pattern of bodily and behavioural changes. The emotion itself is the complex of these elements and cannot be reduced to a single one. Because emotions are Fodoresque modules and are separate from any central cognitive system, Griffiths regards emotional appraisals as distinct from judgements. This idea raises the question, ‘what sort of appraisal is it exactly that is being distinguished by Griffiths?’

Having no judgements, appraisal here cannot be equivalent to the term evaluation as we ordinarily use it (i.e. to ascertain the value of or judge something), though these terms are often used as synonyms. Carolyn Price comments on Griffiths’s analysis that “an appraisal system evaluates [e.g.] the situation as dangerous . . . [and an] emotional appraisal will represent some object or situation in the subject’s environment as threatening, or offensive, or whatever” (2005, 56-57). She goes on to inform us that Griffiths “takes emotional appraisals to be non-cognitive states . . . produced by a separate set of modules . . . they are psychological states of a distinct kind” (Ibid. 61). If what Ekman calls the ‘automatic appraisal mechanism’ (AAM) is a very particular type of

system which due to its alacrity and independence should not be thought of in terms of rational evaluation how exactly does this description help when attempting to account for long-term emotions, such as envy, that involve higher cognitive processes?⁶¹

When addressing this point Griffiths contends that such higher cognitive responses are clusters or patterns of desires that interrupt our on-going activities, and comments that envy occurs when the “occasion of the source of envy is remembered” and suggests that, “the AAM would have some form of memory, storing information about classes of stimuli previously assessed as meriting emotional response” (1998, 92). The AAM will trigger our fear response, for instance, “if we have experienced an object as harmful in some past segment of our learning history” (Ibid. 95). We have a proneness to react to particular situations being embedded within us from earlier experiences either directly or indirectly, that is, either through our own life experiences or through evolutionary traits we have evolved. Griffiths’s view is that the appraisal system that evaluates or “compares” (1997, 92) information is analogous to perceptual systems (i.e. a system that can process information but is independent of any central cognitive system).

Peter Goldie also believes cognitive theories oversimplify emotion analysis being too keen to “force-fit the emotions into the material world, based on a preconceived idea of what marks the mental off from the physical” (2002, 3). He attempts to put forward a description that “provides for the richness and diversity of emotional life” by avoiding this “preconceived distinction between mind and body . . . [so that] one could set out to give an ontology of the emotions directly” (Ibid. 3). His example of a case where contradictory beliefs and feelings are held is someone’s fear of falling from a cliff despite the cliff-walk being in a good state of repair and their acceptance of this fact. Goldie explains this reaction by invoking the notion of ‘cognitive impenetrability’, that is, though you believe there is “absolutely no reason to feel fear, as there is no possibility of falling” (Ibid. 76) yet you still feel afraid.

He writes firstly that in such a case “you imagine yourself slipping, being pushed, or caught by an unexpected burst of wind” (Ibid. 76) and that, “if you know you feel fearful of falling over the cliff, it is possible to identify a belief as reasonably arrived at, say as to absence of the risk of falling given the distance to the edge, so that you can see that it is your feelings of fear that are

⁶¹ Matravers suggests the answer “might be that it doesn’t – it only deals with what [Griffiths] . . . takes to be the paradigm of emotions” (unpublished correspondence 2-10-07).

cognitively impenetrable” (Ibid. 228-229). The first point appears to make quite a bit of sense, for it is perfectly comprehensible to consider how one might imagine a gust (or “burst”) of wind or landslide that could precipitate one’s slipping despite being (apparently) a safe distance from the cliff edge. But the second point is more difficult to grasp; for from where does one’s feelings of fear stem? What is there to convince one that if you do not believe there is a chance (i.e. “you are in no danger” [Ibid. 76]) of falling from the cliff that you would be overcome by “waves of fear”? (Ibid. 76).

Goldie’s answer stems from Hume and he returns to his first point; it happens when one’s “imagination runs away” (Ibid. 77) with one. Of course, it might be legitimate to ask, ‘is this case one which should be considered irrational?’ Goldie himself notes how, “being human does not involve exemplifying the ideals of rationality. What we should look for and expect from emotional thoughts, feelings, and actions is intelligibility, and one can be “intelligibly irrational”, at least where the emotions are concerned. We should also not forget how lovable a person can be for their irrationalities, their inconsistencies, their sillinesses” (Ibid. 237)⁶². Charles Taylor also considers examples where emotions, such as shame and fear might be irrational, “where for instance, we are intellectually convinced that the situation is not menacing or shameful, but we cannot help feeling afraid or ashamed. There would be no room for the notion of irrationality, if we were not in some sense affirming the import in feeling the emotion that we are intellectually agreeing to deny . . . a prominent feature of those situations we consider as paradigmatic of irrational emotion is where the person sees and admits that the import does not apply, but goes on feeling that way anyway . . . beyond the question whether I feel ashamed is the question whether the situation is really shameful, whether I am rightly or wrongly, rationally or irrationally, ashamed” (1985, vol. 1, 49-50).

But of course even where such cases are irrational this does not undermine Goldie’s core argument, as he is still concerned to provide an account of how an irrational emotional response can contain the internal conflict between beliefs and feelings. However, it does raise a broader point of interest regarding the question of why ‘irrationality’ as a concept has accrued such a wholly negative connotation, especially when ‘false-positive responses’ have, at least in evolutionary

⁶² Michael Stocker argues likewise that the attitude one has to a given proposition (he uses the ‘fear of flying’ example) need not be a belief, and so can oscillate between fear and confidence though the belief pertaining to our safety need not alter. One such attitude he isolates to illustrate his point brings us back to Hume, ‘imagining’ (See ‘Emotional Thoughts’, *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (1): 59-69).

terms, many positive attributes. There are two opposing ways our irrational emotional responses may effect us: 1) the 'negative outcome': a individual who, for example, is deeply vengeful towards another may be driven (irrationally) to take a course of action that ends up creating a situation that only harms his interests more than was the case initially; and 2) the 'positive outcome': a individual who, for example, was bullied as a child may react to provocation as an adult by (irrationally) lashing out at his tormentor and, by so doing, deter the bully from picking on him again.

Irrationality then provides us with a useful explanation of these particular emotional reactions. Griffiths writes that "a single aversive experience or a single display of fear by a caregiver may result in a fear of, say, the dark that will be retained despite any amount of information about the harmlessness of darkness. Emotional responses do not seem to adjust themselves⁶³ as readily as beliefs when new information is acquired about the environment. Substantial counter-conditioning seems to be needed to delete an assessment once it has become linked to an affect program response. This may be due to the evolutionary advantages of false-positive responses . . . in evolutionary terms, phobias and irrational distastes may have much to recommend them" (1997, 90-91).

As a cognitive theorist Martha Nussbaum suggests that, "we may often hold contradictory beliefs, especially in cases of long habituation" (2001, 35). One of Nussbaum's illustrations of this is Sandra, a woman who was terrified by a dog during childhood but has since learned "that dogs are no danger to her well-being; but she still fears dogs" (Ibid. 35). This contradictory stance is explained as simply an old belief having become ingrained into the fabric of Sandra's evaluative judgement of dogs, in the same way as Lyons's wrote of "a pattern, physiologically and psychologically, being set" (1980/1993, 74), or Goldie of "dispositions to experience further emotional episodes" (2000, 144).

Goldie regards emotional feelings as inextricably intertwined with the world-directed aspect of emotion and comments on the failure of strong cognitive accounts to fully recognise the fact that feelings are an intimate and familiar part of our emotional experiences. Something of this approach is mirrored by Charles Taylor and will become more evident when addressing the notion of 'introspective and extraspective knowledge' and Taylor's emphasis on 'sense' as a form of low-

⁶³ For more on this point see Part A) sub-section 4) e): How Cognitive Guilt Differs from the Associated Emotions Shame and Remorse.

order 'awareness' (i.e. emotions such as nameless dread being "affective modes of awareness of situation" [1985, 48]).

Goldie makes the point that theories relying on a notion of intentionality in emotions as explicable in terms of feelingless attitudes are wholly inaccurate. Feelings are critical to an emotional state and he isolates two categories of them: 1) bodily feelings, for example, hair rising on the back of one's neck; and 2) object directed feelings, for example, fear of the man coming towards one with a knife. Both categories of feelings reveal things about the world, things about ourselves (introspective knowledge) and things beyond our bodies (extraspective knowledge⁶⁴). The world-directed intentionality of feeling towards is not mere bodily feeling, for those feelings can never tell us what an emotion is about, in fact, the chronology of feeling types would stem "from the feeling towards *to* the bodily feeling" (Ibid. 58). Feeling towards is never a matter of simply thinking of something in particular way X and, then, adding-on a phenomenal ingredient Y (i.e. feeling), for the complete experience is new. Feeling towards is part of one's consciousness of the world with which we are continuously emotionally engaged. Emotions involve thoughts and feelings that are directed towards the world from a vantage point that contains a certain sort of emotional content. Feeling towards is "unlike believing because a person can, without necessarily being irrational, oscillate between feeling a certain way towards something . . . and not feeling that way, without having any evidence or reason which justifies the change, this is not so for believing" (Ibid. 73).

The profound misconception concerning feelings is that they are merely brute, telling us nothing about how to act in the world because feelings are not about anything other than the condition of one's body. Feelings are not peripheral components tacked-on to emotional responses but are intimately conjoined within our emotions with potentially intentional objects, playing a central role in our orientation in the world. This idea of orientation (as we see in the sub-section following) is of the utmost importance to Heidegger at the ontological level when describing the key affective term *Befindlichkeit*.

Like Griffiths and Goldie, Robert Roberts's approach does not identify emotions with judgments or desires but rather conceives of them as setting "the agenda for beliefs and desires: one

⁶⁴ Note here should be taken of Ben-Ze'ev (see Solomon [ed.], 2004, 252) who offers an opposing view.

might say they ask the questions that judgments answer with beliefs and evaluate the prospects to which desire may or may not respond" (de Sousa, 2003, 13). Emotions make particular features of a given situation more prominent from this viewpoint, providing them with an importance they would not otherwise have.

Roberts's 'serious concern-based construals' are those things that impress themselves upon an individual so that they construe, or see them, irrespective of the beliefs they hold about them, "it is an umbrella covering such experiences as seeing-as, hearing-as, smelling-as, etc., as well as the non-sensible thinking of-as (e.g. thinking *of myself as* a pretty smart cookie)" (Roberts, 1984, 399). The lines in the Muller-Lyer figure are used by Roberts to illustrate the point; for even after we have been told, and accept, that it is an illusion, the lines still seem to be of unequal lengths. Roberts returns to Wittgenstein's use of Jastrow's figure, the duck-rabbit, "Just as seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck is not merely knowing that it can be seen as a duck, nor merely judging that it can be so seen, but is construing it as such, so the person who feels triumphant is not merely judging that he is triumphant, but is construing himself as such" (1988, 187).

Within this context Pugmire provides a very concrete example; "I may believe the defendant guilty and a villain or I may *accept (believe)* that he is guilty but, despite everything still *picture* him as innocent, owing to the bewildered *look* in his eyes" (1998, 72). The photographs of the serial killer Rosemary West, as she was taken from police custody to prison, holding an expression of incredulity and innocence, might suffice as an example of this.

An emotion from this perspective is a construal with associated concern that colours how we see things - as threatening, loving, irritating and so on. Construals, thus, are mental events or states "in which one thing is grasped in terms of something else. The 'in terms of' relation can have as its terms any of the following: a perception, a thought, an image, a concept . . . I can imagine my living room in terms of furniture in the store, which I am presently perceiving; or in terms of either the image or thought of my parents' living room, or in terms of the concept *grandiose* or *well-coordinated*" (1998, 190). To be afraid of lions, for instance, is not just a matter of believing lions to be themselves dangerous in some rather abstract way, for example, dangerous if you happen to be bathing in a pool at dusk on the Serengeti, but to recognise (to see) that something of great importance to you (i.e. your life) is potentially threatened by these wild and powerful predators. In

this way Roberts can go on to say that it is not simply judgements, thoughts, and beliefs that form dispositions to emotions but also our "concerns, cares, desires, loves, [and] interests" (Ibid. 191).

c) Charles Taylor's Ontic Interpretation of Heidegger

i) The Conception of Moods in 'Being and Time'

There are a number of essential preliminary points which need to be made if I am to illustrate why Heidegger's account of mood and attunement cannot be equated with any type of cognitive awareness or non-propositional description, and why Charles Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger is inaccurate. To begin, Dasein's way of Being-in-the-world is not, and cannot, be founded on its knowledge about the world but is, rather, founded on its ontological care for its place in-the-world. It is our moods and not our awareness that guides or orientates us, and it is our moods and not our emotions that concerns Heidegger. For moods help in the building of a fundamental ontology by remaining rooted in a "basic experience of the 'object' to be disclosed" (SZ, 232), and attuning us in a particular way to the world and not simply to "fleeting Experiences" (BT, 390) as is the case with emotions. Heidegger makes this clear when he writes "attunement . . . has so little to do with a kind of apprehending that first turns around and turns back on itself, that only because the 'there' has already been disclosed in attunement can inward-turning reflection come across 'experience' at all" (Ibid. 136).

Moods are completely unlike the ontic descriptions offered by either strong cognitivists or non-propositional theorists but are a means of revealing Dasein's Being-in-the-world as a whole, something most explicitly achieved in the mood of *Angst*. They occur without any Cartesian separation of 'I' from the collection of objects it contemplates, that is, before any distinction between 'inner' and 'outer', "mood . . . comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside', but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being" (Ibid. 136).

At their core moods disclose Dasein's that it is and has 'to be', its thrownness and facticity and the fact that our Being is an issue for Dasein; "In attunement, Dasein is always disclosed according to a mood as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being – as the Being to which it is delivered over and which, as existing, it has to be" (Ibid. 134). What is revealed is not just some ontic task or obstacle which needs to be overcome but an ontological (burdensome)

responsibility of addressing our Being-in-the-world. Understood in this way it is not surprising that Heidegger notes our usual response to moods primordial disclosiveness is an evasive fleeing and return to the comfort of the '*they*' environment.

Of course, our moods also work at a level which is of ontic importance to us, a point which may have lead Charles Taylor to misidentify them; for when discussing objectless fear (or what he calls 'nameless dread') he comments, "we cannot designate an object. But this does not show that emotions are not essentially related to objects" (1985, vol. 1, 48). However, 'nameless dread' for Heidegger is a key mood and not an emotion. We must remember, moods offer us a means of grasping how something can count as relevant or important in our quotidian lives. Dasein is helped in its means of determining entities around it by the society and culture into which it is born or within which it lives. And because of our attuned ways of orientating ourselves in-the-world, entities within it can matter, though this does not mean (apart from at the ontic level) that for Heidegger moods have cognitive importance guiding us towards entities already laid out before us in our particular cultural milieu as significant.

Essentially Taylor contends that as our affective means of dealing with entities and situations tells us about the world, so it can be considered, at least to a point, cognitive. Following Taylor, Stephen Mulhall explicitly comments, "because our affective life is conditioned by the culture in which we find ourselves, our being immersed in a particular mood or feeling is revelatory of something about our world – is cognitively significant" (1996, 81). But the cultural conditioning which is the basis for this contention itself depends on our *prior* attunement to the world, "mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards anything" (*SZ*, 137/*BT*, 176). If, in fact, there was no prior template for encountering entities, that is, no attunement to the world, then there could be no experience (including Goldie's 'feeling towards' theory) or perception (including Griffiths's perception analogy theory), for we can be affected only if attuned Being-in-the-world "had not already submitted itself to having entities in the world 'matter' to it in the ways which moods have outlined in advance" (*Ibid.* 137/*Ibid.* 177).

To reinforce the essential primordially of attunement as it is outlined in *BT*, I will focus at this point firstly, on Dasein's everyday mode of Being-in-the-world, a clear understanding of which

will allow me secondly, to provide an account of '*Mitsein* as the Ground of Connectedness' so that I can thirdly, return to objectless fear/*Angst* and the efforts made by Taylor to provide a cognitive slant to Heidegger's analysis and my argument against this move.

In contrast to cognitive and non-propositional accounts the analysis of emotion/mood in *BT* is set out in a way that highlights their impact on Dasein (in cognitive language man, agent, individual) at the ontological level, not (as we saw when considering guilt) with reference to ontic concepts such as God, law, rule, duty, obligation, or culpability. Heidegger suggests that at the expiation of sin level, for instance, the cognitive-religious-psycho-social level guilt (and mood more generally) can never be fully understood. Dasein's Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity means that it is ontologically guilty from the very beginning, that is, from the ground up). Guilt is not just the transgressing of moral rules, or non-moral obligations, but something far more profound.

Moods are one of our most basic constituent traits, allowing us to appreciate our ontological orientation in the world. Along with discourse and understanding, moods make up the fundamental existentialia that lie at the heart of all Dasein's other structures. Heidegger's interest is with those moods that encompass our total perspective and not simply our transient passions (i.e. our emotions, our "fleeting Experiences" Ibid. 390). An effective way to view this is to note that for Heidegger attitudes and feelings are the building blocks for mood, and emotions are "the precipitating particle[s] that crystallises mood" (Solomon, 1977, 130). Though our Being may undergo changes relating to our interests and experiences, our mood will not be lost, in fact, if we were ever to be completely mood-free, we would also be un-tuned and orientation-less to the world, which would make us there-less and, thus, not there-being (Da-sein).

The situation in which Dasein finds itself (its thrownness [*Geworfenheit*]), is called in *BT* its 'facticity', and is described as relating to all those elements in human existence that are simply given and not chosen. What this means for Dasein is that it always finds itself where it has 'to be', enmeshed in certain possibilities for the sake of which it is. However, this situation, though revealed by *mood*, is ignored by Dasein, "Ontologically, we obtain as the first essential characteristic of state-of-mind [mood] that they disclose Dasein in its thrownness and . . . in the manner of an evasive turning away" (*BT*, 175). The first characteristic of mood that distinguishes it from cognitive awareness or non-propositional knowledge is, then, that it discloses Dasein in its

being delivered over to a Being-in-the-world that it already is and has 'to be'. It cannot know how it got to be delivered over or where it is heading and the manner of this revealing is, paradoxically, a turning away from thrownness. Being has become manifestly burdensome for Dasein, yet even in the very act of evasion Dasein becomes aware of its thrown nature, in the same way, for instance, as one might turn away from a quarrel but in the very effort of turning from the unpleasantness be made aware of what we are turning from.

The second characteristic of mood is described as; something that comes from Being-in-the-world as the way of our Being. Mood discloses Dasein's *already* being a certain entity, the state in which Dasein finds itself. I have noted already Heidegger's insistence on not confusing Dasein's Being-in-the-world in some categorical sense as Being-in-something, for Dasein's Being-in is in essence the complete opposite of my Being-in-a-house while I write these words. For my Being-in-a-house cuts me off from Being-in-the-street, but the existential Being-in is an opening out into the world. For Heidegger 'to reside' is an existential dwelling without boundaries, one which opens up the world to Dasein whereby Being-in-the-world is a simultaneous opening to and absorption with and through the world to its own possibilities.

Unlike mere awareness or non-propositional knowledge, mood is a constituent of Dasein's disclosedness, its 'there', which in turn reveals the third vital and distinctive characteristic of mood, mattering. From the disclosedness of the world what is within-the-world may then be encountered. By 'encountering', however, Heidegger means not just sensing something but becoming affected in some way. To be affected by that which is ready-to-hand is only possible if existentially our Being-in is seen in a way, whereby, encounters within-the-world can matter to us. The possibility of mattering itself is sourced in Dasein's mood, as mood has already revealed the world as being something that, for example, can be dangerous and frightening. And only when Dasein is in a mood of fearfulness can it know what is around as threatening, "Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind" (Ibid. 176). Only because the senses belong ontologically to Dasein, whose Being is Being-in-the-world with mood, can Dasein be affected by anything within the world. Attunement, the *a priori* structure of which mood is the expression, forms our world and is the beginning of our knowledge. Mood opens the door to the way we find ourselves, an attunement to our own act of living and our orientation to the world.

ii) Quotidian Dasein's Comportment Being-in-the-world

It is vital at this point to provide a clear description of the term 'world' as it is used in *BT*, if I am to be in a position to illustrate how to avoid confusing the ontic notion of how emotions provide us with an awareness (or sense) of the world and the ontological notion of Dasein and world as one (i.e. our attunement to the issue of Being. Mood being a basic existiale of Dasein while awareness (or sense) and knowledge can only ever have significance at the ontic level as a fleeting passion/'Experience'). We know that our moods do not occur in a vacuum and as they constantly break in on us it is crucial that we have an understanding of just what it is they are breaking in on, that is, our Being-in-the-world. The everyday world of entities which is revealed by mood is described in *BT* as a complex interconnected instrumental system of Dasein's practical concern and solicitude. And it is this very solitude, this 'Being-with' that is the means by which Dasein becomes levelled down in daily routines and interactions. Such conformism closes off Dasein's more meaningful possibilities as it adopts a mindset of indifference, content to embrace what is offered to it by the '*they*'.

The kind of Being that belongs to Dasein is called 'existence' and is intimately linked to the key terms facticity, falling and understanding which make up what is designated as 'care'. This term care moves us still further from the traditional meaning of existence, to become a new and more exact name for the Being of Dasein which is always mine; "Because Dasein has *in each case mineness*, one must always use a *personal* pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'" (Ibid. 68). In this way Dasein opens up the freedom to choose or lose an authentic grasp of its own possibilities while facing or fleeing the issue of Being. This type of mineness is not some private feeling or idea of who 'I am', but rather the way 'I' deal publicly with the issue of what it is 'to be' who 'I am'. Yet, Dasein generally falls into the superficial succour provided by the '*they*' environment of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity, and fails to stand out enough to address the issue of Being. Comparisons though should not be drawn when writing of Dasein's 'fall' to the diluvian theological myth, for Heidegger's description is always given in terms of the limiting of our possibilities.

Despite our daily comportment being, by and large, inauthentic, it would be a mistake to conceive its opposite, authenticity, as some greener pasture attainable to those who escape the flock, or some elevated notion of freeing a secret Self lain still within us. For Heidegger, "*authentic Being-one's-Self*", does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating 'I' (Ibid. 344). In fact, as Dasein's Being is so intimately linked to others and the world, authenticity's focus is on a deeper involvement with them rather than any solitary search for meaning that merely navel gazes. Thus, Dasein's direction is not internal and subjective but outward, incorporating others and the world both of which are intrinsic to it.

Of course, Dasein is not just a present-at-hand object in the world, exemplar of other such objects but exists (as we've seen) in such a way as we saw that the questions posed of it are personal, who?, and not impersonal, what? Present-at-hand (*Vorhandensein*) entities can be thought of as being always an arm's length away, unhelpful in Dasein's efforts to deal with the issue of Being. What is ready-to-hand involves a closeness that Dasein has when encountering entities within-the-world. Meaning "to, towards, the hands" the term *Zuhandensein* is enlivened by Heidegger by applying it to those things that serve Dasein in some way. This mode of being, this way of finding entities as available, is restricted in *BT* to things and not people (which would be *Mitdasein*), to those things that are usable to us - equipment (*Zeug*), for example, footwear/gear (lit. *Schuh-zeug*, shoe-equipment) or *Flugzeug* (aeroplane - lit. flight-equipment). And equipment becomes encounterable because of what is called "dis-tance", the hyphenated construction highlighting the breaking down of distance. Equipment is employed in-order-to realise some goal, the success of which is predicated on the usefulness of the tool in question, that is, on its ability to work in harmony with other co-tools; "Equipment - in accordance with its equipmentality - [is] always *in terms of* [aus] its belonging to other equipment; ink-stand, pen, paper, blotting paper, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room" (Ibid. 97).

To illustrate how *Zuhandensein* is more immediate than *Vorhandensein*, let us consider the following: while out for a walk I pass a horse in a field; I do not simply regard this animal as a neutral entity within-the-world but have a variety of ways of considering it: 1) I might see it as potentially serviceable for my hobby of riding and jumping, as a National Hunt horse perhaps; 2) as a beast of burden, to haul logs to my home; 3) as a mode of transport, to carry me into town; or 4)

as a meal, served with Cumberland sauce for my supper. Thus, it is not necessary for me to coldly view the horse as a piebald coloured shape standing in a field and then ascribe some function to it, perhaps to carry my weight and finally jump on its back. Instead, there is an ongoing form of interaction and encountering which takes place that has practical significance in my everyday world. The ready-to-hand tool makes reference to other tools so as none stand-alone but are linked within an 'equipmental totality' that coheres.

Readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand provide us with a picture of Dasein's basic constitutive state, that is, Being-in-the-world. Dasein's stand in relation to the world and its quotidian everyday environment is always detailed in terms of 'concern'. And its encompassing 'Being-in' is our way of relating to the world a means of understanding through the modes of being ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, as well as through certain moods and the ever-present, though as yet unaddressed, spectre of death.

Dasein's use of equipment is, thus, purposive, as our activity has meaning within the unity of the world and such a means of Being-in-the-world is its basic constitutive state. As it is structured in this way Heidegger makes no effort to prove that an external world exists or, for that matter, other *Mitdaseiende*, for given its care-structure Dasein is already in-the-world with-others.

The complex instrumental system of interconnected ontic entities (*Zeugganges*: 'equipmental totality') is just one sense of the term 'world' in *BT* but it is certainly not the most vital. What is important at the ontic level (and this point is significant to Taylor's misinterpretation of Heidegger) is so only because it acts as an opening into the ontological dimension of world, the structural make-up of the world itself. For what makes entities at the ontic level viable, what denotes the plethora of roles, functions and interactions within which entities may be encountered is their worldliness. It is both at the ontic and ontological levels that the term 'world', and its cognates, is to be applied to human beings, though as Heidegger advises the adjective 'worldly' is inappropriate to use in respect of animals and inanimate objects for they are simply 'in' or 'within'-the-world as, for instance, my umbrella is in the hall or within the stick-stand.

Dasein's Being-in-the-world is, on the other hand, ontologically significant as all of our ontic tasks are conjoined (directly or potentially) to the job of Being itself. For example, the humble coal fire in my living room for the protection of Being; the picture frame to secure the

painting which in turn relates to my desire for aesthetic pleasure; the computer keyboard to my attempt to communicate with others as Being-with and so on. The world is the clearing or the disclosedness of Dasein, for the laying bare of entities as what they are, for the *Da* of Dasein and the disclosedness of the world are the same, and this clearing of the equipmental totality is what Heidegger calls a 'sign'. The sign's job is to indicate the practical context of equipment in its use; "A sign is something ontically available, which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of the ontological structures of availableness, of referential wholes, and of worldliness" (Ibid. 114). It does not reveal the single piece of equipment but the interconnected complex of patterns into which equipment is integrated. A sign does not function as an isolated entity but as "an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself" (Ibid. 110).

Heidegger sub-divides this complex instrumental system of interconnections into four: 1) Any piece of equipment (or any instrument) - hammer, pen, coal, picture frame and so on is only meaningful because of its attachment to other pieces of equipment (other instruments), that is, is part of an 'equipmental/instrumental totality', for "there "is" no such thing as *an* equipment" (Ibid. 403); 2) each piece of equipment is made use of so as to achieve some 'goal', the coal to be put on the fire, so as to provide heat in that room, what is called its towards-which; 3) the picture frame which can only be hung if there is wood to construct the frame from in the first place, that is, its where-of it is made; 4) the pen which is placed in a communal (or social), surrounding after manufacture and might be used by others, that is, its public world. Equipments' readiness-to-hand is defined by its relation, its place within a totality of equipment, its setting within its world of work ('work world'). However, these very ready-to-hand relations, ties, or interconnections only become manifest after some form of breakdown, what Heidegger calls conspicuousness, obstruction or obstinacy has occurred. But what the sum of all of these parts *is*, is the world (or worldliness of the world's way of being), and precisely because the world is so constructed is the very reason it is not concernfully encountered in the course of our daily lives.

It is helpful here to draw attention to the fact that the terms 'community' and 'world' are designated basic existentialia in *BT*; "Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of

existentiality, we call them "*existentialia*". These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call "*categories*" - characteristics of being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein" (Ibid. 70). How Dasein deals with entities and the facts about them as a matter of practical concern Heidegger calls 'existentiell', so the ontic-ontological division is mirrored by the existentiell-existential one. It is significant that as Being-*in*-the-world is an *existentialia* of Dasein, so being-*within*-the-world is a category of, for instance, Dobbin trotting around a field or my umbrella in the stick-stand.

Yet, despite Dasein's intimate ties to others and the world, Heidegger's description of it in *BT* is not plural but very much singular. Dasein is an entity whose Being is an issue for it and whose *Mitdaseiende* actually reveals its singularity, for Dasein can only be isolated when there is something to be isolated from, that is, others. The '*they*' should not be considered just a cohort of singular subjects joined together or a single definite other, but as a crucial element of Dasein's structure, for the "Dasein-with of the others is disclosed within-the-world for a Dasein . . . only because Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with" (Ibid. 156). The '*they*' (*das Man*) of comfortable familiarity is part of Dasein's means of evading the troubling responsibility its authentic freedom induces by trying to decide how 'to be', and the general path through our everyday practical concerns and activities is called 'circumspection'.

A note of explanation needs to be made here regarding the translation of the core term '*das Man*'. The attraction for some commentators, including Hubert Dreyfus (1991, 143), William Blattner (1999, 62), and Dorothea Frede (1993, 57) in translating '*das Man*' as '*the one*', undoubtedly arises from the degree of impersonality and generality the word implies, mirroring Heidegger's intention. For example, "One is not supposed to make eye contact with Caesar", 'one' here means *everyone* in general or *no one* in particular and, naturally, this applies well to *das Man*'s anonymous, inauthentic influence in deflecting Dasein from potentially realisable possibilities. But the word 'one' has other connotations that may mislead the English-speaking reader. It is an impersonal pronoun with strong numerical overtones that are distinctly singular and, consequently, have the potential to be too narrowly interpreted. Take, on the *one* hand, such religious phrases as, "I believe in One God" or "The One True Church" and on the other, secular phrases such as, "The one and only" or "One of a kind". These commonly heard phrases highlight the singularity and exceptionality of a person or thing, while Heidegger's term *das Man* is used to express the very

opposite - the plurality or commonality of Dasein's everyday way of Being. It is for this reason that the translation *the 'they'* for *das Man* seems more in keeping with Heidegger's thought for the English-speaking reader, as the word '*they*' is both impersonal and plural, for example, "*They* (the Romans) never liked me (a Jew)". Though it may be thought *the 'they'* does not include *me*, it seems clear that for Heidegger each of us is the '*they*' for the *other*, we are both individual and many, Being-with-*one* (singular)-*another* (plural)-in-the-world; "One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power" (*BT*, 164); "Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The "*they*", which supplies the answer to the question of the "*who*" of everyday Dasein, is the "*nobody*" to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other [Untereinandersein]" (Ibid. 165-166).

Along with mood and understanding, Heidegger regards 'telling' an existentials of Dasein, for it is an essential means through which Dasein's daily involvement is acted out. 'Telling' is a more accurate translation of *Rede* than 'discourse', as it is natural to speak of 'telling the time', for example, by the length of shadows or 'telling the difference', for instance, between a good work of art and a bad one by looking at them, without the connotation of verbalisation. Telling is considered a means of making known what something actually is and as Taylor Carman observes, "Discourse . . . is not restricted to language, nor indeed to any system of signs or symbols. It is rather the entire domain of Dasein's expressive and communicative possibilities in virtue of which things become interpretable for it, and by it, as such. Discourse is expression and communication in the broadest sense, including all our spontaneous and unsystematic means of conveying something about something to someone" (2000, 19).

It is at once the existential-ontological foundation of language and the articulation of "the intelligibility of being-in-the-world . . . [which] *expresses itself as discourse*" (Ibid. 204). Telling shows up what is talked about rather than what is merely 'said-in-the-talk', by uncovering the thing itself (following the ancient Greek sense of the word *aletheia*, 'primordial truth' or 'un-hiddenness'). Telling plays a chief role in disclosing, and being the conduit, for communication of the 'there' and helps to organise the world, enabling us, for instance, to differentiate neckties from bowties and cravats. And not just as a verbal tool but as I encounter them privately, that is, in the clothing department of a shop where I can (before being directed by a sales' assistant) *tell* which rack is

neckties, which bowties and which cravats, just as I can *tell* which entity is a hammer and which a nail in my garden shed.

Telling, as the articulation of intelligibility, in the sense of expressing in words, or distinguishing one thing from another, is prior to language. Language, therefore, is the means by which such already existing articulation is put into words. What exactly these articulations are Heidegger calls 'significations', and "to significations, words accrue" (Ibid. 204), that is to say, the totality-of-significations is what discourse articulates. And as a fundamental way in which Dasein is in-the-world is *Mitdasein*, such significations find expression in the communion of language. Consequently, Dasein is never existentially alone, for listening and quietude are also potential ways of expressing, distinguishing and directing Dasein in-the-world and to others with whom it is shared.

Of course, I am not suggesting that in *BT* Heidegger considers such a fulsome appreciation of *Rede* to be the norm. In fact, as our mode of being in everydayness is usually fallen, the possibilities offered by telling are most often closed off to us and it deteriorates into idle talk and what lies covered remains hidden, as our grasp of a thing becomes simply that which is gained through the superficial understanding of the '*they*'. As an opening to genuine communication the '*they*' is not an option, for in and through it the public world chooses for us and we slip into inauthenticity.

The profundity of Dasein's Being-in-the-world and the interconnected complex of patterns into which equipment is integrated, along with the world as the disclosedness of Dasein all provide a rich ontological tapestry which Charles Taylor attempts to by-pass in his interpretation of attunement as awareness, and which the non-propositional talk of 'introspective and extraspective knowledge' cannot account for.

iii) '*Mitsein*' as the Ontological Ground of Connectedness

Our 'Being-with' draws further attention to an important aspect of both Heideggerian and cognitive theories of emotion/mood, something I have highlighted throughout the thesis, that of 'connections' (or bonds) between people. By gaining a deeper understanding of *Mitsein* I will be in a position to uncover some parallels that exist between the cognitivist talk of 'connections' and Dasein's Being-

with and its ontological meaning. The term 'solicitude' is used in *BT* to unambiguously differentiate what Dasein encounters. Rather than *Mitdaseiende* (with Daseins) being treated as simply other objects in-the-world to be manipulated, operated or handled, they are interesting, attentive and aware of each other, in a manner more accurately conceived of as solicitous (lit. caring-for); "Knowing oneself [Sichkennen] is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially. It operates proximally in accordance with the kind of Being which is closest to us - Being-in-the-world as being-with; and it does so by an acquaintance with that which Dasein, along with the Others, comes across in its environmental circumspection and concerns itself with . . . Thus in concerned solicitude the other is proximally disclosed" (Ibid. 161).

Others are appresent to me as with-there-Being (*Mit-da-sein*); it is this 'with' that entirely alters our relationship to them from our relationship to ready-to-hand objects or things. What is fundamentally different is that what constitutes my Being-together-with-others, and not my ready-to-hand encounter, is that it is based on both recognising and being recognised, and the balance of these two positions. In and through the world I encounter others and myself, for Being-in is existentially Being-with. That is, Dasein's Being-in is the very means of its coming to terms with the issue of its own Being, it does not somehow step-away from its concerned-solicitude in order to discover who it is, for it is this very dual mode of encountering that enables singular Dasein to engage with others and, equally, others to engage with singular Dasein, for the "Dasein-with of the Others is disclosed within-the-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who are Daseins with us [die Mitdaseienden], only because Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with" (Ibid. 156).

But as I have made clear, Dasein becomes absorbed with everyday concerns and tends to rest in inauthenticity, levelling down in daily routines and interactions. Such conformism results in the closing off of more meaningful possibilities, as Dasein adopts a mindset of indifference and indolence, content to embrace what is dished up to it from the '*they*'; "The Self of everyday Dasein is the '*they*'-self, which we distinguish from the *authentic Self* - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way [eigens ergriffenen]" (Ibid. 167). Such levelling down has the effect of concealing Dasein's profound sense of unsettledness, by suppressing distinctness into meagre averageness, and "constitut[ing] what we know as "publicness" ["die Öffentlichkeit"] . . .

[and as such] everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone" (Ibid. 165).

Heidegger recognised that the ontological structure of the '*they*' had been overlooked when viewed in purely existentialist terms, for its mode of Being-in-the-world was considered simply a natural object that the designation substance was applicable to, and so its disclosive dimension was lost. In *BT*, however, we see how resoluteness pushes us into a caring *Mitsein* with others, and so our Being-with-one-another cannot be considered just a variety of concern but solicitude - one human Being's caring for another, and it is this type of caring that most distinctly defines our connection to one another⁶⁵. Our caring-solicitous mode of Being-together-in-the-world is disclosive of entities and others, *Mitsein* being the reciprocal presence of Dasein's mode of existing with others and *Mitwelt*. Literally meaning 'with-world', *Mitwelt* is that which surrounds this reciprocal presence or, to put it differently, the clearing that constitutes Dasein, something which is not the simple corralling together of entities that exist into some great stockade, but the dwelling place of Dasein's disclosive Being for others and itself.

If one considers, even in simple psychological and developmental terms, the role of connections in a child's capacity to accommodate itself to another's life, we see that this is made possible only by the openness of our *Mitwelt*. This accommodation is the child's means of learning about events and situations, objects and equipment that would, otherwise, be closed-off to it. The 'other' plays a critical part in the child's grasping of the world as being a shared world and allows for a understanding to emerge of the kind of Being each is himself - 'the standing out/beyond' (ek-istence) being both a transcendence of Self to other and a grasping of Self from other, "any human being as an entity that has a world is the same as any other because that world is the same for every human being. We may have wildly different "beliefs" about the world and it may be impossible in practice to resolve these differences; yet this is not enough to make us give up the idea of a single world that is, in principle, the same for all" (Olafson, 1998, 56).

As adult human beings that have come to appreciate the separateness of others, we also recognise the connection that is there in our grasp of the realm of the world. Being-in-the-world is

⁶⁵ There is a clear comparison to be made here between the cognitivist talk of connections and Heidegger's ontological point (discussed earlier in Part B) that we can be guilty for another's "endangered existence" (cf. Part B: section C).

not only a reference to the ontic fact of Being-alongside other things but the ontologically key fact of our Being as Being-with. For Dasein should not be considered an isolated factual entity but a factual thrown Being whose Being-with characterises care as essentially an interconnected instrumental system of meaning that coheres. The 'shared forms of life' of our given culture mean that we are attuned to one another in our everyday dealings in-the-world and manipulate equipment as *'they'* do, revealing our competence to grasp the *mores*, rules and regulations of our community and society.

The Dasein-with of others belongs to Being-with "since the worldhood of the world, in which Dasein essentially is already, is thus constituted, it accordingly lets us encounter what is environmentally ready-to-hand as something with which we can be concerned in our know-how, and it does so in such a way together with it we encounter the Dasein-with of others" (*BT*, 160/ *SZ*, 123). Dasein-with refers then to the way Dasein manifests its grasping of the public roles it plays that are understood by others in our shared world. Such a description reinforces Heidegger's point regarding the false picture of Dasein as isolated or solipsistic, for Dasein simply *is* its meaningful actions in-the-world.

d) The Cultural Conditioning of Emotions, Charles Taylor's Analysis and its Short-comings

When it comes to examining the emotion/mood objectless fear⁶⁶ there are a number of interesting points of comparison between Charles Taylor's interpretation of Heidegger and the cognitive position which brings to the fore particular problems. As there is (apparently) no object on which a judgement can be founded, objectless fear is often cited as a counter-example to strong cognitive accounts. Charles Taylor contends that where such emotions are invoked "the point about these . . . is just that there is no object where there should be one. The very structure of fear is that it is of something; what marks out nameless fear, or in a different way, unfocused anxiety, is that we cannot designate an object . . . for it is not just that there is no object here, rather there is a felt absence of object. The empty slot where the object of fear should be is an essential phenomenological feature of this experience" (1985, vol. 1, 48).

⁶⁶ I will go into more detail regarding the ontological relevance of this emotion when arguing that cognitivists do not satisfactorily account for it in the section following.

This “empty slot”, this “felt absence of object” thus becomes the pseudo-object for Taylor; the nothing that is absolutely everything, that is, anxiety focuses on the object of existentially our having no object - objectlessness becomes the object of *Angst*. When talking of nameless dread as not having a designated object - “I cannot say what”, [Ibid. 48] or “there is no object where there should be one” [Ibid. 48], Taylor sounds remarkably like Lyons, “the object [of so-called objectless fear] is not properly formulable or expressible . . . vague or strange” (1980/1993, 75-76)⁶⁷. Taylor speaks of a “sense of nameless dread” (1985, vol. 1, 48), that is, a type of awareness, just as I might have a sense there is a cat behind me and get a creepy feeling in my skin, but this sense is not at all what Heidegger means by attunement. For the reason the term *Befindlichkeit* is used in *BT* for mood, and not *Gefühl* or *Sinn*, is because our ‘situatedness’ denotes our particular way of being tuned or orientated, the stem ‘*find*’ having the same root meaning as the English ‘find’, something which helps in appreciating the idea of how one locates oneself. This point is reinforced when we remember that the common word for mood in German is ‘*Stimmung*’, which has the literal meaning tuning and, consequently, relates the notion of orientation more succinctly than the English variant.

Taylor considers such emotions to be “affective modes of *awareness of situation*” (1985, italics my own, vol. 1, 48), in saying this, however, he fails to register the important distinction Heidegger draws between ‘Situation’ (*Situation*) written with a capital ‘S’ and ‘situation’ (*Lage*) written with a lower-case ‘s’. The former is Dasein’s total ontological situation, while the latter is the public *das Man* (the ‘they’) common situation, “For the “they” . . . the Situation is essentially something that has been closed off. The “they” knows only the ‘general situation’” (Ibid. 346). But the concepts ‘awareness’ and ‘sense’, and the non-propositionalist talk of ‘introspective’ and ‘extraspective knowledge’, are a very long way from Heidegger’s clear statement that moods are “prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure” (*BT*, 175). Where Heidegger speaks of *Angst* he does not believe it to be an awareness of our situation but an attunement of Situation; for it is because of its uniqueness that mere awareness or knowledge would not suffice as a means of grasping there is this absence in *Angst* in the first place, and so Dasein must be pre-ontologically attuned; “The world as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact specifically occupy ourselves with it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-

⁶⁷ As a consequence Taylor is open to the same objections I develop against the causal-evaluative theory in Part C).

evident, so much a matter of course, that we are completely oblivious of it” (*Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 1982, 165) and, “attunement . . . has so little to do with a kind of apprehending . . . only because the ‘there’ has already been disclosed in attunement can inward-turning reflection come across experience at all” (*BT*, 136).

Taylor’s desire to isolate a cognitive dimension to the Heideggerian conception of emotion/mood is made more overt when he discusses how our emotions are conditioned culturally⁶⁸. When discussing this issue Taylor seems to have in mind the following type of facts and influence with regard to culture and emotion: though there is a degree of emotional commonality across cultures, it is clear that not every group or every individual reacts to emotional events in the same way. Diversity reflects the various beliefs and evaluations that influence the meaning of particular situations for each person. More broadly one can see how diversity across cultures reflects the different patterns of belief that influence how people as members of communities react to events in their lives.

The complex-web of social relationships of which all cultures are made-up, help mould how its people think, feel and behave. As children we learn about the rules that govern our lives, from the intimacy of our own private family nexus, to the larger public community network, to our national identity. The social *mores* we learn to adhere to effect how we react in particular social situations, whether it be queuing for a bus, attending a wedding, or chatting-up a member of the opposite sex. Each culture has a different *Weltanschauung*, and it is for this reason that in multicultural societies, such as the United States, particular cultural groups see the social environment in which they live differently and may even develop a different set of emotional reactions. The Amish community, for instance, because of certain theistic beliefs, regard ‘resentment’ as an emotion one never has good reason to feel and actively try to remove it from their emotional make-up. Cultural influences help in providing the basis for evaluating whether or not another person’s actions constitute an offence, or if a particular criticism should be considered an insult, and what, if any, emotional reaction is appropriate and, finally, which emotion that

⁶⁸ Roger Scruton provides an interesting discussion of this topic in his essay, ‘Emotion and Culture’ in his book, ‘The Aesthetic Understanding’ (1998).

should be. One aspect of the influence of culture on our emotions is that members of the same cultural group can learn to predict (at least to some extent) each other's behaviour.

Taylor argues that we experience the emotion shame, for example, because of a situation that is a shameful one, and react to it in a particular way, "hiding oneself . . . covering up, or else 'wiping out' the blot" (1985, vol. 2, 23). Shame then would not be recognised as this emotion without grasping the situation which gives rise to it, for we are conditioned or determined emotionally by our cultures. "Experiencing an emotion" Taylor comments, "is to be *aware* of our situation as . . . [for example] shameful or outrageous" (italics my own, 1985, vol. 1, 48). We know something is shameful or, more broadly, that shameful things/situations exist in the world (i.e. we know something about the world) because "our affective life is conditioned by . . . culture" (Mulhall, 1996, 81) and, therefore, there exists a cognitive dimension to emotions/moods (including those discussed by Heidegger).

However, even when considered from the vantage point of cognitivism, it is important to note that Taylor's description of shame contains an inaccurate positive appetitive dimension; he writes, "when I am ashamed, I want to hide, or conceal, or perhaps undo what is shameful" (1985, vol. 1, 56). In fact, as he has not drawn a sufficiently clear distinction between the often confused emotions guilt, shame and remorse⁶⁹ his account ends up making shame seem more like guilt. For if shame were to create a response of wanting to "undo what is shameful" (Ibid. 56) or of "wiping out the blot" (1985, vol. 2, 23) and, thus, of making amends then it begins to sound very like the reparations one makes in order to exculpate one's guilt, that is, it contains a clear positive appetitive dimension but, as I demonstrated earlier, shame is not so structured⁷⁰.

Taylor's consideration of a cognitive dimension to Heidegger's analysis of mood might effectively be elucidated with the following example: Tim is afraid of X. The social and cultural environment in which Tim grew up means that his range of emotional responses to object X is limited (as is the number of objects which might be considered fearful in the first place). This cultural grounding carries with it a means of co-attunement (*Mitbefindlichkeit*⁷¹) with others which allows things to matter in determinate ways. Tim's fear has: a) an object - in Heideggerian terms

⁶⁹ See my discussion of these emotions in Part A).

⁷⁰ It is worth noting in this respect also Taylor's position is similar to Lyons's and is open to the same objections. For though the desire in shame is negative (i.e. "I want to hide" [1985, vol. 1, 56]), as it had been for Lyons when describing grief in Part A), it is still an appetitive dimension and should be accounted for.

⁷¹ Compare the previous section c) iii) 'Mitsein' as the Ontological Ground of Connectedness.

“that in the face of which we fear” (BT, 179); b) a number of physiological changes and feelings – “our response to that which we fear” or “fearing” (Ibid. 179); and c) a concern about what will happen – “that about which we fear” (Ibid. 179). What is not distinguished by Taylor is the crucial difference I highlighted when examining mood in general and, which Heidegger brings to the fore during his analysis of guilt, that is, the distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ guilt or, more broadly, between ‘simple emotions’ and ‘complex moods’. Heidegger states that guilt (and mood generally), within the history of western philosophy has only been interpreted at the ontic level, that is, at the ‘simple guilt/lack’ level. One result of this is that “when other notions, such as ‘deserving punishment’ or ‘having debts to someone’ are added to it [i.e. guilt] and, expand its meaning, such interpretations become dominant” [cf. Part B) c:)], and so too Heidegger believes object-directed fear or ‘simple fear’ has become an obstacle to comprehensively grasping objectless (or ‘complex’) fear.

Of course, it must be remembered that moods are to be understood as ‘attunement’ or basic existentials of Dasein, so though ‘simple fear’ may make us aware and be delimited by our cultural environs, at the ontological level objectless or complex fear attunes us to the very issue of our own Being. In daily life we are delivered over to the public means of interpreting things “which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the attunement belonging to it” (SZ, 167-168). The confusion in recognising these distinct ontic and ontological types of emotions/moods stems from the casual way Taylor uses affective terms as equivalents. For instance, he writes, “the vocabulary defining meaning – words like ‘terrifying’, ‘attractive’ – is linked with that describing *feeling* – ‘fear’” (italics my own, 1985, vol.2, 23) and, “for example, a feeling cannot be one of *remorse* unless there is a sense of having done wrong” (italics my own, Ibid. 63). But fear and remorse are emotions with feeling components, and emotions, from a Heideggerian perspective, as Solomon notes, “are the precipitating particle[s] that crystalises mood” (1977, 130). Ontic fear only has importance for Heidegger as a means of disclosing our ontological concerns. In the section entitled ‘*Fear as a Mode of State-of-Mind*’ Heidegger explicitly states, “We are not going to make an ontical report on those entities which can often and for the most part be ‘fear-some’” (SZ, 140/BT 179), in other words, he is not concerned with making a list of our emotional reactions for the fearsome “is not to be understood in an ontical sense as some

factual 'individualized' disposition, but as an existential possibility of the essential state-of-mind [mood] of Dasein in general" (Ibid. 188).

Heidegger takes as unquestioned the impenetrability of primordial mood by cognition together with its positive disclosure as an indication of its depth and originality as Dasein's mode of revealing. Cognition, awareness, sense or knowledge cannot explain or assume epistemological priority with respect to the revelations of mood, for, as I've highlighted, moods disclose Dasein to itself "*prior to* all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure" (Ibid. 175). By stating "*beyond* their range of disclosure" Heidegger makes clear that the italicised "*prior to*" must be taken both temporally and logically with respect to the structure of disclosure. Mood reveals our situation both before our understanding formulates an explicit judgement and also supports the understanding of its judgements. This point is one of the most significant contributions of Heidegger's philosophy to the understanding and appreciation of the crucial role of emotion/mood analysis in the constitution and interpretation of human experience.

As Taylor does not distinguish between situation and Situation, emotion and feeling (emotion and mood), simple and complex fear, attunement and awareness we arrive at a point where Heidegger's deeply ontological description is shoe-horned into an ontic low-order cognitive account. Taylor's desire to describe matters at a cognitive level (our emotions tell us about the world) ignores the fact that this telling is only at the ontic level of concernfully Being-in-the-world, only Dasein's simple fear or shame or guilt.

e) Conclusion

In this section I raised objections to the cognitive account by considering examples of emotions which are not founded on beliefs or judgments, including our emotional reactions to fictional characters and reflex emotions. I noted Paul Griffiths's return to Paul Ekman and Jerry Fodor's notion of an 'involuntary modular system' to help explain these emotions, and detailed how Peter Goldie uses the idea of 'cognitive impenetrability' as a means of coming to terms with cases where a person's beliefs are at odds with their feelings. I considered the question of the irrationality of such cases and described Goldie's 'feeling towards' theory, noting some points of comparison in the area of 'world-directed intentionality' with Charles Taylor's account of nameless dread. I

completed this sub-section with a look at a similar account to the non-propositional descriptions, Robert Roberts's 'serious concerned-based construal' theory.

I went on to critically examine Charles Taylor's attempt to interpret the key ontological concept attunement as awareness. I noted Heidegger's description of Dasein's everyday mode of Being-in-the-world, something which provides us with a picture of Dasein's basic constitutive state, a means of standing out which helps us to distinguish it from Taylor's ontically orientated description. As Dasein is not in-the-world as other entities are (for its roots lay embedded in ontological earth) it has an openness, a transcendence of the world which is unique to it. I highlighted Taylor's by-passing of the task of distinguishing between key affective terms, something which leads to the mislabelling of objectless fear as an emotion, and the misidentification of shame as having a positive appetitive dimension.

I claimed also that Taylor incorrectly attempts to provide a cognitive basis for Heidegger's description of mood by considering the cultural conditioning of emotions; something I argued offered only an ontic account of the crucial and primordial concept *Befindlichkeit*. I went on to describe just what mood and Being-in-the-world mean in *BT* and how, although 'others' play an essential role for Dasein at the ontic level of the 'they', it is at the deeper ontological level of connections as the ground of Being (and not just at the level of our cultural conditioning) that mood has most relevance to Heidegger.

In the section following, I will argue that objectless fear is really a fear of not grasping, not being able to grasp, the meaning of fear, that is, an ontological fear of having rejected or, perhaps, more accurately, forgotten what it is 'to be', the forgetting of Being (*Seinvergesenheit*). I examine the unique make-up of the mood *Angst* and how Heidegger expands our understanding beyond that offered by the cognitivists by revealing that at its core, far from there being something in-the-world which we find threatening (as with 'simple fear'), it is the world itself which is threatening or "That in the face of which one has *Angst* is being-in-the-world as such" (SZ, 186).

Part C

1) The Cognitive Account of Objectless Fear and its Short-comings, and the Pathway towards Heidegger's Ontological Description

- a) Introduction
- b) Objectless Fear and Crucial Distinction between Nescience and near Nescience
- c) The Manifest Limits of the Causal-evaluative Account (and Cognitivism in general) to Fully Capture the Meaning of *Angst* and the Pathway Towards Heidegger's Analysis
- d) Conclusion

a) Introduction

Having provided a thorough account of the structure of emotion and, specifically grief and guilt, from the cognitive perspective (i.e. Part A:), as well as examined the non-propositional accounts of Goldie and Griffiths, I am now in a position to assess in detail a key and often inaccurately described emotion/mood, objectless fear. In this section I will draw up a point of transition or pathway towards Heidegger's description of this mood by isolating objections to the accounts expounded in the work of William Lyons, Martha Nussbaum and David Pugmire. I develop arguments against their efforts to suggest that the object of objectless fear is simply mislabelled and should, in fact, be called a mood or, as Lyons suggests, a 'vague' or 'inexpressible' emotion, and go on to examine Heidegger's account of *Angst* within the framework *BT*.

b) Objectless Fear and the Crucial Distinction between Nescience and Near Nescience

William Lyons's contends that objectless fear is often used as an "exception to the claim that an emotion is based on knowledge or belief about properties . . . Fear and cognate emotions such as fright are usually described as evaluating their object, at least in part, as dangerous to the person concerned. Now, if this is correct, it would not seem strange for there to be a fear which might evaluate one's very ignorance of the situation, one's lack of knowledge, *one's not knowing anything* about the object, as dangerous. Thus fear of the dark may not be fear of the absence of light but fear

of the *absence of knowledge* or, to put it more exactly, fear arising because one does not know what might be out there in the dark and because *one thinks* that there might be something to injure or startle one. My *imagination* might suggest holes or pits to fall into, things to attack or startle, or more ethereal enemies" (italics my own, 1980/1993, 75).

There is an immediate and significant objection I wish to raise against the account given so far; "[To] not know what might be out there in the dark" is not fear of "*one's not knowing anything* about the object", on the contrary, it is fear stemming from knowledge, the elementary knowledge that the dark may hide a foe, as yet undetected, but no less threatening, in fact, more threatening perhaps because of that. If one were not to know anything whatsoever about an object one would clearly be in a state of nescience and, thus, not in a position to appraise one's knowing nothing as dangerous. Even if one allows for mere descriptions of objects, and not objects proper, to be the basis for Lyons's evaluation of danger, one would run into the same trouble. For on what would this description be based? Such a descriptive account must be founded on something and so cannot be nescient.

David Pugmire's account of objectless fear mirrors Lyons's position when it comes to the notion of 'ignorance,' but is quite distinct in respect of 'thought' or 'imagination'. He writes that the mere "not know[ing]" (i.e. Lyons's "one's very ignorance") is what is frightening, rather than one having the thought, or imagining, that there might be "something to injure or startle one," "Looming, strangeness, darkness and so on, must be able to frighten *autonomously*, that is, without being construed as portents of danger" (italics my own, 1998, 39). But surely the very reason 'strangeness' is strange, and 'looming' is fear inducing, and the 'darkness' scary, is because they instil in us a feeling of threat, in other words, "portents of danger" are an essential component in these concepts. This point might be made more concrete if one considers the example of a grief-stricken person. When 'B' dies we do not expect to find 'A' (her husband) laughing uproariously at a Keystone Cops film, precisely because the emotion so construed is of having experienced a profound and irretrievable loss, an evaluation that prohibits its opposite, uproarious frivolity or amusement, from being felt. To say that grief without this cornerstone could still be grief, that is, to say one must be able to grieve autonomously, without it being construed as a profound and irretrievable loss, seems to be to offer a description of grief that bears no resemblance to how we

normally understand grief and, thus, for it to be such a unique case that it could hardly be said to be grief at all. And in the same way, one might ask, just what type of fear or fright is it Pugmire is describing without it being "construed as [a] portent of danger"? In fact, I would suggest, it is not fear at all.

In detailing apparent objectless fear it seems fair to say that both Pugmire and Lyons's account might more accurately be said to be a description of anxiety, that is, a profound sense of unease about something uncertain rather than fear. If one takes Lyons's 'fear of the dark' notion and applies it to adults it raises obvious difficulties. Is it really a case of genuine fear for a reasonable adult person to say he or she is afraid without knowing anything about that which they claim to be afraid? Or that the imagined "holes or pits" or "ethereal enemies" into which they might fall, or by which they might be injured, are rational?

Peter Goldie talks of objectless fear in the following way: "Your fear on waking may have no very specific object - the dark, the shape of the curtains, the strange noise which woke you - but it is still an emotional experience and not a mood. And the next morning, when your fear is gone but you remain anxious, it is natural to say you are anxious about everything this morning, or about nothing in particular, or that you are anxious about everything and nothing" (2000, 17-18). But as Carolyn Price notes, "the fears that Goldie describes in this passage do not seem to be objectless fears . . . A sudden fear of the dark, or a strange noise, or an unfamiliar silhouette at the window may not be well-founded, but in each case it seems possible to say why that subject might find these things frightening⁷²" (2006).

Plainly, for such imaginings to be genuine one's imagination must be built on something but to be nescient is to be absolutely ignorant, so from where does the object that is evaluated as dangerous appear? It cannot just be nothing, for what I know nothing about is nothing, not the something that fills this nothing gap. "*Not knowing anything* about the object" does not lead to imagined objects but imagined objects may very well fill the gap of my not knowing. Yet, such imagined objects must be based on something, for example, childhood fantasies or past experiences or knowledge that such things (e.g. "holes or pits") can exist. If, let's say, I know absolutely

⁷² As part of an overall critique of the cognitivist analysis Paul Griffiths summarises their position (particularly Robert Solomon) on this point as being one where, "The object of this [objectless] state is things generally" (1998, 28). Later I will look at reasons for suggesting Griffiths's summary is not quite what cognitivists' say.

nothing about astronomy, let alone black holes, I cannot then be afraid of them, rationally, irrationally or any other way. Therefore, to literally "*not know anything*" about something cannot create an evaluation that this very state of nescience is dangerous. If it were true that fear of the "absence of light" is really fear of the "*absence of knowledge*," then, it is not a giant step to suggest that such epistemological fear would be my constant occurrent companion. Could not my ignorance of great swathes of knowledge produce all manner of objectless fears? To propose ignorance as the evaluative component of such an emotion is to open a door to myriad objectless fears that do not make any sense. The problem here is that neither Lyons or Pugmire distinguish between nescience - that is, literally not knowing anything about something and near nescience - that is, knowing only the bare bones or elementary facts about something, on the one hand, and irrational fears and genuine though as yet unexplained, rational objectless fear on the other.

Of course, if children were to report such cases of fear our concerns would be raised but not in the manner outlined. We recognise that children are often, for instance, irrationally fearful of the dark, imagining all sorts of despicable terrors waiting to attack them once asleep. We placate their fears by explaining that the bogeyman does not exist in reality or that the likelihood of a black hole gobbling them up is implausible. In other words, we explain how things really are, their "ignorance of the situation," their "lack of knowledge" is not the foremost source of their emotional state, rather it is their imaginations and gullible natures in accepting too earnestly fairytales and fantasies. What is crucial here is that one would no more regard an adult's imagined fear of "ethereal enemies" or claims of fear arising from states of nescience as genuinely objectless than one would a child's fear of the bogeyman.

Lyons goes on to say that, "Because such a fear is not directed at an object, *one will not have made any judgment* explicitly or implicitly about the properties of an object. But equally, perhaps, one could say that the fear in such cases is about being totally in the dark literally or epistemologically. In consequence, one could say that what one fears is the situation of being in *no position to cope* because one does not know what is happening or liable to happen. From here one might be able to make out a case that such fear is based on judgments about properties of one's *situation*, for example that the *situation is describable* as one which *I do not know anything about* or with which I believe *I am unable to cope*" (italics my own, 1980/1993, 75).

The idea that this type of fear is about being "totally in the dark literally or epistemologically," or that this situation is "*describable* as one which *I do not know anything about*, or with which I believe *I am unable to cope*," raises the question, 'What is it one is not coping with when one does "*not know anything about*" one's situation?' It appears that what Lyons is hinting at is, in fact, more in line with an emotion such as objectless anxiety, and a description more akin to an example cited by William James: "I went one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight . . . when suddenly there fell upon me without any warning, just as if it came out of the darkness, *a horrible fear of my own existence* . . . I became a mass of quivering fear. After this the universe was changed for me altogether. I awoke morning after morning with a *horrible dread* at the pit of my stomach, and with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew before" (italics my own, 1929, 157). Perhaps recognising an uncomfortable degree of commonality between James's description and his own, Lyons quickly allows for another option: "Alternatively what are often described as cases of objectless fear might be better described as cases in which the object is not properly formulable or expressible . . . so-called objectless fears might be cases where one has a *vague* sense of foreboding, a *vague* feeling that some doom is about to befall one. Here the object is *just vague* rather than absent but it is still an object" (italics my own, 1980/1993, 75-76). Hanging onto his causal-evaluative theory he finishes, "But even in such cases one presumably has beliefs and makes judgments such as 'There are things out there which make me feel that I'm in danger but *I cannot adequately describe them*', and these beliefs and judgments are the basis of one's emotions" (Ibid., italics my own, 76).

In the descriptions outlined above we move with alacrity from a situation as "describable as one which *I do not know anything about*," to one that "might better be described as . . . not properly formulable or expressible", to "some cases of *so-called objectless fears* might be cases where one has . . . *a vague feeling* that some doom is about to befall one." The latter descriptions, inexpressibility and vagueness are difficult to assess, precisely because they are ineffable and nebulous, but, perhaps, the first option offers a way to investigate the problem effectively.

c) The Manifest Limits of the Causal-evaluative Theory (and Cognitivism in general) to Fully Capture the Meaning of Objectless Fear and the Pathway towards Heidegger's Analysis

As we saw, Lyons wishes to draw our attention to a case of fear where no judgements (explicitly or implicitly) are made about the properties of an object yet one is overcome with fear. He offers the possibility that in such a case one is "totally in the dark literally or epistemologically" and so, what one fears is being in no position to cope "because one does not know what is happening or liable to happen" (Ibid. 75). This suggestion allows Lyons to say that, "such fear is based on judgments about properties of one's situation [not of an object *per se*], for example that the *situation* is . . . one which I *do not know anything about* or with which I believe *I am unable to cope*" (Ibid. 75). But how do we reach the position that this situation is one that I fear? In fact, the situation would never become one of objectlessness, apart from the earlier example I gave of irrational childhood fears if it were to be understood in purely cognitive terms.

Why, for instance, would not knowing something instil such fear, unless there was some reason to think that being literally in the dark was dangerous, that is, unless there was *something* we feel endangered by? And if that was the case, such feelings of danger must then be object-directed, for example, there must (however paradoxical it may sound) be an actual 'ethereal' or more tangible enemy such as a night prowler and such a person must be conceived as being possibly outside in the dark waiting to break in to my home. Thus, to be afraid of the dark literally, without an object, would be considered irrational while regarding epistemological darkness or nescience as the evaluative component of such fear would be equally irrational. Genuine objectless fear only becomes meaningful when viewed as an existential or ontological concern. Something that fits Henry James Snr.'s description more accurately, "One day towards the close of May, having eaten a comfortable dinner . . . thinking of nothing and feeling only the exhilaration incident to a good digestion, when suddenly - in a lightening flash, as it were - *'fear came upon me, and trembling made all my bones shake'*. To all appearances it was a perfectly insane and *abject terror without ostensible cause*" (F. W. Dupee, italics my own, 1951).

In fact, Lyons himself hints at something similar, "For there do seem to be well attested cases of people being afraid or depressed but also being unable to pick out anything, real or illusionary, as the particular object of the fear or depression. That is, there are cases of emotional

states which appear to have no focus or target of any sort and so certainly nothing which could be called a particular object or target. They are, so to speak, *emotions aimed out at the world* but ones that do not come to rest in any one spot or on any one thing" (italics my own, 1980/1993, 104).

To extricate himself from the possibility of contradiction Lyons reverts to his previous position; "The term ['particular object'] merely implies that the emotional state is about something rather than nothing, though this something might be *vague, inexpressible, imponderable* and the content of a false belief" (Ibid., italics my own, 105), and, "A particular object is not merely just not nothing, it is something which can be focussed on *sufficiently for one to evaluate it* as, say, dangerous or futile" (Ibid., italics my own, 105). By claiming that objectless emotions are really just emotions that have vague objects⁷³, Lyons simply muddies the waters. For as I have shown, on the one hand, he asserts that the emotional state is about something though it may be vague or inexpressible or imponderable, while on the other, he contends that a particular object is something that "can be focussed on *sufficiently for one to evaluate it*" (Ibid. 105).

But how can something that is imponderable also be focussed on? For imponderable surely means incalculable, unthinkable or not capable of being estimated or valued. So the 'something' that Lyons's 'particular object' is about is incalculable and unthinkable, yet it is also something that can be focussed on, and focussed on sufficiently, to be evaluated. But how is this possible? For something to be evaluated means that one can ascertain the value or amount of it. The tension is obvious; if something is incalculable and unthinkable it cannot also be evaluated, sufficiently or otherwise. Lyons needs a foundation on which to build the emotion objectless fear, something that can be evaluated but vague and imponderable objects don't fit the bill and his ambivalent comment, "Whether one is to say that there are cases of objectless emotions or merely that the object is rather strange, such as one's ignorance in a given situation, may be undecidable" (Ibid. 76) reinforces the concerns I have outlined with regard to the causal-evaluative theory's inaccuracy in describing these emotions. Paul Griffiths mistakenly attributes to Lyons the claim that "clinical depression requires the judgement that things are pretty bad. The object of this state is things generally" (1998, 28). This is Griffiths and Lyons's rather unsatisfactory example of an objectless emotion. For certain types of depression a far better understanding of them may be gained when they are

⁷³ Comparable positions are taken by Goldie (2000, 17-18) and Nussbaum (2001, 69).

considered a response to what Heidegger calls the 'voice of conscience' [see Part B)]. Note also the important role of 'existential anxiety' in Heidegger's analysis, a mood that accounts for what is often, inaccurately, called 'clinical depression.'

But as I've noted, Lyons does not in fact go this far, saying only that the object is 'vague' or 'inexpressible' or 'strange' which is quite different from saying the object is "things generally." For when something is vague it is still an object, even if that object is immaterial, "one's very ignorance of the situation" (1980/93, 76). But when something is 'things generally', it cannot be an object in the causal-evaluative sense, for 'things generally' is nothing in particular and so, can be no 'particular object'. Of course, if existential anxiety were admitted, then, William James's 'horrible fear' or Henry James's Snr. 'abject fear' might begin to make more sense.

In fact, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that the objectless emotion spoken of by Griffiths ('things generally') is more in line with how the cognitivist Martha Nussbaum describes the type of grief she felt when moving from Brown University to the University of Chicago: "there was a good possibility that the object of the grief was a much more vague and elusive object, such as "my past" or "the years of my youth", since I had spent twenty-five years living in Cambridge, Massachusetts . . . This highly general object was definitely not in my power to regain . . . I decided that the past was probably the real object of the grief" (2001, 69).

But no matter how woolly Nussbaum's object might be, she, like Lyons, Pugmire and Goldie tries to force through a contradictory account of objectless emotions one that is, in fact, object-focused, "emotions always have an object, even if it is a vague object; they always invest the object with value, and involve the acceptance of beliefs about the object" (Ibid. 133). Yet, Nussbaum herself appears to recognise that such a stance has problems and quickly moves to try to re-label such emotions as moods, "It is very difficult to distinguish an emotion with a vague or highly general object from a mood: one may feel generally fearful, and that will be an emotion with a vague object, if its content is that some (vague) danger is viewed as impending. It will be a mood to the extent that even that type of highly general or vague object is absent" (Ibid. 133). This is actually a common manoeuvre by cognitivists and one Deigh spots, "The usual replies from cognitivists . . . consist in either excluding experiences of objectless emotions from the class of emotions proper and placing them in some distinct class of mental states, such as moods, or

attributing to them a subtle or suppressed intentionality, which then explains away their apparent objectlessness⁷⁴" (1994, 826).

But Nussbaum's description seems as flawed as the earlier examples provided by Pugmire and Lyons. For though she speaks of joy, for instance, as being an emotion when it is about "how the *world* is" (italics my own, 2001, 133) she also contends it is a mood when it "doesn't focus on anything" (Ibid. 133). But objects that are so 'highly general' and 'vague' such that they are about 'how the world is', can hardly be said to do anything other than focus on absolutely everything, that is, on absolutely nothing in particular. And in the same manner as before, we can ask, just what type of 'fearful' emotion is it Nussbaum writes (see questions raised of Pugmire's position at the beginning of this section) that has such an utterly vague sense of danger? If the notion of danger is diluted to the point where it is so 'highly general' that nothing can be named or even hinted at as its object, then, fear seems a rather arbitrary designation. Calling it objectless, existential or ontological *Angst* would, I argue, be more appropriate, for such "highly general or vague objects", such as, "how the world is" or "*emotions aimed out at the world*" are really cases of not knowing anything about the world or what is fearful in this most general sort of way. But this 'not knowing' is conceptually the very same as the nescience I discussed earlier. Being afraid or joyful about everything in general is really being afraid or joyful about nothing, for absolutely everything is nothing in particular.

d) Conclusion

In this section I brought to the fore an important distinction between between nescience and near nescience or between genuine objectless fear, that is, fear which has literally no object (or a Heideggerian mood) and so-called objectless fear, that is, fear whose object is merely vague (or a cognitive emotion). I argued that Heidegger's concept of *Angst* is, in fact, a more precise name for what cognitivists call 'objectless fear' and noted how genuine objectless fear only becomes meaningful when viewed as an ontological concern. For the 'highly general object' spoken of by Nussbaum is quickly re-labelled by her a mood when it does not fit the cognitivists' template.

⁷⁴ See also on this point: O. H. Green; 'The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory', Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1992, 33-34); C.D. Broad, (1971) 'Emotion and Sentiment' in Broad's 'Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy', (ed.) David Cheney, London Allen & Unwin (286-287); and Anthony Kenny (1963) 'Action, Emotion and Will', London: Routledge and Kegan (60-62).

Lyons's description of these emotions being 'aimed out at the world' and incorporating everything are akin to my discussion of nescience, for absolutely everything is nothing in particular and so cannot be an object in cognitive terms.

In order that I might be in a position to raise contrasts between cognitive and Heideggerian accounts of emotion/mood analysis I highlighted the differences in their approach to describing objectless fear and the short-comings that exist. Drawing attention to these problems will allow me to move forward (in Part C: 2) to detail some possible solutions by getting to grips with Heidegger's ontological description of *Angst* in *BT*.

2) Heidegger's Account of *Angst* and Death in 'Being and Time'

- a) Introduction
- b) *Angst* as Dasein's Basic Attunement/Situatedness
- c) *Angst*'s Profound Disclosure of Dasein's Authentic and inauthentic Choices
- d) The Ontological Insights Revealed by *Angst*
- e) *Angst*, the Structural Components of Falling and Death in 'Being and Time'
- f) Death as the Vanishing Point in our Lives and The Question it Raises
- g) Being-with (Others), Representations and Death
- h) The Totality of Meaning in Death
- i) Death's Ever-present Shadow Revealed Through the Structure of Care
- j) Conclusion

a) Introduction

William Lyons's insistence that the objects of objectless emotions are only vague rather than non-existent, leads to a contrary account of vague-object directedness for objectless emotions. And it raises the question why he, and theorists like him, such as Pugmire, Nussbaum and Taylor do not simply reject the notion of objectlessness altogether. In what follows I argue that real objectless fear only becomes meaningful when viewed as an ontological concern, and suggest that by examining Heidegger's unique interpretation of *Angst* in *BT*, along with the concepts falling and

death, one can begin to make some significant inroads into acquiring a greater understanding this enigmatic mood.

b) 'Angst' as Dasein's Basic Attunement/Situatedness⁷⁵

I have described in what has gone before in Part B) how fallen Dasein is scattered among the constantly alternating objects of its curiosity and how the anonymous, plural '*they*' of average-understandability is its general mode of Being-in-the-world. What I have not yet addressed is singular Dasein's over-coming of inauthenticity, for Heidegger, *Angst* is not fear, not even the vague objectless fear described by cognitivists, for unlike fear *Angst* has no distinct object, whatsoever, within-the-world that is the source of its anxiousness. I have chosen to leave the German word *Angst* un-translated in an effort to emphasise the move away from the cognitive notion of objectless fear, which is, itself, often considered a synonym for the English word 'anxiety, the common translation of *Angst*.

Angst is not simply an emotion/mood 'aimed out at the world' rather it stems from the fact that the "world and Dasein are one . . . Dasein's Being-in-the world is . . . both an absorption in, and a constitution of, the world as such" (Kelly, 1994, 34). Dasein's mood *Angst* stems from Being-in-the-world as it has already been disclosed, "*the world as such is that in the face of which one has Angst*" (BT, 231). So attempting to describe particular objects, as Lyons has done ("vague entities", "not properly formulable objects" [Lyons, 1980/93, 75-76]), as sources of objectless fear are of no interest to Heidegger (these I might now call, following my comments in Part B) 'simple fears' or 'anxieties', simple emotions), for far from Dasein feeling anxious or afraid of objects in-the-world, it is these very things it flees towards. Dasein does "not flee *in the face* of entities within-the-world; these are precisely what it flees *towards* - as entities alongside which our concern, lost in the "*they*", can dwell in tranquillized familiarity" (BT, 233-234).

Angst is a threat to everyday familiarity and comes from Dasein's projecting ahead into possibilities, and the overriding possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein (or death) from

⁷⁵ This is Charles Guignon's translation of the German word 'Befindlichkeit', a more successful rendering than Macquarrie and Robinson's "state of mind" (SZ, 134/BT, 172), which implies a privately accessed mental state, and also the very awkward contemporary suggestion of John Haugeland, 'sofindingness'*, a meagre improvement on his earlier 'so-foundness'+ (*'Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity - Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus', vol. 1, Jeff Malpas and Mark Warthall [eds.], 2000, 51). +('Heidegger: A Critical Reader', Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds., 1992, 36).

which it arises. *Angst* is "characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere*" but this 'nowhere' does "not signify nothing" - the threat "is already 'there'" (Ibid. 321). Dasein is anxious for itself, and as its everyday existentiell concerns and worries dissipate, it is brought to face itself. Dasein is left with something essential to consider, for "*Angst* individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as '*solus ipse*'. But this existential 'solipsism' is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world" (Ibid. 233).

c) *Angst's* Profound Disclosure of Dasein's Authentic and Inauthentic Choices

As I have made clear the world is Dasein's Being-in-the-world and the self where it becomes its own non-issue. *Angst*, like the equipmental breakdown of conspicuousness, obstruction and obstinacy that reveals the present-at-hand in the ready-to-hand, exposes a total breakdown, a groundlessness of the world and of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, "*That in the face of which one has Angst [das Wovor der Angst] is Being-in-the-world as such*" (Ibid. 230). In other words, *Angst*-ridden Dasein has an opportunity to 'see' itself (how it is), feels unsettled and turns for refuge in the 'they'. But "when Dasein 'understands' unsettledness . . . it does so by turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the 'not-at-home' gets 'dimmed down'" (Ibid. 234). Dasein is made aware of its (ownmost) potentiality-for-Being and its being free to choose itself authentically; in such freedom it is given over to itself and is responsible for making something of itself. Freedom though is only recognisable because Dasein as Being-in-the-world has been delivered over to its potentiality-for-Being in the first place. The very indefinite sense which Dasein experiences in *Angst* brings it closer to the nowhere in not-being-at-home (*Nicht-zuhause-sein*). Its focus is, consequently, not out in-the-world or world itself but Being-in-the-world as oneself. Dasein is brought back in *Angst* from its falling and absorption in the 'they', in its among others conformity, to Dasein as thrown individualized Being-in-the-world with an abundance of possibilities or choices and, equally, to an awareness of its limited power to fulfil them. *Angst* is then not felt as a response to the end of life but to the true constitution of Dasein's nullity-ridden Being.

The fundamental mood of *Angst* makes clear that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of Dasein's Being. Such possibilities reveal themselves as they are and not as camouflaged by entities within-the-world of the everyday (Dasein's usual mode of being). *Angst* discloses and individualises Dasein, revealing the groundlessness of human existence, the point at which singular Dasein must address itself authentically if it is to find meaning for itself. The sense of unease one experiences Being-in-the-world (as thrown Being - with the disclosedness of its 'there') and, for oneself, is the groundless sense of meaninglessness which, in turn, allows for its opposite, the clearing to authentic meaning for the first time. If we can overcome our disquiet at feeling anxious, we can grasp our mortal existence and take responsibility for ourselves genuinely. Being anxious Dasein recognises its alienation in the 'they', the upshot of which is that it "takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted" (Ibid. 232).

d) The Ontological Insights Revealed by Angst

On the back of these remarks, I argue that the fear spoken of as objectless by cognitivists in the previous section, is a fear of not grasping, not being able to grasp, the meaning of fear. That is, an ontological fear of having rejected or, perhaps more accurately, forgotten what it is 'to be', the forgetting of Being (*Seinvergessenheit*: Olafson translates this word as 'forgetfulness of being,' 1998, 101). Fear it should be remembered was for Heidegger a mood, and moods (as I discussed at the end of Part B:) are more all-embracing than emotions, they are complex affectual phenomena in a way that emotions are not and supply us with our total orientation, "Moods reveal the co-presence of all things in a way more comprehensive than any comprehension, more immediate than any perception" (Haar, 1992, 159).

Angst is a mood not simply "aimed out at the world" (Lyons, 1980/93, 104) or about "how the world is" (Nussbaum, 2001, 133) rather, it is the world, it is being-there in the face of its own thrownness and situatedness that one experiences *Angst*. It is a threat to everyday familiarity and, as I have detailed, comes from our projecting ourselves ahead into possibilities and the overriding possibility of death from which it stems. Death as a constant threat is indefinite and can occur whenever and from wherever, from nowhere. *Angst* is characterized by the fact that what threatens

is nowhere. But this 'nowhere' does not signify nothing, for the threatening is already there, yet nowhere. We are made uneasy not by the ready-to-hand objects in-the-world or by others within-the-world, it is these things we retreat to for succour and distraction, but by the totality of the nothing, the something that is the world itself. Dasein is the nothingness, the clearing in which things appear, not the things themselves. Others enter the clearing more completely if we see them not just as objects-in-the-world but as authentic beings.

e) *Angst, the Structural Components of Falling and Death in 'Being and Time'*

In this sub-section I want to look at the critically important concepts falling (which returns us to my earlier concerns in Part A:) and death by detailing the conceptual landscape into which the ontological significance of *Angst* is placed. I question the translation of *Gerede* as 'gossip' and show that in this fallen state language is a communicator of mere averageness whereby primordial understanding gets passed over for the common, superficial grasp of the thing. Curiosity and ambiguity are also described and I review the four phenomena temptation, tranquillization, alienation and entanglement that characterise falling. I show how despite its negative connotation Heidegger is keen to ensure that falling is neither conceived as somehow less in-the-world because of its inauthenticity, or for it to be understood in a derogatory sense, for it is only if Dasein is essentially drawn towards inauthenticity that there can be any push towards authenticity.

When examining death I describe how one cannot die for another at an ontological level nor experience their loss of Being or fathom their Dasein's totality in death. I illustrate how it is that human existence is coloured by its relationship to death (as its existential mode is being-towards-death [*Sein-zum-Tode*]) in a way that nonhuman animal existence is not. I describe how Dasein's projection (future) can lead to authentic acceptance or inauthentic fleeing from death and by being thrown (past) into its factual, finite, there-located existence, Dasein can never escape this most permanent possibility. And I illustrate how fallen (present) Dasein becomes absorbed in the 'they'-world of blinkered conformity, the result of which is its alienation from the crucial issue of its own death, by considering it a mere fact of living and not an issue to be addressed by it, in its own particular life.

At this point it is important to consider the fact that when Lyons wrote of certain cases of fear being target-less and 'aimed out at the world' he was unwittingly drawing attention to something of great importance, "*That in the face of which we fear, the 'fearsome', is in every case something which we encounter within-the-world*" (BT, 179). Objectless fear, Heidegger asserts, reveals "Dasein in the Being of its 'there', even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness" (Ibid. 180). Dasein does not find the object of objectless fear (or *Angst*) out in-the-world but as a possibility of Being-in-the-world through mood that has already disclosed the world. Those so-called 'vague' entities within the world, those 'not properly formulable' objects that cognitivists wish to make explicit and which they attempt to describe as 'particular objects' that are the ground for objectless fear are of no interest to Heidegger, for it is these things Dasein flees towards. Falling is sourced in Dasein's absorption in the '*they*' and its fleeing from *Angst*. The world in which Dasein is found tempts it to cut itself off from itself by proffering inauthenticity as meaningful and genuine. The everyday world bedazzles or tranquillizes Dasein in such a way that constant movement (curiosity) distances (alienates) it from its authentic self. As thrown Being-in-the-world Dasein's facticity inherits the anonymous '*they*' components of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity; as Heidegger rather dramatically, puts it, "Dasein's facticity is such that *as long as* it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the '*they's*' inauthenticity" (Ibid. 223).

Dasein is moved or dragged (*Wirbel*: lit. 'turbulence', 'swirl' or 'vortex') away from itself, for "falling is conceived ontologically as a kind of motion" (Ibid. 224), and finds that it is interpreted purely in terms of its 'there'. Taylor Carmen's notes that this "constantly being torn away from authenticity . . . along with being dragged into *das Man*, characterizes the agitation of falling as *spiraling (Wirbel)*" (SZ, 178, 2000, 17). And it is death, as the metaphorical 'vanishing point',⁷⁶ to which we are all attuned, the end that is our no-longer-being-there (*Nicht-mehr-da-sein*), that sets our falling in motion. Because we share our lives so intimately with one another the awareness of our own end comes first through the death of others. But we are often loath to contemplate death directly, and though in the broadest sense it is a phenomenon of life, we buttress ourselves from it by being immersed in the '*they*'-world.

⁷⁶ See sub-section g) following for more on this idea.

As Dasein generally knows itself only through the everyday means of its Being-in-the-world, so it is part of the 'they'-structure that cuts it off from primordially. Fundamentally, Dasein, by embracing the social standards and *mores* of its community and society, inherits its fallen state, "Proximally and for the most part the Self is lost in the "they". It understands itself in terms of those possibilities of existence which 'circulate' in the 'average' public way of interpreting Dasein today" (Ibid. 435). As plural 'they'-self, Dasein is educated, socialized and attuned into this distance from authenticity. It is pre-occupied with its everydayness, the prefix 'pre-' illuminating both its mode of being and its factically ordained delivery into such a mode of being. And as the 'they'-self Dasein and the 'simple emotions' it exhibits are culturally conditioned but one should not, by extension, lose sight (as Taylor does) that this conditioning is only possible at the ontic level, and that Heidegger's concern is with providing a description of the ontological significance of 'complex moods'.

Idle talk (*Gerede*) cuts Dasein "off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in" (Ibid. 214). Though *Gerede* is often translated into English as 'gossip' this rendering can be misleading, as gossip carries with it a strong sense of involvement in finding out facts (or non-facts) about someone or something. This degree of attention and interest is exactly what Heidegger does not wish to convey by the term *Gerede*. Instead, a more appropriate translation might be prattling, yakking, or wittering, a form of near non-communication that merely, "gets passed along in further retelling, [and] amounts to perverting the act of disclosing [*Erschliessen*] into an act of closing off [*Verschliessen*]" (Ibid. 213). Other German words, such as, *Plauderer* ('talker', 'prattler') or *Geschwätz* ('babble', 'twaddle') also come closer to Heidegger's desired meaning when he uses *Gerede*. *Klatsch* might also be a more appropriate translation for the English 'gossip', as *Klatschbase* is generally translated 'gossip-monger'. For these reasons, I do not follow Macquarrie and Robinson when they speak of *Gerede* "as being constituted by just such gossiping"⁷⁷ (1962, 231).

What is addressed in such prattling is not the object of communication, the very thing that the communication refers to, but whatever happens to be said about it. Such yakking gets passed

⁷⁷ For the same unhelpful translation see: Dreyfus (1991, 231); Inwood (1999, 208); and Hall (1993, 139).

on without deeper consideration and the object that should be under scrutiny becomes pushed further from view, so that we lose contact with it and our communication becomes groundless. Wittering turns out to be a false form of comprehension, one that garners strength in its very ignorance and increases, rather than diminishes, a sense of understanding everything that is talked about. Such a process results in a closing off of objects for discussion, as the '*they*'-self already and, simplistically, understands them. Prattling uses language as a communicator of mere averageness and the situation is created that what is superficially said-in-the-talk becomes commanding. This state of affairs extends to the point where prattling lacks a stable foothold in anything primordial, a position that becomes self-perpetuating and expands to embrace all things.

Self-assured idle talk, oblivious to its undermining tendencies, constantly covers up or cuts off entities in-the-world, "since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which it *leaves undone*" (Ibid. 213). Because of this our genuine relationship with others and the world is continually being closed off. "Prattling and scandal are always and everywhere elsewhere. Each person is the other to the others. The members of a scandal network may be unified by ideas to which no one will admit in his own person. Each person is thinking of what he thinks the other thinks. The other, in turn, thinks of what yet another thinks . . . Each person, however, is a neighbour of his neighbour. What They think is held with conviction. It is indubitable and it is incontestable" (Laing, 1967, 68-69).

The process of deterioration from primordial understanding to groundlessness stems from the fact that, "Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein - a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself" (BT, 217). Encounters in the world that are curious are always swift and purblind. One never has the time to slow down when one is curious; it is the 'seeing' and not the inspection that becomes important. 'Seeing' here designates not just perception but our way of encountering - how we might 'see if that tastes right?' or 'see if that feels okay?' Curiosity's constant unrest allows only for new objects and distraction, there is no time to pause and marvel or to be puzzled, just the incessant skipping of never dwelling anywhere. Curiosity's knowing is just to have known, as one might 'know' Dublin after a forty-five minute tour bus-ride to 'see the sights', before skipping off to 'see' Paris or Berlin. Curiosity, being everywhere and nowhere, is intimately linked to idle talk. Both

modes of being take the other with it, and by understanding everything, and being everywhere and nowhere, quotidian Dasein is forever being 'unrooted'.

Such deracination tends not to concentrate on the extraordinary, the unusual, the novel as Dasein is merely inquisitive, distracted and continuously moving from one new thing to the next, without ever grasping the meaning of anything in its entirety. Encountering those things in-the-world, including Dasein's 'Being-with-others' and 'Being-towards itself', which are accessible to us, and about which we can all have a say, it becomes "impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not" (Ibid. 217). What is thought to be properly grasped in this ambiguous state is not, and what is not thought to be so grasped is - but remains undetected. Ambiguity pervades all our ways of dealing with the world and ourselves, and even how Dasein projects itself into possibilities. The freeing up of genuine possibilities from the 'they's' ambiguous grip (in prattling and curiosity), is only feasible when public interest has died away. But once such a thing has occurred, fallen Dasein will have moved on also, for there is no time to stop when mere surmising is enough to find approval from the 'they'.

Ambiguity occurs because Dasein "understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of that with which it concerns itself . . . Everydayness takes Dasein as something ready-to-hand to be concerned with - that is, something that gets managed and reckoned up"⁷⁸ (Ibid. 335-336). This means that Dasein allows itself to be dealt-with in terms of being an entity in-the-world, addressing itself in the same manner as it encounters other entities in its everyday constitution of concern, "Everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known . . . This case of averageness reveals . . . an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the "levelling down" of all possibilities of Being" (Ibid. 165).

Dasein's way of Being-in-the-world is, then, characterised by falling, a deflecting of Dasein from comprehending objectless fear or *Angst's* disclosive potential, and the consequent effect this has on its ability to face up to its true self. However, Heidegger does not use the term 'falling' in a derogatory sense. For he recognises that it is only if Dasein is essentially drawn towards inauthenticity, that there can be a push towards its opposite, authenticity. Though Heidegger in no

⁷⁸ One is reminded here of Heidegger's contention that guilt has been incorrectly interpreted in the history of western philosophy at merely the ontic level and so is assessed (as I mentioned in Part A:) in terms of a metaphorical reconciliation account where claims and counter-claims can be balanced off.

way wishes to distort inauthentic Dasein, so that it becomes interpreted as being somehow less in-the-world than authentic Dasein, he does want to emphasise that Dasein's superficial fascination with the world (and others), has pushed it further from itself. This not-Being-itself (*Das Nicht-es-selbst-sein*), in an environment of such not-Being, is daily reinforced and, ironically, becomes for itself falsely positive, making the recognition of one's fallen way of Being all the more difficult to discern. Heidegger calls Dasein's (and the public world's) persistent presentation of itself in idle talk (where lies the possibility of concealment) a 'temptation towards falling'. And because of the cockure-ness of the 'they', *Angst* and understanding are forced from contemplation, and shallow suppositions and easy answers tranquillise us with banal certainties.

But 'tempting tranquillization aggravates the falling' for when Dasein comes to compare itself with what is around, it becomes clear that it has not even begun to explore what is to be understood of its own Being, and so falling alienates its true potential. Nevertheless, this alienation does not result in Dasein clearly seeing itself as having closed off its authentic potential for Being, but confuses it even more by tempting it with explanations that corral it into inauthenticity and entanglement.

The four phenomena of temptation, tranquillization, alienation and entanglement characterise falling, and this Heidegger calls Dasein's "'downward plunge' (*Absturz*). Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness" (Ibid. 223). This plunge, and falling more generally, is - as it pushes Dasein away from authenticity into the phoney publicly assured world of the 'they' - exemplified in a movement of turbulence. It should be remembered, however, authenticity is just another way of dealing with our everydayness and that falling is present only because Being-in-the-world understandingly with moods is a disclosive type of Being for Dasein.

f) Death as the Vanishing Point in Our Lives and the Question it Raises

Angst discloses Dasein's world to it fundamentally and makes it powerfully aware of its mortality, and the permanency of this possibility in its everyday life. "The all-pervasiveness and omnipresence of death's threat to an individual is captured by Heidegger with the term "indefiniteness" (*Unbestimmtheit*). The possibility of death is indefinite, for it is not confined to

any particular moment or time span. The possibility of death can materialize at any moment . . . the indefiniteness of death's 'when'" (Ibid. 302) implies its lack of connection with any particular "here" or "there". This is why the threat disclosed in anxiety - the threat of death (Ibid. 310) - is perceived as coming from 'nowhere'" (Ibid. 321, *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, 1993, 202). This objectless mood overcomes us from time to time and the discomfort⁷⁹ which it engenders often remains puzzling, for when we attempt to examine the reasons for it there appears to be no source, no traceable pattern through which we can work it out. In fact, so used are we to not questioning this enigmatic state, that if asked what we are feeling we routinely reply, "nothing". Yet this nothing, as I have shown, is far from being just not something.

But why should an awareness of our own mortality be so unnerving? The knowledge that my existence will inevitably end is crucially significant to me in my life, yet this significant fact can never be an actuality *in* my life. Wittgenstein reinforces this point when he writes, "Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death" *Tractatus*, 6.4311. For me living, death can only be a possibility, albeit an ever-present one, and one that overrides all other possibilities. Given the forcefulness of this fact, one is left with a choice - to flee from such recognition or stand up to it. By standing up to it we are made ask a question akin to the one raised by Karl Rahner; "How will I feel at the hour of my death? Then there will be no more "daily routine"; then I shall suddenly be abandoned by all the things that now fill up my days here on earth. And what will I myself be at that hour, when I am only myself and nothing else? My whole life long I have been nothing but the ordinary routine, all business and activity, a desert filled with empty sound and meaningless fury. But when the heavy weight of death one day presses down upon my life and squeezes the true and lasting content out of all those many days and long years, what will be the final yield?" (1960, 46). In more Heideggerian terms the question might be put: in the face of the fact that death is not just the end of Dasein, as the death (or more precisely 'perishing' [*Verenden*])

⁷⁹ In his poem 'Aubade', Philip Larkin conveys something of the discomfort we feel when we consider our own death, "In time the curtain-edges will light./Till then I see what's really always now./Making all thought impossible but how/And where and when I shall myself die./Arid interrogation: yet the dread of dying, and being dead,/Flashes afresh to hold and horrify . . . the total emptiness for ever,/The sure extinction that we travel to/And shall be lost in always. Not to be here,/Not to be anywhere,/And soon; nothing more terrible,/nothing more true./This is a special way of being afraid/No trick dispels . . . And so it stays just on the edge of vision,/A small, unfocused blur, a standing chill/That slows each impulse down to indecision./Most things may never happen: this one will,/And realisation of it rages out/In furnace-fear when we are caught without/People or drink. Courage is no good:/It means not scaring others. Being brave/Let's no one off the grave./Death is no different whined at than withstood" ('The Collected Poems of Philip Larkin', 1996).

of a dog is the end of its living, but a possible way to be, that is, the possibility of no longer-being-able-to-be or "the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein" how then can life be meaningful?

g) Being-with (Others), Representation and Death

In death Dasein is moved into a transition to no-longer-Dasein, losing the Being of its 'there' and being removed from any possibility of experiencing it. My highlighting (in Part A:) of the importance of human connections now shows itself as vital to Heidegger's analysis, for it is because as individuals we cannot go through our own death that the deaths' of others takes on such profound significance for us. As I've stated, an essential way of our Being-in-the-world is Being-with-others and, because of this, Dasein's grasp of another's death is not merely coldly accepted as a life no longer living - another entry in the obituary column of life's reconciliation account. We are so closely linked to others in-the-world that Heidegger says we can "'be' another Dasein" (BT, 284), that is, we can act as a representative (with distinct limits of course) for another in everyday life. As quotidian Dasein sees itself in what it does, in what it is concerned with, so it defines itself. One is thus absorbed in the world of concernful-solicitude with others who share these concerns, so how one *is* is representable by another. Though Heidegger naturally accepts that someone else can die for another, as in the case of sacrificing one's life for another, this 'dying for' can never mean that the other's death has been taken away. For it is at the point of the possibility-of-being-no-longer-Being that such representability crumples, "*No one can take the Other's dying away from him*" (Ibid. 284).

The death of a loved one for human beings, expressing as it does his or her not-longer-being-encounterable, does not mean no-longer-present-at-hand (*Nicht-mehr-vorhandensein*), "The end of an entity *qua* Dasein is the *beginning* of the same entity *qua* something present-at-hand" (Ibid. 281). For this reason we grieve in the way we do, often with the accoutrements of masses, orations, hymns, prayers, wakes and so on is because the deceased 'in his kind of Being' is still something much more than a mere lifeless ready-to-hand object in our world. Heidegger emphasises this point in a way that is missed by cognitivists, "when we speak of "Being-with", we always have in view Being with one another in the same world. The deceased has abandoned our

'world' and left it behind. But *in terms of that world (Aus ihr her)* those who remain can still *be with him*" (Ibid. 282). Though not implying that we can in any way experience the loss-of-Being of the deceased, we can be there as loving with-others and feel the loss felt by others by sharing their grief. These two points are succinctly described by R. D. Laing, "No matter how deeply I am committed in joy or suffering to someone else, he is not me, and I am not him . . . The fact that the other person in his own actuality is not me, is set against the equally real fact that my *attachment to him is part of me*. If he dies or goes away, he has gone, but *my attachment to him persists*. But in the last resort I cannot die another person's death for him, nor can he die my death" (italics my own, 1960, 52).

For many, the questions arising from considerations of death are too uncomfortable to ponder, as Seneca put it "we never anticipate evils before they actually arrive . . . so many funerals pass our doors, yet we never dwell on death" (1997, 90) and, as a result, we fall back into the everyday world of the '*they*'. The world encountered through the '*they*', as I have shown, is continuously being levelled off to the lowest form of understandability, and it is in this way of being that Dasein is generally immersed. Considered from the '*they's*' perspective death is just another event in the world, one where euphemisms, for example, he has 'passed on' or 'passed over' are used to deflect from the true reality of the situation. Something of this attitude to death was made tangible even in the jewellery worn by the bereaved over the last three or four centuries in Europe. It was not unusual, for instance, for a mourning ring of the eighteenth or nineteenth century, to hold the inscription, '*not lost but gone before*'. Death as an internal, ever-present living possibility is ignored and the delusion of inauthentic existence is deepened. One needs courage to face *Angst* and our own death and all that it discloses, but singular Dasein is all too often unable to garner the strength to do this, as it is (usually) tranquillised by the familiar in the embrace of the '*they*'. Our thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to us in *Angst*, and should be 'home' (*heimlich*), is pushed further from us as we fail to face up to it in feelings of unsettledness (*unheimlichkeit*).

h) The Totality of Meaning in Death

One of the difficulties that emerges when addressing the question of death is our inability to grasp death in its totality. Dasein is forever pressing forward into new possibilities and always remains something less than complete except, of course, when it comes to its own demise (*Ableben*). In death, Dasein's Being as a whole is over and so it cannot be an existential totality. Dasein is no longer and, thus, cannot grasp itself in its death, it cannot step out of its no-longer-being in order to see itself in its totality.

Death is not considered by Heidegger the last stop on life's journey or the harvesting of ripe fruit, for it occurs to both the very young - long before they have had a chance to mature, and to the very old - long after their physical powers have deserted them. Death, though ever-present, cannot be understood by us in its entirety and nor can we grasp a full understanding of it from the death of others. Despite the fact that we can recognise the transition from Being to no-longer-Being of another (most directly brought to the fore in funeral rites, orations, commemorations and so on) we cannot experience their transition (their loss of Being) and, hence, cannot fathom their Dasein's totality. I emphasised earlier (in Part A:) the point that at the heart of Being Dasein is characterised by nullity (or lack of Being), and it is this lack (or debt) which is repaid in Dasein's end.

As Heidegger draws a distinction in relation to temporality between how human and non-human animals exist in-the-world, so too does this distinction have relevance in relation to death. Horses and dogs 'perish' while Dasein's end is its demise; this distinction is made in order to further reinforce the point that Dasein's position within-the-world is highly unique. Dobbins may try to avoid perishing by not jumping over large ditches or by sheltering during hail storms, but these actions are performed not at the level of an individual horse reflecting or mulling over the choices he has in order to flourish in life but as evolutionary survival patterns passed on through inheritance. Human beings, on the other hand, must constantly make decisions about particular possibilities, and death is nothing less than the "*possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all*"⁸⁰ (Ibid. 307) Heidegger comments, "the ending of that which lives we have called 'perishing'. Dasein too 'has' its death, of the kind appropriate to anything that lives . . . In so far as this is the case, Dasein too can end without authentically dying, though on the other hand, *qua* Dasein, it does

⁸⁰ For an alternative view of just how impoverished, or otherwise, the world of the nonhuman animal is, see Alasdair MacIntyre's book, 'Dependent Rational Animal' (1999, esp. 43-52).

not simply perish. We designate this intermediate phenomenon as its 'demise'" (Ibid. 219). Demise is the factually understood reality of our end but only as something that will happen, something in the future. However, we know that demise is not just another word for perishing, for human existence is coloured by its relation to death, its existential mode of Being-towards-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*) in a way that nonhuman animal existence is not. In fact, perishing and demise are part of Heidegger's more general distinction between factuality and facticity. Demise being an intermediate phenomenon, it is not perishing, not authentic dying, but the end of human life.

Death can be either experienced within its existentiell or existential dimensions. In the former, Dasein's ontic everyday life ends in its demise though this is not to say that demise is completely inauthentic, nevertheless, it may be so fashioned if Dasein understands itself not as an authentic existential Being but, merely, as this intermediate phenomenon, treating death as a future occurrence and not as an elemental part of its basic nullity. This stance has the effect of Dasein turning (or fleeing) from the importance of its negative foundation. Authentic dying, the existential importance of death is, in its defining what Dasein is, not just the absolute possibility of this event occurring at some point in the future but the grasping of Dasein that makes it mine. Despite the fact that others can represent me or that I can make choices, that is, others can take on my role in society as teacher, window cleaner, lawyer or whatever, and I can choose to obey or disobey the law or do or not do my job, what death defines most thoroughly is the one case where representation and choice is impossible, where I and I alone *must* attend, that is, my ineluctable appointment with death. So death individualises Dasein by its over-arching presence; yet it might be argued that death does not threaten one constantly and, as a result, the individualisation such a spectre is thought to cast does not materialise. It may be suggested that it is reasonable to feel threatened by death while fighting on the front lines during a war, or sailing single-handed around the world but usually, in one's everyday life, one is not so threatened. However, the retort might be; as none of us know the time or place of our death and as there is no possible re-organising of our lives that can help us to avoid death, so indeed, death does impose a constant threat, one that can be either faced up to or fled from.

i) Death's Ever-present Shadow Revealed Through the Structure of Care

It is important at this point to relate the analysis of *Angst* and death to the crucial concept care (i.e. the Being of Dasein) and its three components, each of which will help to reveal the constancy of the threat mentioned above. Firstly, within the future dimension of understanding/projection lies the ultimate and most unique possibility of death, that of ending all other possibilities. Dasein can either choose to accept death and live in recognition of its end, or hide from it, by excluding any consideration of it for as long as possible. Secondly, death is related to the care component of what is already (past), that is, to its facticity (what is given). Dasein, being in the situation of the there-located existent in-the-world, is from the moment of life finite and there is nothing to be done to escape this permanent factual feature of its condition. Thirdly, death is brushed under the carpet by the anonymous 'they'-world in which we become absorbed. By falling (present) we distance ourselves from the issue of death (e.g. by using euphemisms). In these three ways care, Dasein's all-pervading fundamental state, underscores death's constant threat. If it were to be otherwise, if it were to be sporadic, death's threat could be turned off at particular times in our lives but for this to happen it would also mean care had stopped being Dasein's all-embracing basic state, a consideration which is not viable if Heidegger's account is to remain consistent.

What is critical in Heidegger's discussion of death is not that Dasein dies but that Dasein cannot know its death. However, its approach to death, its way of dealing with the ever-present possibility of the impossibility of Being, can mark it off as authentic or inauthentic. We know that the authentic mode of being in this regard is anticipation (*vorlaufen*, lit. fore-running) and that such a mode "*reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self [Man-selbst], and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself . . . in an impassioned **freedom towards death** [Freiheit zum Tode], released from the Illusions of the "they", and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious*" (Ibid. 311). Such freedom towards death is Dasein's possibility to die its death, not a death hijacked by the 'they' but one's very own. There is no universal template for death which can be followed, each must decide who he is and what he wishes to become individually, and to this end 'to be', to have taken control of oneself (i.e. to be self-possessed), is to freely choose oneself. In other words, each quests to reach his own potentiality for Being.

j) Conclusion

I detailed in this section how *Angst* is described by Heidegger as posing a threat to everyday familiarity and arising from Dasein's projecting ahead into possibilities and the most fundamental possibility of all, the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein (or death). I have described how *Angst* both reveals the starkness of our thrownness (i.e. our not having laid the ground for our Being) and Dasein's individualisation to a point where it must address itself authentically if it is to find meaning for itself. *Angst* allows Dasein to see its alienation in the 'they', a consequence of which is that it "takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself . . . in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted" (Ibid. 232). I concluded this sub-section by emphasising *Angst's* primordiality.

The unsettledness of Dasein's Being-in-the-world matters to it in that it is "a threat which reaches Dasein itself and which comes from Dasein itself" (SZ, 189). Unlike the threatening way of 'mattering' disclosed in fear (and discussed in Part B: as Dasein's cultural conditioning), the threat disclosed in anxiety is indefinite, it is not this or that entity in-the-world that is threatening and nor is it a specific way of Being or Dasein that is threatened. Rather it is Dasein's Being-in-the-world as such that is threatening, and it is this very same Being-in-the-world that is threatened. In short, Dasein threatens itself. Dasein is to itself "a being with the character of being threatening" (Ibid. 185). This threatening character is the authentic way of mattering.

Death is not the *telos* towards which our lives daily journey. There is nothing we can do to eliminate its inescapable presence, we may watch our diet, exercise, avoid war zones and sailing single-handed around the world but no amount of caution can eradicate death's constant spectre. The fact of our Being-towards-death is an essential structural component of Dasein's existence. The consideration of perishing, demise and authentic dying is Heidegger's radical and innovative contribution to the question of death's role in human existence. Death for him is no longer just a negative phenomenon from which we should flee but one that if faced up to can become the means of gaining a more authentic existence, one not fractured but one which beats out its own path, and possesses its own, genuine self. To anticipate authentically one's own death is to move closer to an embrace of one's totality, as the delimited marker of death releases one from the grip of the 'they'.

But death is not to be brooded upon or actualised, for if that were to happen death would simply have overwhelmed us, rather than act as the 'vanishing point' in the portrait of our lives.

Authenticity does not look for actualisation or morbid brooding, but the anticipation of our own "possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all" and by so doing Dasein acknowledges that: a) by perceiving death as a threat its Being is an issue for it (it matters); b) the threat which is acknowledged is understood to spotlight not any particular possibility but Dasein's Being as a whole; and c) as a consequence of b), Dasein comes to recognise that far from its daily life being its own and something it has been responsible for, it has lived according to the 'they'-world's standards and ordinates, ignoring its individual and authentic self.

In summary then Dasein's authentic (*Eigentlich*) Being-towards-death (*Sein-zum-Tode*) labours after fulfilment, attempting to grasp ontologically its own finitude rather than take refuge in the over-arching conformity of everydayness. *Angst* deflects us from feelings of indifference (the result of absorption in the 'they') about our certain end, and emerges in our anticipating death as a possibility, though not encouraging us to actualise it. Death shows Dasein its totality, its finitude, its responsibility, its freedom and its authenticity. In *Angst* we recognise our thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) and, as such, that we are thrown into a Being-towards-the-end (*Sein-zum-Ende*), as Pozzo says in *Waiting for Godot*, "They give birth astride a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more" (Beckett, 1980, 89).

3) General Conclusion

The core aim of this thesis has been to describe and critique some contemporary cognitive theories of emotion, while also offering a means of reading Heidegger's ontology of emotion/mood that expands our understanding of these affective responses. It is my hope that by providing a critical assessment of the structural, analytic model on which a conceptual, ontological description of emotion/mood can be built, I will have bridged, to some small extent, the distance between the analytic and Continental traditions within philosophy by illustrating that there is much to be gained from both approaches when providing emotion analysis.

The foundation of the thesis was laid by describing the cognitive hybrid account of the structure of emotion; focusing initially on an examination of the six components of emotion and

how they come together in respect of specific emotions and, then, by isolating each in turn before highlighting a number of anomalies that exist in each case. For example, I discussed the fact that though the evaluative component is often considered essential to the make-up of emotion, exceptions such as reflex and objectless emotions challenge this orthodoxy. I described how cognitivism as a theory is subtly complex, with nuances that create different branches of that approach, such as the hybrid, strong and weak theories. However, as my goal was not to write a review of the various types of cognitivism, I focused my attention on an influential and representative contemporary account, William Lyons's causal-evaluative theory.

I began to unpick some aspects of Lyons's theory by drawing attention to the confusion that is created by his not differentiating between the appetitive dimension in the emotion grief, that is, between 'a desire for no company' and 'an absence of desire for company', and the consequent misidentification of this emotion with passivity. Also in opposition to his account, I argued that wishes were always a part of grief and illustrated how hope can be borne from a wish, before documenting the complicating factors this understanding of grief creates. The neglected, though vital role of overlapping in emotions, was also highlighted, most particularly when it comes to drawing distinctions between variants of the same emotion.

The wholly negative description of grief presented by Lyons, and cognitivists generally, I claimed missed a number of critical features of this emotion, and I offered a radically different interpretation of this emotion which I called 'positive grief'. I emphasised the importance of considering the attitude of the deceased (where possible) in the time before their death, and how this greatly effects how we grieve. I offered reasons for believing that grief may more helpfully be understood as a natural process of coping with loss rather than merely an evaluation of that situation as hopeless, something, in fact, that facilitates a means of dwelling on a shared object of loss and one that allows the griever to express and commune with others over the loss they feel. In turn this process assists the bereaved to avoid being overwhelmed by grief and, thus, has a powerful self-protecting dimension, a further positive connotation not addressed by cognitivists.

I suggested that the apparent passivity of grief is often its opposite, an active time of reflection and reappraisal where there is an acknowledgement of the deceased's desire that our grief not destroy us, that we express our sorrow to other loved ones and move forward in our lives

productively. In this respect I also drew particular attention to the idea of ‘connections’ between people, and I described how bonds through love, for instance, alter how we experience grief, and other emotions, and scrutinized how an individual's behaviour, intensity of feeling, physiological changes and the longevity of their grief, are all directly effected by this second overlapping emotion. On the back of my remarks regarding connections, I went on to argue that the often misrepresented emotion ‘survivor guilt’ is comprehensible not merely in negative terms as irrational, something suggested by cognitivists (or more puzzling in a Lyonsian fashion where, I argue, it comes closer to a description of anger) but, more optimistically, when viewed as the breaking or disconnecting of the loving bonds we have with people. Connections that made us feel, literally, united and provided us with a sense of harmony with those people closest to us in our lives. Focusing on the significance of connections in our affective lives, at both the ontic and ontological levels, has been one of the common threads that runs through the thesis.

I moved on in Part A) to consider the second key emotion under examination in the thesis, guilt; and how it is described by cognitivists in terms of its everyday, ontic affective role in our lives and within the parameters of the biological, neurological, cultural and cognitive spheres. Once I had outlined the composition of guilt from the cognitive perspective I was then in a position to raise a number of questions of that theory and, later, to examine, from an ontological perspective, the Heideggerian analysis of this emotion/mood. In contrast to cognitivism, the account detailed in *BT* is of Dasein's "Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity", which means Dasein is ontologically guilty from the ground up and not simply because it has transgressed moral rules or non-moral obligations.

In Part B) 1: I defended Heidegger's pre-cognitive and ontologically important description of moods by suggesting a reading of guilt that, firstly, introduced a distinction between simple and complex guilt/lack and, secondly, by using this distinction to accurately interpret and describe just what Heidegger means when he talks of moods as distinct from feelings and emotions. Guilt, for instance, can be either a simple mood, that is, when it is an emotion (e.g. when one has violated a legal ordinate one previously adhered to and one is aware of this fact); or it can be a complex mood, that is, when it is an ontological response (e.g. primordial guilt's attuning, disclosing and revealing of the raw facticity of life, our thrown Being-in-the-world and its being defined in terms of Being-the-basis-of-a-nullity). I went on to detail further important related concepts in *BT*, by

scrutinizing, for example, the 'voice of conscience' and 'anticipatory resoluteness'. At this point, I made it clear that within Heidegger's fundamental ontology is revealed a unique understanding of moods which was helpful in moving us beyond the limits exposed in the causal-evaluative theory.

In Part B) 2: I looked at the non-propositional theorists offered by Goldie and Griffiths and suggested that despite their descriptions being more subtle than either the strong or hybrid accounts, they were still given at the ontic rather than ontological level and so could not be compared with Heidegger's analysis of emotion/mood in *BT*. I pin-pointed a number of core deficiencies in the cognitivist, and non-propositional, accounts of the emotion objectless fear, and I detailed how they (like Lyons) confuse nescience with near nescience, before illustrating how their analysis of this emotion (though they do not recognise it) actually comes closer to Heidegger's account of the mood *Angst* in *BT*. I discussed, and refuted, the cognitivists and Charles Taylor's suggestion that the object of an objectless emotion is only vague rather than non-existent, and how this position leads to a contradictory account of vague-object directedness for objectless fear. I also registered their attempt to re-label these emotions by recording their suggestion that when an object is so general as to be about 'how the world is', then, it is most likely a mood. I posited the idea that real objectless fear only becomes meaningful when viewed as an ontological concern and noted how this idea is reinforced by Heidegger's treatment of the concept *Angst* in *BT*.

I discussed Taylor's attempt to shoe-horn Heidegger's analysis into a cognitive description by stressing the role of cultural conditioning and argued that this attempt was a misconstruing of Heidegger's basic consideration of Dasein's Being-in-the-world and the ontological role of moods in our everyday concernful-solicitous activities. Heidegger's desire, I contended, was to show how attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) lies beyond the realm of cognition and that cultural conditioning occurs only at the ontic level of Dasein's 'they'-self and so mood, as distinct from emotion, cannot be reduced to cognitive concepts, such as sense, awareness or knowledge. I also drew attention to Taylor's casual disregard for the distinction between *Situation* and *Lage*, his cavalier use of affective terms as equivalents, and his not registering the distinction between what I have called 'simple' and 'complex' emotions/moods, that is, cognitive emotions and Heideggerian moods, all of which leads to a failed attempt to equate 'attunement' with 'awareness'.

I proceeded in Part C) to interpret and articulate Heidegger's unique understanding of objectless fear or *Angst* (the third major emotion/mood under review in the thesis), along with the critical concepts falling and death, before illustrating how this mood plays a major role in our lives as our basic state of ontological orientation. I looked at how singular Dasein is faced, in *Angst*, with its own thrownness and situatedness and described how, unlike cognitive anxiety, *Angst* stemming from Dasein's projection into future possibilities and the overriding possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein (i.e. death), is a fundamental threat to our conformity in the 'they'. *Angst's* potency has the highest significance for us as we are brought face to face with ourselves Being-in-the-world.

On the back of these remarks, I argued that the objectless fear spoken of by cognitivists (and Charles Taylor) is, in fact, a fear of not grasping, not being able to grasp, the meaning of fear. That is, an ontological fear of having rejected or forgotten what it is 'to be' - the forgetting of Being. For Heidegger *Angst* is a mood, understood, not in the limited way cognitivists use the terms anxiety or objectless fear, but as a means of supplying us with our total orientation, revealing the "co-presence of all things in a way more comprehensive than any comprehension, more immediate than any perception" (Haar, 1992, 159).

The underlying premise of this thesis is my contention that despite the merits of cognitivism, it nevertheless misidentifies a group of emotions that are made more intelligible when worked out in Heideggerian terms. By focusing on the emotions grief, guilt and objectless fear I have brought to light a number of serious short-comings within the cognitive theory and of its approach to emotional analysis more broadly. Some of these problems find solutions, I claim, when brought within the scope of an ontological analysis, and specifically when *BT* is interpreted and read in the manner I have described.

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